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ABSTRACT

Do perceptions of corruption affect external political efficacy? If so, how? This paper
investigates whether perceptions of corruption contribute to external efficacy on the aggregate,
country level, and on the individual level. This paper seeks to expand the scope of the current
corruption and efficacy literatures by examining, on the aggregate level, ninety five countries,
and on the individual level, all available barometer surveys from the period of 2000-2012.
Methods of analysis include time series, standard OLS, and hierarchical, or multilevel, modeling.
In addition to the primary research question, this paper investigates the potential interactions
between perceptions of corruption and press freedom, trust in media, and socioeconomic status.
On the aggregate level, this paper finds no statistically significant relationship between
perceptions of corruption and external political efficacy. On the individual level, this paper
consistently finds a statistically significant relationship between perceptions of corruption and
external political efficacy. Moreover, the interactions between perceptions of corruption and
trust in media, and socioeconomic status, were generally statistically significant, indicating that
the magnitude of the effect that perceptions of corruption have on external efficacy does change
based upon one’s socioeconomic status and/or trust in media. This paper tests and verifies the
philosophical assumptions that perceptions of corruption contribute to external political efficacy,
and is therefore a threat to, in particular, democratic legitimacy.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION1

“The corruption of the best things give rise to the worst.”
– David Hume
Political corruption is a worldwide phenomenon. There are no governments or territorial
boundaries able to keep it at bay. It is pervasive. This pervasiveness is what makes it all the
more interesting for study; it is not isolated to one culture, government, regime, or marketplace.
It is a universal concern. Corruption affects countries struggling with democratic transition and
internal stability, such as Brazil and Mexico, alongside those that are already well established,
such as Canada and the United States (Morris, 19992; Power & Taylor, 2011; Blais et al., 2005;
Evans, 2004, Sun & Johnston 2009). Likewise, it affects countries that are not democratic at all,
such as China, or those that are only questionably so, like Russia. It is indiscriminate in its
ability to infiltrate society. Corruption is a topic of considerable depth that has not been fully
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My many thanks to the committee that assisted in the development and editing of this work: Professors Guo,
Cooper, Love, and Weber of the University of Mississippi – Oxford. Without their input this work would not have
come to fruition.
2
This essay contains references to two different Morris’. To distinguish between them due to overlap in publishing
years, they are referred to as J. Morris and S. Morris in short of Jonathan Morris and Stephan Morris respectively.
1

realized or explored; some facets of which could be important for other topics in political
science, namely political efficacy and democratic legitimacy. Due to the multifaceted nature of
corruption, in addition to its seedy nature, a variety of unorthodox methods must be employed to
adequately measure it for the purposes of this study. These methods are explored in more detail
in the appropriate chapters and sections. The central focus of this dissertation is the
examinationof perceptions of corruption and external political efficacy; specifically, whether
perceptions of corruption alter external political efficacy on two levels: the country and the
individual. The reason for this, besides absence in the literature, is to determine whether or not
the perception of corruption in government has a deleterious effect upon, particularly democratic,
regime stability.
Corruption as a topic for political science has been explored extensively over the past
forty years and from various angles, but using perceptions of corruption is relatively new; this
could be as important, if not more important, than actual instances of corruption, such as
scandals, and particularly from the standpoint of trust in government and system legitimacy, both
important aspects of regime stability, especially in democracies (Morris & Klesner 2010). Even
in the event that no corruption can be demonstrated, there could still be a persistent underlying
belief that corruption exists. This is the basis of such common cynicism in the American
electorate, among others, that cries “they’re all crooks” in reference to politicians, and to “throw
the rascals out” as a solution. If corruption comes to light then it is usually fought, but this is the
primary issue with corruption as a phenomenon – it, like criminality, can be difficult to gauge
since it must first be discovered and uncovered. For example, according to hypothetical police
reports an area may be safe, based on arrests of criminals and estimated deterrence of further
criminality. Yet this is only part of the idea or feeling of safety in the public. Even if the police
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force is effective on paper it may not contribute to the notion that an area feels safe; the data at
this point only speaks to the ability of the department to deal with criminality that has already
been discovered. The same principle applies to considerations of corruption. Much like with
standard criminality, corruption exists in two official states: discovered and undiscovered, which
is to say that discovered corruption and criminality can and often will be pursued and dealt with
whereas undiscovered corruption and criminality will not be.3 Much hinges on the knowledge of
whether either is officially known. Crime and corruption that is not officially discovered still
exists and the degree of which is always a matter for investigation and interpretation. This is the
purpose of investigation of and vigilance to corruption in the real world.
Corruption by itself is difficult to measure as scholars have aptly noted (Peters & Welch,
1978; Fackler & Lin, 1995; Williams, 1999a; Warren, 2004; Bukovansky, 2006). Troubles range
from the purely subjective nature of corruption to the fact that corruption is in and of itself seedy;
its existence, though known on some level, is largely an enigma when it comes down to locating
it, as discussed above. It exists in the shadows until it is exposed but its effects are felt both
before coming to light and after – it is only after that it is recognized and appropriately labeled as
the cause or effect of other issues. In consequence, it is necessary to find a means of gauging
corruption without resorting to outward signs of it, such as through news media, police records,
litigation, or scandals. The most appropriate measure of corruption, then, is perception of
corruption. Measuring corruption as perceptions of corruption cuts through otherwise restrictive
methodological barriers, such as cultural relativity4, or a uniform measurement of discovered

There is also a third option: that neither would be investigated – but that would be an indication of corruption in
and of itself if discovered.
4
What is regarded as corrupt in America, such as a moral infraction by the President, may not be regarded as such in
France, Italy, or India, for example. A French President may not be held to the same moral standard as an American
President; likewise, professional standards may simply be different. What may be unethical in one location may be
acceptable, or at least tolerated, in another.
3
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corruption, such as police records or scandals5. Furthermore, another advantage is that
perceptions themselves give rise to attitudes, and from attitudes, action; thus measuring the
perceptions of corruption for a person or group can better enable predictions to be made upon
their potential behavior. One of the most important attitudes for political behavior and regime
stability is external efficacy, and it is this attitude that takes central focus alongside corruption
for the duration of this essay.
Political efficacy is, at its most basic level, how much a person believes he or she can, if
desired, “influence governmental decisions” (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 83). To that end there are
two different types of political efficacy: internal and external. Internal efficacy refers to a
person’s self-determined competence and knowledge of politics, and the person’s perceived
political influence. External efficacy refers to a person’s confidence that the government,
political system, and regime are responsive to the person and his or her associated demographic;
be it race, religion, class, sex, etc. (Valentino, Gregorwicz, & Groenendyk, 2009, p. 308).
External efficacy is the primary point of interest for this paper next to corruption.
Whether a person believes that government is responsive to his, her, or like peoples wishes, is an
important consideration for potential behavior. Do perceptions of corruption in government
contribute to a decline in external efficacy? Does it contribute at all? In other words, if people
perceive that the government is corrupt, are they likely to disengage with the system because
government or leaders do not seem responsive? If so, does this harm the government and/or
regime?

5

Scandals are discovered incidences of corruption but also tend to be grandiose. Corruption does not have to be an
extraordinary media event. It can as subtle as bribing or otherwise coercing a police officer to ‘look the other way’
to get out of a speeding ticket. Scandals are not always incidences of corruption, either, as any casual look to
tabloids would show.
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A practical investigation of the particulars of this essay is to determine potential linkage,
if any, between perceptions of corruption, political efficacy, and governmental instability; in
particular, instability in democratic regimes. Given the assertions of Morris & Klesner (2010)
that democracy is at particular risk of the effects of corruption for regime stability, it stands to
reason that it could be an important issue for this area, which has been largely left uninvestigated
by literature beyond broad consensus that corruption is normatively (that is, morally and
philosophically) bad for democratic politics6. The mechanism for investigating this is whether
perceptions of corruption contribute to external political efficacy, and from there, government
instability and potential regime change. It may be the case that perceptions of corruption in
government are a non-issue for stability at large, but this will not be known until it is properly
investigated.
It is likely a near universal viewpoint that corruption is bad, but the reality of whether
corruption is or is not important for matters of political efficacy, itself an important factor in a
multitude of other political issues, is sorely lacking in the literature and deserves further
examination. If citizens do not believe that their governments are responsive to people like them
because they see it, that is, they perceive it, to be a corrupt institution that benefits the few at the
expense of the many, this threatens to undermine government legitimacy and perhaps even the
regime’s legitimacy as well. If the corruption persists beyond an immediate government, such as
a particular administration, then it is a natural extension for citizens to blame the political
system, the regime, itself for the problems. This is the fundamental logic that fuels this study.
Put simply, this essay seeks to answer the following questions:

Does perceived corruption affect external political efficacy? If so, how?
6

Evans (2004) is a notable exception to this. She argues that corruption is good, though this is isolated to the
American case, which is considerably gridlocked without ‘greasing the wheels.’
5

Considering the importance of political efficacy on regime change, answering the
questions above can have a number of implications. First, if perceptions of corruption contribute
to a decline in external political efficacy, then perceptions of corruption can be indirectly linked
to potential government instability and regime change. Such a link would heighten the
theoretical and practical threat of corruption for governance, and thus for anti-corruption
measures in regime stability considerations and especially democracies, per contentions of
Morris & Klesner (2010). Second, if perceptions of corruption do not contribute to a decline in
external political efficacy then perhaps it has an effect independent of political efficacy upon the
government and regime, though this is unexplored in this paper.
Much of the literature has tended to focus upon individual countries, regions, or subregions in both corruption and efficacy literatures. The United States, in particular, has extensive
and exclusive discussion for itself and the field at large. This study, in contrast, seeks to expand
the scope of the corruption and efficacy investigation as broadly as possible. Individual regions
and countries are controlled for due to their natural importance, but the central research question
is not inherently limited by geography.

6

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL CORRUPTION

“Corruption is like a ball of snow, once it’s set a rolling it must increase.”
– Charles Caleb Colton
The words of Colton are ominous but, thankfully, not necessarily true. Corruption need
not continue if citizens and governments seek to curtail, prevent, or destroy it. Through exposure
corruption is already fought by the likes of law enforcement, investigative committees, active
judiciaries, and vigilant citizenry. It is in government, business, democracy, and
authoritarianism. It can exist on an individual, collective, or institutional level. As stated before:
it is an all pervasive force. Is it good? Bad? Most would say no, it is not good; corruption is an
affliction to be rid of. For some, though, especially those benefiting, corruption is good. If not
good, then it is at least not quite so bad after all. In terms of academic literature, there is near
universal consensus that corruption is a negative, especially in the long term – both in terms of
politics and in economics, the latter of which is the usual scapegoat for why corruption should be
permitted to continue.
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Though this paper does not seek to contribute to the normative argument over whether
corruption is good or bad directly, it does work from an understanding that, consistent with much
of the established literature, corruption does seem to be bad, and should thus be treated as such
from a practical, public policy stand point, and especially in democracies. Given the perks of
doing research in a regime that values both individual self-determinism and protection from
government, it would stand to reason that authorship of this essay be colored by the fact that an
opportunity even exists to research it without persecution. As such, corruption, particularly as it
relates to its effects upon democratic governance, takes center stage in much analysis. In review
of the literature, it is clear that this admitted bias is not an isolated case.

Corruption at Large
As Peters & Welch (1978) note, “serious examination of corruption in America occurs
largely at those times when particularly venal acts have been exposed” (Peters & Welch, 1978, p.
974). Yet it must be understood that corruption itself is not an isolated or rare phenomenon,
within America or a single point in time. It is a pervasive force that is not limited to place or
time. This is the impetus for Peters & Welch’s (1978) work. They developed a systematic
definition for corruption in order to better promote additional research. They define it as: the
donor, the favor, the public official, and the payoff (Ibid., pp. 975-978). From an early stage in
political science literature corruption is not isolated to a public official acting alone; it is an
interaction between an official and an interested party, such as a wealthy constituent. Regarding
serious examination after certain acts are exposed, this is the traditional reasoning behind
research in the area of corruption. Why bother unless it is topical? The problem with this
reactionary analysis is that it only investigates a brief period of corruption that has, most
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importantly, already been exposed. The nature of corruption is based entirely on not being
exposed, and thus more attention should be paid to corruption and how it is investigated.
Redlawsk & McCann (2005) offer additional and more recent nuance into the
aforementioned definition. They illustrate that, at least within the confines of the United States,
citizens have two fundamental definitions for what constitutes corruption: favoritism and law
breaking. This is consistent with the Peters & Welch (1978) conceptualization since providing a
favor for an interested party, the donor, can be favoritism and illegal due to, for example, a
conflict of interest. The most important contribution that Redlawsk & McCann offer, however,
is that there appears to be a preference for one definition over another in accordance with voting
groups. Those whom are more likely to vote for liberal, or leftist candidates coincide with those
who regard favoritism as the primary means of corruption. For those who regard mere illegality
as evidence of corruption, voting preference is more mainstream – and voters are likely to
support either major party in American politics. Illegality, in other words, is a more uniform
definition for corruption whereas favoritism tends to be a liberal concern. Still, the very fact that
such a distinction exists is important. Why should corruption have such a variable definition?
Moreover, why should this definition change? This is an example of cultural relativity on a
micro-scale. For American liberals, favoritism is as corrupt as illegality. For all other
Americans of differing political attitudes, illegality is the norm of corruption. If such is the case,
then only when favoritism is actually illegal should these definitions overlap. Perhaps more
important than that, however, is that an act of corruption need not be illegal for it to still be
evidence of corruption. The definition, despite being given nuance by these authors, has become
muddled. This can be problematic for empirical purposes.

9

Johnston (1983), using Elazar’s cultural classification schema, finds additional evidence
for certain groups regarding corruption differently. Johnston’s focus, however, is convictions of
corruption. Interestingly, moralistic subcultures within the United States, which are historically
rooted from Scandinavian regions of the world, have the highest rate of convictions. These
cultures also tend to be the most politically liberal – and, when coupled with the findings of
Redlawsk & McCann (2005), indicate that corruption as favoritism may be regarded as the most
easily punishable form. Pure illegality, in contrast, may be harder to prove. This serves as an
example of how complicated considerations of definition and measurement are for corruption at
large. If culture is highly important, as Johnston argues, but cultures have different conceptions
of corruption and, in addition, varying rates of conviction – for whatever sundry of reasons – a
uniform measurement of definition would have to account or bypass cultural barriers.
There is an additional conception of corruption, however, that greatly alters its theoretical
importance to the field of political science. Fackler & Lin (1995), investigating voter decision
calculus, argue that corruption – either perceived or evident – is an important part for voting
calculations when combined with traditional economic (rational choice) motivations for voting
decisions. The authors regard corruption in this way as information exchange; that corruption, or
more specifically the label of ‘corrupt’ is the means of identifying the value of a candidate for
voters. This conceptually links the existence of corruption to voting, and thus to democratic
institutions. From this theoretical link practical considerations can be better understood,
particularly in the realm of corruption and governance, especially in democracies. Indeed, it is
this area that allows corruption to be linked to political efficacy and democratic legitimacy,
which Sun & Johnston (2009) explicate below.
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Sun & Johnston (2009) open their work by declaring “[d]emocracy is widely expected to
restrain corruption” because “[d]emocratic institutions and politics make it more likely that
corruption will be discovered and publicized, allow citizens and political oppositions to make an
issue of corruption, and facilitate recourse ranging from public hearings to voting the scoundrels
out” (Sun & Johnston, Does Democracy Check Corruption? Insights from China and India, 2009,
p. 1). In other words, democracy provides both the institutions and ideal culture to combat
corruption. At least, this is the idea. Sun & Johnston (2006) investigate whether democracy
does in fact combat corruption in an examination of two case studies: India and China. These
cases are interesting, especially since China is not a democratic regime. Despite not being a
democratic regime, China is experimenting with liberalization, and so one policy that often goes
hand-in-hand with democratization serves to be tested. Sun & Johnston (2009) finding is
startling for those who contend that democracy curtails corruption simply by being democracy.
Despite the philosophical claims to the contrary, democracy is not found to assist in combating
corruption. In the case of India, in particular, the conditions, if anything, are conducive to
sustaining corruption instead of eliminating it. The authors find that “[a] poor and unregulated
democracy, it seems, can undermine liberty and the rule of law while prolonging the cycle of
underdevelopment and corruption” (Ibid., p. 16). The authors note that liberalization should be
promoted over democratization in terms of priority versus corruption. In China, the authors find
that within their authoritarian framework the middle and upper leadership can insulate
themselves from corruption whereas democratic institutions, such as those in India, are more
porous and thus subject to greater spread of corruption. For Indians attempting to oust corrupt
politicians or entire governments and administrations, choices can be between one corrupt party
and another corrupt party, which lends itself to citizen disillusionment. For China, and perhaps
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due to historically and uniquely Chinese arrangements, corruption is expected to be fought and
exposed by the Communist Party and the media, the latter of which is under the thumb of the
Party. Keeping the Communist Party clean adds to its credibility and legitimacy, thus
contributing to regime stability (Ibid., pp. 13-15). Combining these two cases, the authors find
that corruption contributes modestly to regime stability. Given that only two cases were
examined, however, this finding is unsurprising. The qualitative findings comparing China and
India in particular, however, remain quite interesting. The implications of democracy in India
not combatting corruption due to the governance there reaching a saturation point of corruption is
telling: democracy’s susceptibility to corruption is threatening. Albeit not explicitly examined,
the potential impact that such pervasive perceptions of corruption have on the general
population’s external efficacy is worth further exploration; and this work serves to further
motivate the central investigation of this essay.
Given the philosophical and theoretical importance of democracy being corruption free,
many studies focus upon research in democratic regimes. Likewise, much corruption research is
done, much as Peters & Welch (1978) claim, after corruption has been exposed in these regimes,
no matter the form it takes. Underkuffler (2009) notes that definitions of corruption become
important here, since corruption can be shows of favoritism or illegality; pork barrel
expenditures, for example, can be regarded as corrupt yet it is not illegal, though it may show
favoritism. Evans (2004) speaks to this point, as she argues the importance of pork barrel
politics to American government; though it may be a show of favoritism to some degree, and
thus regarded as potentially corrupt, it is desirable for its practical benefits.
Voting and campaigning are also areas where corruption research has provided fruitful
insight. Allegations of corruption during campaigning can, depending upon the country, result in
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a measurable decrease in support for candidates and parties. Citizen backlash to corruption does
seem to occur, though the degree of the response seems entirely dependent upon the country of
origin and the contexts of the alleged corruption. For example, an American Congressman,
depending upon the party, will suffer an average of 6-11 points dropped due to allegations of
corruption, whereas Canadian politics seems far more sensitive, where entire parties can collapse
(Peters & Welch, 1980; Redlawsk & McCann, 2005; Johnston, 1983; Blais et al., 2005). The
other side of the spectrum would show that Greek politics is highly tolerant of corruption, at least
in terms of voting results.
Corruption is also important on the globalization front; particularly in the economic
aspect of it. The role of the multi-national corporation (MNC), in particular, is worth noting.
There are two facets to the importance of corruption and globalization: practical and normative.
On the practical side, corruption “distorts markets and competition, breeds cynicism among
citizens, undermines the rule of law, damages governmental legitimacy, and corrodes the
integrity of the private sector. It is also a major barrier to development” (Heineman, 2009, p.
360). As these relate to the role of multi-national corporations, the use of corrupt practices
should be curtailed, normatively, and must be curtailed for greater efficiency in development by
traditional measurements, such as GDP. For MNCs, particularly those whose wealth and
influence are greater than the GDPs of some countries, the need “to create a ‘high performance
with high integrity’ global culture” will provide stable, non-corrupt norms to business with the
understanding of the practical – that is, in support of long-term profitability – benefits that go
along with it (Ibid.). Williams (1999b) and Sandholtz & Gray (2003) complement this stance by
noting the importance of globalization, both in terms of corporate involvement and international
pressure in economic development, and thus anti-corruption efforts overall. Corruption is
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regarded as normatively problematic with practical consequences generally speaking, though
there exists exception to this rule.
Harrison (1999), in his examination of Mozambique during its democratization and
liberalization period, finds a relationship between liberalization and corruption that does not
behave as expected. He does not focus upon the measurement or repercussions of corruption but
instead focuses on the politics of it. Corruption in this case, he finds, enhances the liberalization
already taking place in the country. Corruption, Harrison argues, is a means of increasing
personal satisfaction due to unfinished transitional norms in the presence of structural and legal
uncertainty (Harrison, 1999, pp. 537-538). Thus, it is not simply a negative force with antidemocratic or anti-liberalization effects, but also a means for citizens to get around cumbersome,
finished or unfinished, structures to obtain goods and services required that may take far more
effort and resources when conducted more legitimately. This hearkens back to words of the
Roman scholar Tacitus who famously stated “[t]he more corrupt the state, the more numerous
the laws.” In essence, the framework of government can be unnecessarily burdensome. For
Harrison’s study of Mozambique, this regards a state in transition. For the average citizen,
perhaps it is simply beyond condition and understanding to participate in what is being
constructed; they must operate as they know at the time. Furthermore, one acts to achieve a goal
in the most rational means possible – and if engaging in a liberal marketplace, particularly one
that is not yet fully established, is simply too burdensome next to engaging in otherwise ‘corrupt’
practices, who is to say that this is wrong? The underlying logic of Harrison’s assertions are
very much consistent with rational economic reasoning.
Here the normative aspects of corruption become entangled with the empirics. Johnston
(1986) notes this trend nearly thirty years ago and determines to classify the various corruption
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camps. First, he identifies the moralist camp, who argue that “corruption is harmful to societies
and governments, impeding development and eroding the legitimacy even of honest elites and
well-run institutions” (Johnston, The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment,
1986, p. 459). Second, the revisionists camp, who “point to possible benefits of corruption,
suggesting that it can speed up cumbersome procedures, buy political access for the excluded,
and perhaps even produce de facto policies more effective than those emerging from legitimate
channels” (Ibid.). Third, he acknowledges a camp that he leaves without a name which simply
argue that whether corruption is good or bad, beneficial or detrimental, depends upon a number
of political conditions in the case being studied, e.g.: “the balance of political and economic
opportunities, levels of economic development, national integration, and governmental capacity,
or upon the relationships among key factions and elites” (Ibid.). These classifications have clear
ontological delineations: moralists approach corruption as a normative bad, and thus all research
is presupposed to unveil corruption and curtail it. Revisionists, in contrast, focus upon the
practical effects that corruption has on a particular topic. Perhaps corruption ‘greases the
wheels’ of politics, increasing efficiency and reducing gridlock. Does this not make corruption
desirable? Therein lies the issue: it is a clash of philosophy and practicality. Perhaps corruption
does in-fact reduce gridlock and increases efficiency in government bureaucracy, for example –
but in principle, a moralist would counter, the moral cost is too substantial, and thus corruption is
still bad. The third, unnamed group that Johnston identifies are not necessarily a mix of either,
but more-so neutral observers. Instead of casting judgment through matters of efficiency, ethics,
or morality – judgment is based entirely off of a case-by-case analysis. Perhaps in the United
States corruption is detrimental, both in terms of morality and efficiency, but in Estonia it is
morally irrelevant with great gains in efficiency, or is merely more socially acceptable (Tavits
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2010; Carlin 2013). This establishes conditionality when and where corruption could be
regarded as desirable.
Consistent with the potentiality that corruption may not always be a negative for
democracy or liberalization, Moran (1999) shows how corruption changed South Korea and the
Philippines from the 1960s-1990s. Johnston (1986) would classify Moran’s work within the
neutral, unnamed camp where corruption being good or bad must be determined on a case-bycase basis. In his study Moran repeatedly finds the interaction of business interests and
corruption in government, and a soft, that is to say largely ineffectual, judiciary which will not
punish corruption on economic grounds. The perceived benefits of permitting corruption
between the government and relevant businesses were thought to outweigh the costs of
corruption. Though at times this is seen as an accurate analysis, Moran ultimately concludes by
noting the problems of economic growth once corruption took root, particularly in the
Philippines (Moran, 1999, pp. 582-583). Further growth can only be accomplished by uprooting
the businesses and their political cronies who perpetuate illicit favoritism. Since growth is
desirable, the presence of corruption is regarded as a net negative in the end, after an extensive
historical analysis. Moran’s (1999) findings, particularly when combined with those of Harrison
(1999), indicate that while corruption may not always be a negative – at first – it tends to end in
this way as it saps the potential growth and vitality from governments and economies. The same
combination of findings are true in other areas and with other case studies, such as Mexico,
Indonesia, China, Russia, Brazil, India, and Estonia (see: S. Morris 1999; 2009, Robertson-Snape
1999, Tay & Seda 2003, Sun 2004, Rose-Ackerman 2006, Power & Taylor 2011, Neild 2002,
Heidenheimer & Johnston 2005, Tavits 2010). The short list of pros and cons of corruption as it
relates to economics are: short term benefits in terms of growth and ease, particularly in markets
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transitioning to liberal norms, but with long-term drawbacks. Corruption in economics is thus
ultimately self-defeating if the end goal is economic growth and prosperity.
The primary means of identifying corruption is, as has been noted, exposed corruption.
This is not the sole means of doing so. Likewise, as Harrison (1999) discovers and as Moran
(1999) conditionally finds, corruption is not necessarily a negative trait. Perhaps corruption has
short term benefits, as Moran finds, or perhaps corruption alleviates the harshness of regime
transition. Perhaps not. The normative nature of corruption always leaves one question that
demands to be answered, even in times when corruption seems harmless or beneficial: Does it
not depend upon who is being asked? The crooked police officer or politician, one who is not
exposed, would surely see the benefits in his or her corrupt activities. The other involved in the
act, say a corporate beneficiary – would this beneficiary not also regard such corruption as
inherently good? Rationally speaking of course both parties would see this as ‘good’ and
desirable – up until being exposed. Therein lies the trouble with much of the existing corruption
literature: it is entirely dependent upon the world of exposed corruption. Reliance upon charges,
convictions, journalistic reporting, and media spectacles are norms for measuring what
constitutes corruption around the world. There is one other means of doing so, however, that
exists outside of these strictly exposed acts of corruption: perceptions of corruption.

Perceptions of Corruption
The perceptions of corruption literature is not nearly as extensive as the general
corruption literature and is, in fact, far more recent. The bulk of it has been done recently and by
a small group of scholars, most notably S. Morris and Klesner. S. Morris, in particular, has an
extensive history of studying corruption; his case of choice since the 1980s being Mexico. The
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scope of studies dealing with perceptions of corruption are small but significant. They are
explored in more detail below.
First, a recent seminal work on corruption by S. Morris (2009), Political Corruption in
Mexico. Morris investigates political corruption in Mexico through the lens of perceptions of
corruption and during a period of ongoing democratization; he acknowledges, though, that there
are other ways to measure this and actively does so for sake of greater analysis into his case
study. In addition to perceptions of corruption, Morris uses participations in corruption and
patterns of corruption for his analysis. The most substantive finding of his study, however, is
with his investigation into perceptions. Using this lens, he finds that, “[d]espite democratization,
corruption clearly remains a prominent feature of Mexican politics” (Morris S. , 2009, p. 229).
This is an important finding for the field of corruption but also for the use of perceptions of
corruption as a useful measure. Firstly, democratization itself is seen as a force to impede the
growth and prevalence of corruption – and to find a case where this is not true is startling. The
literature holds a general consensus that democracy tends to hinder corruption when compared to
alternatives (Johnston 2005, S. Morris 2009, Sun & Johnston 2009, Power & Taylor 2011). S.
Morris asserts that “[i]n addition to its structural and institutional effects, democracy also works
to curb corruption by way of its ideological and cultural foundation” (Morris S. , 2009, p. 6).
Consistent with commentary made earlier, Morris continues, stating that “[t]he philosophical,
normative discourse informing the institutions of democracy privileges basic notions of equality
and justice, of citizenship, and of openness and accountability: values clearly antithetical to
corruption” (Ibid.). In other words, the very nature of democracy is unconducive to the spread of
corruption.
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The very philosophical ideals of democracy that are meant to curb corruption, however,
are also especially vulnerable to it. Thus, as S. Morris finds, the prevalence of corruption in
Mexico undermines the democratic nature of its politics. The general public generally perceives
the government, or specifically politicians and police officers, as not acting in the interest of the
public, but for themselves (Ibid., p. 229). The effect is twofold: first, that corruption is
propagated by the very institutions (democratic) that were supposed to eliminate it; and two, that
corruption remains or increases because the general perception is that it will not go anywhere.
The attitudes held by both experts and the general population in Mexico is that politics and those
within politics are corrupt, and thus they have no interest in curbing this corruption. Similar to
the quote by Oscar Wilde that “the bureaucracy is expanding to meet the needs of the expanding
bureaucracy,” perceptions of corruption are perpetuating its spread by virtue of the expectation
of it (Ibid., pp. 133-147). In other words, Mexico is corrupt because that is simply the way it is;
that is the norm, it has become socialized (Carlin, 2013). As a result of expectations of
corruption it has created a sort of tolerance for it. Consistent with S. Morris’s (2009) findings, it
is understandable why trust and confidence in government are so low in Mexico; particularly for
those who perceive politics as corrupt. Again, Morris finds that those who did have such
perceptions held lower trust and satisfaction with democracy and the government or
administration currently in power (S. Morris, pp. 154-155).
Tavits (2007a) investigates the effects of corruption on the subjective well-being of the
citizenry. She finds that for those in a clean system the subjective well-being measures are high
but gets even higher if a person’s preferred political party is in power. Perhaps most compelling
of this study, however, is in the finding that when governments are corrupt, having one’s
preferred political party in power did not increase one’s subjective well-being. In other words,

19

the corruption overrode the feelings of subjective well-being that would normally surface if a
person had his or her preferred party in office. Corruption, then, has a deleterious effect on the
subjective well-being of citizens in democratic regimes. Presumably, given the rate of
corruption being higher in non-democracies and the general (though not uniform) absence of
voting and political parties in non-democratic regimes, subjective well-being will generally be
low in non-democracies than democracies.
The link between corruption and trust in government is noted elsewhere in the literature
as well, and not exclusively a finding in S. Morris’s study of Mexico. Seligson (2002) finds that
experiences of corruption lower perceptions of regime legitimacy and lowers interpersonal trust
in general. Bowler & Karp (2004) find that reported instances of corruption contributes to the
general perceptions of corruption in the citizenry; and thus they have lower trust in government
and in the system at large. S. Morris & Klesner (2010), again analyzing Mexico, report directly
on the perceptions of corruption issue and find that perceptions of corruption lowers trust in
government, but also the other way around as mentioned above. The relationship between
perceptions of corruption and trust in government is a circular issue; they feed into one another
which compound the problem further. Their finding epitomizes the attitude indicated by
Colton’s quote at the beginning of this chapter regarding corruption as a snowball.
Voter apathy is the citizen attitude towards government and the political system whereas
voter turnout is citizen behavior, or actual engagement with the political system. The difference
between the two is important and are kept separate for this reason. Voter apathy is linked to
perceptions of corruption in Anderson & Tverdova (2003), which attributes rises in corruption to
more negative citizen attitudes towards their governments in sixteen democracies worldwide.
Likewise, Canache & Allison (2005) find similar links but isolated to South America.
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Corruption breeds negative attitudes towards government both systemically and with individual
governments. These issues of voter apathy and turnout are particularly important for democratic
regime stability and change. This is discussed in more detail in chapter 3.
Voter turnout and perceptions of corruption are a different issue. Dobratz & Whitfield
(1992), examining Greece, find that charges of corruption (and thus increased perceptions of
corruption) do not positively or negatively impact the voter turnout in the country. This is an
unexpected finding. Despite the seriousness of the allegation of corruption, it does not appear
that these charges are important enough to influence voter behavior in that place or time. This
investigation was isolated to Greece, but if the conclusions are indeed broadly applicable, then
the implications are several-fold. First, assuming charges of corruption contributed to overall
perceptions of corruption in the general population, then these charges were not significant
enough motivators for altering voting behavior; in essence, a politician can disregard charges of
corruption as important to an election. Second, charges of corruption may not contribute to
overall perceptions of corruption and this is why it is unimportant in the formation of voting
behavior. Either implication is interesting and potentially important. It is a pity that this study
has not been more broadly examined.
Meier & Holbrook (1992), building upon Johnston (1983), in contrast to Dobratz &
Whitfield above, find that in the United States corruption depresses voter turnout. Again, much
like the case of Greece, this is not a cross-national study, but the implications are again
noteworthy, particularly for democratic regimes assuming a degree of broad applicability. Are
the differences between the two studies due to case selection? Certainly. But gaining two
distinct findings provides a clue that perhaps the effects of corruption depend upon other factors.
What these factors are is certainly open for investigation. Is it prevailing political culture? Some
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structural determinant? The nature of the corruption charges themselves – such as whether there
were a string of ‘less’ corrupt activities versus a string of ‘more’ corrupt activities?7 Expanding
the number of cases to determine whether corruption depresses voter turnout writ large would be
a worthwhile addition to the field.
It is important to note that there are some nondemocratic regimes that hold votes of
various kinds as well; voting need not be exclusive to democratic regimes. Take China for
example: there are votes for positions on local levels as well as votes to send members of the
Communist Party, from sub-national levels, to the nation’s capital. In principle, there is no
reason why corruption would not also be applicable to these situations in terms of depressing
voter turnout. There is, granted, an issue of priority for citizenry and their democratic
expectations, but this is a case of voting nonetheless.
Despite the nondemocratic nature of China’s voting, it does have experience with
liberalization, as indicated earlier. Liberalizations relationship with corruption is mixed and
contentious. Certainly, there is evidence to suggest that liberalization assists in curtailing
corruption, yet, as Sun (2004) points out with liberalization in China, it also creates the potential
for “different and even greater expressions of” corruption (Sun, Corruption and Market in
Contemporary China, 2004, p. 193). One of Sun’s most pointed refutations is of the contention
that corruption can increase efficiency (or ‘grease the wheels’) of politics. Observing corruption
over time from socialist economics to its 1990s transition to market liberalization in China, he
argues that:

7

Severity of corruption is difficult to gauge in any uniform consideration; context is always important. For sake of
conceptual understanding, though, compare bribing legislators to get laws passed vs. a regulator looking the other
way on a minor code infraction. The case of bribery seems far more severe, and thus ‘more’ corrupt than the case of
permitting a minor violation of code.
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The incentives for the buyers of corruption (bribe givers) have shifted from mixed benign and unscrupulous
to mostly malevolent over time. In the early reform period, the revisionist argument that bribes help to
overcome structural deficiencies and get around cumbersome bureaucratic regulations was more applicable
to nonstate actors who tried to overcome entry barriers [in] the early days. However, the same argument
applies poorly to the plethora of speculators, fraudulent investors, and producers, smugglers, and tax
cheaters. Instead, the negative effects cited by corruption’s critics are on target. Since the early 1990s,
bribers’ motives have generally corresponded to the characterization of corruption’s critics. Instead of
structural inequalities, favor seekers are now driven by explicitly self-serving advantages: commercial
benefits, monopoly benefits, underhanded competition, property thefts, tax frauds, regulatory oversight, and
judiciary partiality (Ibid., p. 197).

Corruption in China, according to Sun, has been enhanced by the freedom that
liberalization measures have provided, particularly for lower-ranking members of the
government, such as those on local levels. Decentralization of power, in terms of economic
organization and transition from socialist command economics to liberal economics, gave rise to
corruption on these local levels. Thus, in terms of ability for officials to exploit the citizenry, or
extract “rents,” per Rose-Ackerman’s (1999) terminology, decentralized market liberalization
was a boon for self-serving, financial and economical corruption (Sun, Corruption and Market in
Contemporary China, 2004, p. 193). All of these effects of liberalization must be put into
context with the political system it was introduced to, Chinese communism. The effects may be
isolated to this case, but if indeed these are more broadly applicable as Sun seems to indicate in
many of his principle-based arguments, then examination of democracies should resume. If
liberalization, as Sun contends, is the factor that encourages corrupt activities, then the degree of
liberalization could very well be an important determinant for perceiving more or less corruption.
Moreover, democratic governance is historically linked to liberalization, and thus the propensity
for corruption may be present simply due to the presence of liberalization and regardless of the
anti-corruption norms of democratic philosophy. This degree of liberalization question is
included on the country-level analysis in chapter 4 for testing due to its theoretical importance.
Given the potential range of corruption in democracies, what accounts for these
differences? Is case selection, per Meier & Holbrook (1992) and Dobratz & Whitfield (1992) all
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there is? What kinds of democracy are more conducive to corruption? Is there some aspect of
democracy that can increase or decrease it? Tavits (2007b) sought to answer these questions. In
order to do so, she examined how political institutions could influence the level of corruption due
to clarity of responsibility. The ultimate test for such clarity of responsibility lies in voting
patterns. Similar to the findings of Blais et al. (2005) regarding the Canadian electorate’s
response to the Ad-Scandal, Tavits concludes that “[i]f lines of responsibility are clear, it is
easier for voters to identify whom to reward or punish at the polling booths” (Tavits, Clarity of
Responsibility and Corruption, 2007, p. 227). As a result, democracies with greater clarity in
their governing structure will suffer from less corruption because citizens will reward clean
behavior and punish crooked behavior come election time, much as the Canadian Ad-Scandal
demonstrated in the 2004 national election there. In essence, the clearer the responsibility for an
activity, the better able the citizenry is able to reward or punish this activity, regardless of what
the activity may be. This is not a uniform response to corruption, and scandals in particular,
however.
Carlin et al. (Forthcoming; published online in January 2014), examining why scandals
hurt some presidents and not others in Latin America, conclude that it is entirely a function of
whether the economy of the country is doing well or not. If the economy is doing well,
presidents are not punished for scandals as severely, or at all, compared to when economies are
performing poorly. Economics are important here, and further serve to illustrate why such
measurements should be included during any other examination. In other words, money talks;
and economics trump scandals. The same debate exists for the Lewinsky Scandal between Zaller
(1998) and Miller (1999), though conclusions are highly contextualized. Regardless of the
particulars of that scandal, however, a frequent point of note is in how well the American
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economy performed at the time. This positive performance, issues of scandal definition and
severity, and media frenzy aside, helped President Clinton survive the impeachment storm.
The media are helpful in exposing corruption by virtue of their watchdog role in politics;
the aforementioned Lewinsky-Scandal is a standard example of this. Even here, however, with
media functioning in the classical role, there is reason for pause in its effectiveness for holding
government and its officials responsible. Porto (2011), examining Brazil, seeks to answer the
question, “[d]o more denunciations [from media] necessarily mean better accountability [in
government] (Porto, The Media and Political Accountability, 2011, p. 103)?” His answer is:
sometimes. He warns that “extensive and dramatic news coverage of corruption does not
necessarily lead to improvements in political accountability” because some coverage may
embroil innocents in scandal, damaging reputations of those who are undeserving (Ibid.).
Potentially worse is that an increase in media saturation over corruption can erode public
confidence in democracy itself. For a country in transition such as Brazil, trust in the institution
of democracy is essential for the regimes survival. Combining Porto’s piece with that of Carlin
et al. and the picture of intervening variables becomes clearer when it comes to corruption.
Economic performance and degree of media coverage, and from this, media type, can be
important mediating factors in determining the effect of corruption (and perceptions of it) on
governments. Moreover, context is still important – economics need not be the only concept to
interfere with uniform response to corruption and scandal – and sometimes it is as simple as the
sensitivity of particular populations and their expectations for their governments; this plays to
socialization and expectation of government norms once again (see: Carlin et al., Forthcoming,
Blais et al. 2005, Tavits, 2010, Kee, 2003).
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Tavits (2010) offers some additional insight into corruption, but notably outside of the
traditional system-level or politically-centric realm. Instead, she focuses on why someone would
want to participate in corrupt behavior on the individual level to begin with; specifically,
someone on the outside, such as a wealthy private citizen, bribing a public official. She does
include consideration for the public official engaging in misconduct, but the most telling addition
to the literature is on the outsider. She finds, contrary to literature on social capital and
interpersonal trust, that, at least in her case of Estonia, engaging in corruption has nothing to do
with distrust of the government or one’s peers. Instead, Tavits proposes that engaging in
corruption is a matter of socialization (Tavits, Why Do People Engage in Corruption? The Case
of Estonia, 2010, pp. 1273-1275). Corruption breeds more corruption because a norm is
established that permits it, even if on an unofficial level. Carlin (2013), Johnston (2006), and
Morris (2009) echo these findings of socialization all across Americas. Johnston (2006) rightly
points out that, no matter what the public believes, if the very officials perceived to be corrupt
are the ones writing laws to combat their own corruption, are such measures not merely facades
to placate the electorate?
Tavits (2010) and S. Morris & Klesner (2010) provide two seemingly incompatible
explanations for the same result: corruption occurs due to either a lack of interpersonal trust
which compounds corruption and a decline in interpersonal trust further, or a lack of
interpersonal trust has nothing to do with engaging in corrupt activity – it is merely socialization
and pragmatism. Perhaps both explanations are not incompatible, however. Perhaps they are
merely two additional means for which corruption is pervasive in governance and society. This
can be broken down even further.
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Take socialization for example. Socialization is regarded as the means to spread
corruption as an acceptable norm. On some level, interpersonal trust is required in order to
believe that engaging in this corrupt behavior will not result in personal punishment. After all, if
everyone is engaging in these behaviors, why would any single person, an initiate in particular,
believe that he or she was vulnerable? Socialization to a norm, even an illicit or destructive
norm, requires trust in a system, formal or otherwise, which permits perpetuation. Now, for a
neutral observer, one who is not a part of the socialized norm of corruption, this can still result in
an overall decline of interpersonal trust in a given country. Just because a norm of corruption
exists between, say, national bureaucrats and wealthy businessmen, does not mean that nonbureaucrats and not-so-wealthy businessmen will engage in these practices or even perceive it to
be an acceptable norm. Again, this speaks to the seedy nature of corruption and the required
disclaimer that such socialization may only create and perpetuate a norm that exists on an
unofficial level instead of an official one.
Corruption seems to be able to go anywhere; any regime and any state. How can it be
resolved? Theoretically there are a number of ways this can be resolved, and as indicated
throughout this review of the literature, not all seem to work – at least, not all work at all times.
A solid example of nearly corruption-free governance is the case of Singapore8. Kee (2003)
identifies seven pillars for Singapore’s success against corruption. First, “strong political will
and example of political leaders;” two, “accountable government;” three, “public service
characteristics and ethos;” four, “reduced opportunities and incentives for corruption;” five,
“enhanced likelihood of detection;” six, “swift and severe punishment;” and seven, “strong

Currently (early 2014) ranked in the top 6 cleanest countries in the world according to Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index. It is tied for 5 th place with Norway. Interestingly, 1st and 3rd place are also tied,
leaving no 2nd or 4th places at present.
8
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public support” (Kee, 2003, p. 264). Kee goes into great detail on all seven of these, but here
each will be elaborated upon more concisely. Regarding the first, regarding strong political will;
Kee identifies anti-corruption as a key component of popular parties in power since the late
1950s. Practicing “moral authority” Kee argues, is crucial for stamping out corruption from the
top-down, which Singapore’s government did aggressively and without hesitation (Ibid., pp.
264-265). Accountable government, Kee’s second pillar, is accomplished through Singapore’s
parliamentary political system. This system, despite having a very dominant party with little
outside opposition, routinely permits and encourages challenging debate and criticism; so much
so in fact that additional seats in parliament were formed exclusively for opposition parties to up
the veracity and challenge of democratic debate. To promote better public service and ethos,
Kee’s third pillar, Singapore has established and strictly maintains its efficiency focused
meritocracy. This meritocracy is the standard by which the government operates without
exception. Nepotism and patronage are unacceptable. To remove incentives for corruption
Singapore has high transparency; this is consistent with Tavits’s (2010) observations regarding
clarity of responsibility. Kee notes that the more transparent the government, the more likely it
is to reduce incentives for corrupt behavior. Kee’s fifth pillar, enhanced likelihood of detection,
is epitomized in a powerful and largely independent investigatory bureau dedicated exclusively
to combatting corruption. Its specialization and independence permit it to be highly efficacious.
The final two pillars, swift and severe punishment and strong public support are greatly
interwoven with the other pillars. Singapore is notorious for its highly punitive, Draconian
judicial system. This system, however, has a broad base of support. Citizens are confident that
they can report suspected corruption that will be investigated and, if corruption found, it will be
punished. In short, Singapore has created a political culture where engaging in corruption
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provides high potential risk with low potential reward. As a result, few decide to engage in it
(Ibid., pp. 264-271). This socialization of corruption as non-acceptable, as well as providing
strong disincentives to engage in it, make it less problematic from a practical standpoint.

Gaps in the Corruption Literature
With all that the corruption literature is expansive it does contain several gaps. Some
studies are dated and would be far more useful with more updated data, or with more expansive
studies. Take the studies of Meier & Holbrook (1992) and Dobratz & Whitfield (1992); both
deal with voter turnout. Both establish that perhaps there are varying conditions for which
corruption influences voter turnout. Expanding the investigation of voter turnout to more cases
could greatly clarify the issue. Perhaps Greece is the exception to the rule that corruption does
not influence voter turnout. Or, perhaps America is the exception to the rule. Either way, further
study is needed in order to answer these statements, preferably with wider scope and being up to
date.
Perhaps the biggest gap in the literature is felt by the impression left by S. Morris’s
(2009) work on Mexico. The findings are leviathan in depth but small in scope. Certainly, much
more in known of Mexico today than before, and a great deal of information can be obtained
through Mexico’s in-depth study. However, there are many more cases that can and should be
studied. Ideally the depth of research conducted on Mexico could be done for all countries in the
world, but this is unrealistic at this time, at least all at once. There are many works dealing with
explicit case studies, many of which have been included in this short review of the literature.
What tends to be lacking, however, is in the number of studies that reach beyond low case
numbers. Instead of smaller scale studies, some of the principle findings of this (S. Morris’s
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2009) case should be taken for investigation on a much broader scale. Regional investigations
are a logical next step – but why not go further than this?
As indicated in the introduction and demonstrated throughout the literature, corruption is
not isolated to any one particular regime or country. It has its greatest presence, at least in the
literature, amongst countries in transition and democracies – but even the latter suffers from the
potential of being a matter of convenient case studies. Greater concern tends to be placed on
corruption in regimes that are principally opposed to it, such as democracy. Research is more
justifiably conducted in a society that permits such free exploration of ideas and actively
encourages its conduct through, for example, research grants. Broader studies should be
performed to glean the most data as possible. The tendency has been to confine research to
smaller, more contextualized studies of countries and regions than to broaden it even more. This
paper seeks to bridge the gap between these smaller studies and a far larger one.
The importance of democracy, despite claims that research should be expanded from it,
cannot likewise be overstated. No matter the arguments for or against potential benefits of
corruption between Johnston’s (1986) moralists and revisionists camps, the ability for it to take
root in systems philosophically opposed to it demands ongoing investigation. As such, in both
democratic and nondemocratic regimes, the notions of political efficacy are important. How
corruption, particularly perceptions of corruption, interact with political efficacy, and external
efficacy most importantly, should be given greater focus. It is a gap in corruption research that
should be filled and this essay will attempt to do so.
Before empirical analysis takes place, however, political efficacy itself must be explained
and its literature properly, if tersely, reviewed. Furthermore, its connection to corruption must be
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better established, particularly as it relates to areas of practical political importance, such as
regime stability and legitimacy. This review and analysis will be presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL EFFICACY AND CORRUPTION

“The government doesn’t care about you, or your children, or your rights, or your welfare, or
your safety … it’s interested in its own power. That’s the only thing. Keeping it and expanding
it wherever possible.”
– George Carlin
If ever there was a quote to epitomize political efficacy and corruption, the words of the
late George Carlin would do it. Carlin spoke of the American government, one of the world’s
beacons of democracy. His words are deeply cynical and critical. One needs only to consider
several troubling trends in surveys of the American government to note that Carlin did not speak
merely for himself, however. Gallup polling, for example, indicates approval ratings of the
American Congress at historic lows, a downward trend that began shortly after the tragic events
of September 11th, 2001. Regardless of one’s opinion of American politics or its style of
governance, the ideas eschewed in Carlin’s words are important for considerations of political
efficacy. But what exactly is political efficacy and why is it important, both by itself and in
relation to corruption?
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Political efficacy is, as mentioned earlier, “an individual's belief in the value of political
action and the probability of success in this action” (Weissberg, 1975, p. 470). Furthermore,
political efficacy can be separated into two categories: internal efficacy and external efficacy.
Internal efficacy refers to a person’s self-appraised competence and knowledge of politics, and
the person’s perceived political influence. External efficacy refers to a person’s confidence that
the government, political system, and regime are responsive to the person and his or her
associated demographic; be it race, religion, class, sex, etc. (Valentino, Gregorwicz, &
Groenendyk, 2009, p. 308). In other words, “[i]ndividuals high in internal efficacy feel they
understand how to take part in politics, and are not intimidated by the challenges, conflicts or
disagreements that occur in that arena. External efficacy refers to an individual's belief in the
openness and responsiveness of the political system” (Ibid.). If a person has low internal
efficacy, he or she has little to no knowledge of how to take part in politics or affect the political
process in any meaningful way; as a result of this, he or she would naturally believe to have little
to no political influence. If a person has low external efficacy, he or she believes that the
government does not care, or is unresponsive to, him, her, or people like him or her.
For the purposes of this paper external efficacy is the focus. Still, an overview of the
literature of political efficacy at large is appropriate to put all into context. The overview will
begin with internal efficacy and end with external efficacy. After this overview, efficacy will be
explored alongside corruption, regime stability and change. Democracies hold particular
importance due to the contentions that democracies are most susceptible to corruption, so this
chapter will end with considerations for what has been dubbed the democratic deficit
phenomenon. Though this concept does not serve as a critical component of corruption or
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efficacy, it is a potentially important effect; thus it will be given appropriate consideration as a
practical implication of corruption and efficacy.

Political Efficacy at Large
Political efficacy is not always separated into the internal and external categories. The
trend has certainly increased since the distinction was made in the early 1970s, particularly after
Pateman (1970)9, though. Weissberg (1975) tackles political efficacy without distinction. The
reason for this is the linking between efficacy and political illusion, or what Weissberg refers to
as “golden lies” for the successful operation of governance (Weissberg, 1975, p. 487).
Weissberg argues that efficacy is essentially myth; that it too greatly separates political reality
from views, beliefs, and feelings socialized through childhood for what should be as opposed to
what actually is. Weissberg’s critical analysis of political efficacy questions its usefulness
outside of political disengagement or disillusionment (Ibid., pp. 484-486). His critique, however,
is fully compatible with the ideas under investigation in this essay. The connection that efficacy
has to socialization, furthermore, provides additional foundation for linking corruption and
efficacy together. If, as Weissberg contends, efficacy is of particular significance during times
when populations are unable to fit political reality with their socialized political illusions and
ideals – Weissberg’s ‘golden lies’ – then political corruption and political efficacy should be
logically connected to efficacy, and thus democratic legitimacy.
Karp & Banducci (2008), also keen to examine both internal and external political
efficacy, do so through an examination of various electoral systems in twenty-seven democracies

9

Pateman, Carol (1970). Participation and Democratic Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press; claimed by
Morrell (2005).
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around the world. Their primary focus was on distinguishing the differences between
proportional representation systems and more popular alternatives, such as first-past-the-post as
it relates to citizen participation in politics and political efficacy. The assumption is that
proportional representation systems provide greater opportunity for nuanced politics by way of
allowing more parties to compete, even if vote totals do not capture majorities for any particular
party. Due to the perceived benefits that PR affords over alternatives, the authors then assume
that PR systems would enhance political efficacy, both internal and external (Karp & Banducci,
2008, pp. 311-316). The authors find that PR systems do tend to increase political efficacy,
though citizens who prefer small parties have lower increases in political efficacy than those who
support larger parties; this being a likely result of winner vs. loser politics explored more in this
chapter. Moreover, the differences between citizen political efficacy between those who prefer
small parties and large parties were smaller in PR systems than in alternative systems (Ibid., pp.
330-331). This can be attributed to smaller parties having more weight in PR systems than
others where such parties may not even gain enough votes to be given seats in a legislative body.
Overall, the authors find evidence showing that structural and institutional arrangements do
affect political efficacy and political participation. Taken on the whole, both increase when a
democracy has a proportional representation system. As a direct result of this work, the presence
of proportional representation is tested during the country-level analysis in chapter 4.

Internal Efficacy
Works dealing exclusively with internal efficacy are few and far between; many authors
are content to investigate both at the same time or focus upon external political efficacy. Morrell
(2005) breaks this mold in his examination of internal political efficacy and deliberative decision
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making. Specifically, Morrell seeks to determine whether deliberative decision making – a
cornerstone of democratic politics – leads to increases in internal political efficacy. One would
assume this to be the case; participation in the deliberative process would increase one’s
knowledge of the process – at least this is the logical assumption. Contrary to expectations,
deliberative decision making does not necessarily lead to an increase in internal political
efficacy. The author is quick to note, however, that at least face-to-face decision making will
lead to an increase in one’s confidence towards the deliberative process; any such internal
efficacy increase will thus be situation specific, e.g. whatever was being deliberated over a
person will feel better about, but not politics writ large (Morrell, 2005, pp. 65-66). As Morrell’s
work pertains to this essay, it establishes caution when constructing theory regarding the
relationship of corruption and efficacy. Supposing that perceptions of corruption influence
general attitudes towards government, it is possible that any effect corruption has on efficacy is
muted due to it being merely another area of consideration with everything else. In other words,
compared to say, personal educational attainment, corruption may take a secondary role.
Another interesting contribution to the study of internal efficacy comes from Valentino et
al. (2009). The authors investigate efficacy, emotional states, and the cultivation of participation
in democracy. They find that, for those with high internal efficacy, anger will serve as a
sufficient motivation to participate in politics enough to become habitual. Satisfaction gained,
particularly from winners, will accumulate with each subsequent election and thus produce
consistent voting behavior. Fear, unlike anger, does not contribute to a rise in habitual voting
behavior once internal efficacy is factored, though it may be a sufficient motivator to engage in
voting during a single election cycle (Valentino, Gregorwicz, & Groenendyk, 2009, pp. 325327). An important implication of this work is that anger and reaction can be important for
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political behavior as long as one possesses sufficient knowledge of politics to spur such action.
An informed, angry citizen is more likely to react to politics and thus seek to influence it. If this
citizen succeeds in achieving his or her preference by virtue of the vote, then habitual voting will
form; external efficacy will rise.

External Efficacy
Iyengar (1980) is an early work concerned with external political efficacy in his study of
diffuse system support. There he makes an interesting finding regarding political efficacy’s
impact upon diffuse support of governments and regimes. He finds that “efficacy is not a
fleeting response to current political realities but is, instead, a more firmly embedded attitude
concerning the responsiveness of the regime” (Iyengar, 1980, p. 255). This provides an
opportunity for expansion with regards to what feeds into these considerations of external
political efficacy. If external efficacy concerns the responsiveness of regimes and not just
governments or administrations, anything that feeds into external efficacy will have an indirect
link to regime stability. Supposing, then, that perceptions of corruption are found to influence
external efficacy, this will be an indication that corruption has some influence, albeit indirect, on
attitudes of regime performance10. Such performance can be intimately linked to democratic
legitimacy. This is discussed in more detail in a later section.
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Regime performance being the next logical connection between efficacy and responsiveness. If a regime is
regarded as responsive it can be said to be performing well, whereas if it is unresponsive then it is not performing
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responsiveness is a better indicator of actual external efficacy. Responsiveness itself is a matter of confidence in
government alongside the effect of preferred party or candidate winning an election to gain the winner v. loser
effect.
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Practical applications of external political efficacy are readily available. The results of
party politics in the United States, particularly after 1960, for example, indicate steady declines
in voting patterns largely attributed to external political efficacy (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982).
Moreover, this can be explained through rational voting calculus. Pollock III (1983) states that
“individuals who harbor feelings of personal political competence (high internal political
efficacy) and relatively cynical assessments of the responsiveness of the political system (low
external political efficacy) are more prone toward unconventional, nonconformist participation,”
e.g. engaging in protests but not voting (Pollock III, 1983, p. 401). If such behavior results in
disillusionment or disengagement with the government, or worse, opposition to it, then
democratic legitimacy is again threatened not just philosophically, but practically. On the
opposite side of the spectrum, Finkel (1985), also working with the United States, finds that
when citizens participate in politics their sense of responsiveness from the regime increases. The
implications, then, are for increased diffuse support for the regime since participation leads to
increased external efficacy.
Lambert et al. (1986) temper the findings of Finkel (1985) and other earlier works. The
authors acknowledge that political efficacy is an important tool for analyzing regime,
government, and administration support, but with one important addendum: upon their analysis
of the Canadian provinces, Lambert et al. discovered statistically a statistically significant
relationship between the feelings of political efficacy amongst those whose favored party won a
race versus those whose party lost (Lambert, Curtis, Brown, & Kay, 1986, pp. 724-728). In
essence, those whose party won will have increased political efficacy as well as support for the
government; this segment of the electorate will support both the regime and the government due
to winning. Those whose party lost will have decreased support for both the government and
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regime. Support can also be separated based upon the level of government engaged with, be it a
national, or federal government, and a subnational government (Stewart et al., 1992; Bowler &
Donovan, 2002; Anderson et al. 2007).
Finkel (1987), studying West Germany this time, substantiates earlier findings by himself
but outside of the United States. Finkel (1987) finds that electoral participation does increase
one’s sense of external political efficacy and leads to increased diffuse support for the regime but
again sees a negligible, if existent at all, increase in internal political efficacy.11 Participation in
electoral politics leads to diffuse regime support and increased sense of efficacy amongst the
participating citizenry. These causes and effects have a reciprocal relationship as well, which
only further leads to stabilization of a new regime, such as the federal republic that West
Germany was cultivating at the time (Finkel, The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy
and Political Support: Evidence from a West German Panel, 1987, pp. 460-463). The
implications of these findings are consistent with much of the literature: increased efficacy arises
from increased participation, and increased participation arises from increased (particularly
external) efficacy.
Madsen (1987), investigating petitioners’ self-efficacy, merely political efficacy as a
catch-all term, and regime support, find nuanced support for previous scholars and their findings.
Madsen finds that, for those who successfully petitioned the Indian government on some issue
and had their issue resolved, their sense of self-efficacy was very high but their view of
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the above review of the literature is based on Finkel’s explanation of his findings and not necessarily his use of exact
terminology. It seems clear that support for both regimes and political efficacy, particularly external, are found, if
perhaps not clearly enunciated. (Finkel, The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy and Political Support:
Evidence from a West German Panel, 1987, pp. 460-463).
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governmental responsiveness was only marginally higher than the norm. For those who did not
successfully petition the Indian government on an issue, thus not getting their issue resolved,
their sense of self-efficacy was unmoved, but their view of government responsiveness was
significantly and negatively affected (Madsen, 1987, pp. 577-578). Madsen concludes by
contending that attitudes towards government responsiveness are not arrived at in the same way
as political efficacy. He notes that the operationalization between his version of efficacy and the
norm12 leads to potential conflicts in terms of theoretical implications, but that the overall
implications are still applicable (Ibid., p. 579-580). As Madsen’s work pertains to this study, the
primary point of interest is in the finding that, similar to Lambert et al. (1986) in Canada, there
appears to be a winner vs. loser effect taking place. A winner is one who has interacted with the
government and its procedural processes and gotten his or her way, whereas a loser is one who
has either not interacted with the government at all and thus not gotten a preferable outcome, or
one who has interacted but failed to gain the desired outcome.
Clarke & Acock (1989) buttress the findings of Lambert et al. (1986) but with one
important clarification. Clarke & Acock find that participation in politics does not influence
political efficacy per se. They contend that though such an effect can be documented, as works
prior to this certainly have, they are in fact observing the wrong relationship. It is not that
participation in elections is contributing to a rise in one’s political efficacy, it is having any kind
of consideration for the elections themselves. If a person does not vote but does support the
winning candidate in an election, particularly a high profile election, then a person will have
increased political efficacy (Clarke & Acock, 1989, pp. 561-562). Siding with a winner, even if
one does not actually vote for a winner, increases political efficacy. This provides evidence that
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nonvoters do not necessarily have to possess low external political efficacy. All that is required
would be support for a winning candidate of sufficiently high political office, such as a
presidency. Considerations of the variables of democratic legitimacy, examined later in this
chapter, will need greater specification as a result. Assumptions of nonvoting and voter apathy
being one and the same, for example, cannot automatically be contended.
Similar to Stewart et al.’s (1992) research in distinguishing political efficacy between
national and subnational units, Bowler & Donovan (2002) also take subnational units as a central
focus of study. For Bowler & Donovan, they focus on the American states. In particular, the
authors investigate differences between the states in terms of direct participatory democracy; the
use of ballot initiatives, in particular. The authors find that, for those citizens living in states
with more direct democracy, their sense of political efficacy is likely to be higher than those in
states with less direct democracy. Additionally, the authors find support that civic engagement is
higher in those states with more direct democracy; a logical outgrowth of having more
opportunities for direct citizen influence over politics. Perhaps most significant in Bowler &
Donovan’s findings, however, is that these measures of direct democracy are just as strongly
indicative of increased political efficacy as education – the variable most strongly and positively
correlated with political efficacy levels. This provides strong evidence that structural level
variables can be as important as individual level educational attainment, much as Ainsworth
(2000) argued in his theoretical work. In addition to their already significant findings, the
authors find support for the winner vs. loser paradigm; those who support winning initiatives will
have higher political efficacy than those who support losing initiatives (Bowler & Donovan,
Democracy, Institutions and Attitudes about Citizen Influence on Government, 2002, pp. 389390). Bowler & Donovan’s findings do not go unchallenged.

41

Dyck & Lascher (2009) refute claims that direct democracy increases political efficacy
levels. Their arguments and findings are twofold: first, that internal efficacy in-fact decreases
with more exposure to direct democracy because participation in, for example, ballot initiatives,
requires a higher level of political knowledge than simply voting in a conventional candidate
election, dissuading low-information citizens from voting. Second, that for external efficacy,
voters generally have higher rates than non-voters regardless of being in direct democracy or not.
Furthermore, the information level of a voter greatly impacts the level of external efficacy that he
or she feels. For the uninformed voter, there is significant increase in external political efficacy
in the presence of direct democracy… but this is mitigated by their low political information, and
therefore fails to help the case for direct democracy. For decently well informed voters, there is
a mild increase in external political efficacy (Dyck & Lascher Jr., 2009, pp. 417-422). The take
away from these distinctions is not that direct democracy is particularly effective to increase
external political efficacy, but that being informed of politics is. The authors thus advise caution
in linking direct democracy, or those democracies with more direct forms practiced systemically,
to higher external political efficacy. This is an interesting finding in support of this paper’s goals
of investigation because it calls into question the potential and inherent differences between the
various versions of democracy around the world. Likewise, if applied to non-democratic
regimes, it would seem that knowledge of politics is again a critical component of efficacy.
Thus, even if in a non-democratic regime, if one is informed about the workings of politics, one
could thus influence it. In essence, awareness of the workings of politics leads to external
efficacy. This naturally leads into the next section regarding the most visible means of learning
about politics, the media.
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Media and Efficacy
Returning to Stewart et al.’s (1992) consideration of context, another context worth
noting is one of media use. Albeit in a literature seemingly unrelated, Aarts & Semetko (2003)
find a link between media consumption, particularly television news watching, and political
efficacy. They find that “regularly watching public television news tends to enhance [internal
political efficacy], while watching commercial television news regularly might decrease internal
efficacy” (Aarts & Semetko, 2003, p. 776). They find an additional effect on traditional “press”
use, but the effect expands to both kinds of political efficacy, not just internal. Internal efficacy
is important in the establishment of political knowledge to prompt participation – or, in
accordance with Stewart et al. (1992), at least a party and candidate preference – which is what
makes this finding useful for the purposes of this paper. Media use in general, then, cannot be
dismissed from analysis of providing contexts for perceptions of corruption or for efficacy.
Media consumption has an effect upon consuming populations. The effects upon
citizenry’s political efficacy has been established with Aarts & Semetko (2003), but what other
areas can media literature shed some light upon for the purposes of this study? The media
literature can and does contribute, particularly when considering what can assist, directly or
indirectly, into perceptions of corruption. Given the link between media use and efficacy, such
an examination of media and perceptions of corruption, or media and perceptions at all, is
prudent. A brief examination of media follows.
Debates rage in the media literature over what effects media at large has over consuming
populations. Originally the debate was over there was an effect at all; this has become muted.
There are effects, and for the purposes of this study the effects are relevant to how perceptions
and attitudes can be altered through media presence and use. This is especially pertinent to
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provide additional context into how such use could influence attitudes about government that
feed into political efficacy considerations such as: knowledge of politics and responsiveness of
politics.
The first point to stress here is that the media is only as important as its consumers allow
it to be. Bennett (2002) finds that, concerning the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, inattention to the
scandal contributed as much to public opinion as did the initial attention paid. For this study, the
important finding of Bennett is that the good (economic) times of the ‘90s coupled with
exhaustive coverage of the scandal and the type of scandal itself led to a more muted reaction
amongst the population than would have been anticipated otherwise. Sex scandals are not as
perceptually damaging as a bribery scandal, for example. One is an abuse of an office’s power,
whereas another is a moral infraction. This is also a case of a culturally relative moral issue.
The Clinton-Lewinsky Scandal may have been (initially, anyway) a big deal in the United States
but not, perhaps, in France, Italy, or Canada.
Regardless of moral relativity, however, the media is expected to fulfill a classical
watchdog role in politics. If the government or a particular politician is not performing as well
as one would expect, or is embroiled in corruption or other scandalous behavior, the media will
‘bark’ and the people will listen. The media, then, acts as a magnifying glass into politics so that
it performs to the preferences of the citizenry. Valentino et al. (2009) note that anger, in
particular, spurs voters to action. The watchdog function of the media handles this effectively.
Porto (2011) illustrates the point in his examination of Brazilian media since the 1980s. In this
time, the media in Brazil has become increasingly aggressive in its investigation and reporting of
corruption in the Brazilian government. In doing so, Porto finds that Brazilian anti-corruption
agencies and the citizenry have punished guilty government officials due to, presumably in no
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small part, to the anger reaction described by Valentino et al (Porto, The Media and Political
Accountability, 2011, pp. 122-124). When the media acts as a watchdog and barks at corruption,
the citizenry reacts. The media reinforces internal efficacy which, in turn, affects external
efficacy. When politicians are successfully removed from office due to media exposure and
citizen backlash, in Brazil, Canada, or elsewhere, then external efficacy is expected to rise.
Mutz & Reeves (2005), in their laboratory study of televised incivility and attitude
formation, find that televised differences of opinion that remain civil do not alter government
attitudes whereas those that are uncivil does alter government attitudes, and negatively. Perhaps
most importantly, however, is that greater incivility led to higher interest and ratings despite its
negative effects upon government trust. The nature of television then may inadvertently
contribute to declines in external political efficacy due to its eroding effect upon government
attitudes. Since external political efficacy and trust in government tend to correspond to one
another, it would seem potentially troublesome for any state, regardless of regime type, to have
an overabundance of televised incivility. The likelihood of having such incivility is likely due to
the degree of freedom of the press. The problem, then, could be exemplified by the most
liberalized, or unrestricted, media environments.
In Baumgartner & Morris (2006) and J. Morris (2009), both examining The Daily Show
with Jon Stewart and its effects upon its audience members, both have startling results. For
Baumgartner & Morris, viewers gain a greater interest and knowledge of politics by watching the
show but lose trust in government as a whole, primarily due to the molding of news and
entertainment – or so dubbed ‘infotainment’ – which lends credence to the comedian Jon
Stewart’s words, even if they are jokes. The resultant increased cynicism towards government is
not limited to the system at large, it has practical impacts upon individual elections. J. Morris
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(2009) examines the show’s coverage of the 2004 party conventions. The show was more
critical of the Republicans and less so of Democrats. The viewers of the program were more
likely to consequently view the Republican ticket with greater negativity than its Democratic
counterpart. These two cases are important because they illustrate the practical impacts of a
program that does not even qualify as a hard news, despite incorporating snippets of news
American news broadcasts in its show. Mere infotainment has an effect upon its viewership.
Media is not regarded as more important than structural factors included in the framework of this
essay, but it is noteworthy nonetheless for its effect upon the viewership.
The media has an effect upon a population, inadvertent or otherwise, and must be
accounted for to accommodate other literature relevant to this study. Since trust is so intimately
linked to perceptions of corruption and, in theory, the democratic deficit, the potentiality for
media to alter levels of trust in government must be addressed for a more complete study
(Gunther & Mughan 2000, 402-403). Accounting for the regime type is also important due to
the ownership differences between private and public (or state owned) news media (Ibid.).

Efficacy, Corruption, and Democratic Legitimacy
Linking perceptions of any sort, media, corruption, attitudes towards government, to
efficacy has a long history within the efficacy literature. As illustrated many times scholars have
examined the relationship between perceptions and attitudes with actual political behavior,
particularly in the democratic context. To understand efficacy and corruption better through
conceptual linkages, a simple input and output statement can be made. Immediate environments
such as the workplace, home, with friends, alongside consumed media, input into considerations
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of both internal and external efficacy. Internal efficacy, or self-appraised knowledge of politics,
is largely an input to potential behavior. If a person believes he or she understands politics, he or
she is more likely to do so. External efficacy, or the belief that the government is responsive to a
person and people like him or her, is an input into behavior; but sufficient internal efficacy is
required in order to know how to appropriately engage. The results of actual politics will then be
input to external efficacy. Based on the prominence of winner vs. loser findings, should a
person’s preferred outcome (be it political party, candidate, or policy) occur, a person will
experience an increase in external efficacy. If a person’s preferred outcome does not occur, there
is a chance that external efficacy will decrease.
Healthy democracy is dependent upon an active civic culture. Furthermore, democracy
itself is exercised by masses voting for elites who understand that they are subject to the wills of
non-elites. Thus, elites whose responsibility is the governance of a democratic state increase the
external efficacy of non-elites, that is, the masses, because the latter view themselves as having
sway over the former (Almond & Verba, 1963, pp. 117-121, 136-140). In short, elites do what
the masses want – at least within reason. As long as this relationship remains so, external
efficacy should in theory, remain high, and thus democratic health is assured. Similar to other
scholars, Almond & Verba also identify the importance of internal political efficacy, albeit in an
explanatory way, as a crucial input for political behavior, i.e. civic engagement. A citizen must
first know enough about politics to know how to affect it. Once this is known, he or she can and
should do so for good democracy.
Suppose the traits and trends identified above were out of alignment; that they were not
smoothly contributing to solid democratic governance. Suppose that elites in government were
not responsive to the wishes of the masses to whom they owe their power. Suppose, then, that
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new elites were brought into power by masses who preferred them over their unpopular
predecessors but that these new elites simply continued, or worse, exacerbated, the issues that led
to calls for dismissal in the previous election cycle. Theoretically this would have a dramatic
impact upon the external efficacy of the masses. No longer able to bend the elites to their wills,
the governance of the state is no longer reminiscent of a democratic state but a non-democratic
one (Ibid., pp. 118-119).
There are two potential ways to view efficacy and regime change. First, that external
efficacy is a cause for regime change at large, and second, that it is a cause of only democratic
regime change. Consider the notion that low external efficacy will contribute to a decrease in
political behavior. Supposing that sufficient portions of a democratic electorate were to
disengage from politics due to low external efficacy, the very nature of democracy being subject
to the will of the masses – typically a majority and certainly at least a plurality – becomes
undermined. At this point one would expect the regime’s democratic foundations were in
trouble. The logical effect of such a democratic ailing, to use Ulbig’s (2008) terminology, would
be reform; but reform can either promote or remove democracy.
The idea that regime change can occur in more than just democracies in the presence of
external political efficacy is also a possibility. Supposing that a non-democratic regime is
unresponsive to the needs of its subjects, and presumably to an extreme degree, such as to the
point of deprivation13, these same subjects can become disposed to rebellion and revolution. Inso-doing, the proceeding government would present an increase in external political efficacy for
its people regardless of its regime type. Populism is not isolated to democracy, and even the
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See (Gurr, 2011 [1970]) for more information on political violence, rebellion, and models for then; notably the
‘relative deprivation’ model as reason for rebellion and through it, regime change.
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most autocratic of governments can be popular. One need only examine history of fascism to
appreciate the powers of popular movements in non-democratic circumstances.
Democracy, like any other form of government, is not perfect. In some cases democracy
is unrepresentative or unfair to certain segments of the population; historically this is particularly
easy to observe given the inequality between the sexes, races, and classes. Contemporaneously
these are (typically) not the case, particularly in the long established democracies of the world.
This does not mean, however, that all feel as though they are perfectly represented or equal in
their countries of citizenship. This is where political efficacy and democratic legitimacy can
come into play. Should a person not feel as though he or she has a fair say in government, or
that the government is not responsive, or does not care for his or her political preferences, then
this can be regarded as problematic for the regime’s continuation. Since there are winners and
losers in democratic regimes based upon the voting apparatus, the success of democracy is
pinned not on winners, but losers. If losers consent to the winners, then democracy has
succeeded; if losers cannot or do not consent, then democratic legitimacy is threatened.
Moreover, should such a person be part of a growing disillusioned segment of society, a growing
portion of the middle class for example, the potential for a crisis of democratic legitimacy,
otherwise known as a “democratic deficit” by Norris, can be more fully realized (Anderson,
Blais, Bowler, Donovan, & Listhaug, 2007).
The existence of a democratic deficit has far reaching theoretical and practical
implications. Equality is the basis of democracy, despite how equality can be defined. Likewise,
the structural conditions for democracy are not uniform worldwide. There are federal systems,
unitary systems, presidential systems, parliamentary systems, and combinations. All of these are
democratic and all are susceptible to creating a deficit; that is, failing to fulfill democratic
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principles of fairness and equality; or in Norris’s (2011) terms, where expectations of democracy
do not fit with the outcomes of democracy. Without pointing to one structure or another as
‘more’ or ‘less’ democratic than the other, it is clear that without structures of popular rule and
officials’ accountability a deficit can be created which, in practice, changes the system from
being democratic to something else, be it autocratic, oligarchic, or anarchic (Pitkin, 1967, pp.
190-208). The presence of corruption in a democratic system, then, can have far reaching effects
upon both the principles of democracy and the structures of democracy – and create a situation
where such a democracy is in danger. But so what? Why should democracy matter? The
answer to this has several layers.
Norris (2012) examines three areas of substantive importance: prosperity, welfare, and
peace. In all three areas Norris finds that democratic regimes perform better than their autocratic
counterparts. Generally speaking, the more democratic and liberalized a system becomes, the
better off it will be in terms of prosperity and welfare. For peace, though there are some
democratic regimes, Israel for example, that struggle with internal security, by and large most
democracies are quite peaceful internally and externally (Norris, Making Democratic
Governance Work: How Regimes Shape Prosperity, Welfare, and Peace, 2012, pp. 188-195).
Democracies themselves may not be the alpha and omega of governance, but relative to current
alternatives, democracies outperform the rest by a comfortable margin. It is this demonstrable
superiority of economic prosperity, personal welfare, and peace of democracy compared to
alternatives that makes a perceived deficit so theoretically and practically problematic.
Democratic legitimacy is concerned with the stability of democratic regimes around the
world. To understand why democratic legitimacy is worth consideration against external
efficacy and corruption is to understand first the potential end results of a potential deficit in
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legitimacy. The first and most obviously extreme result is in the collapse of the democratic
regime. This need not be a pernicious event, but it is a destabilizing one for the state that would
suffer from it. Such destabilization has a sundry of practical and theoretical negatives that go
with it; not the least of which are the effects upon markets, administration, governance, and law
and order. Even in the event that such a regime collapsed and rose again to another iteration of
democratic governance, even small bouts of anarchy are potentially damaging. Perhaps worse
for democratic theorists, however, is in the potentiality for non-traditional trajectories of
democratization, particularly in the post-communist world. Indeed, the transition of post-Soviet
countries to democratic norms is not universally successful, and the degrees of democracy are
not uniform. Structural and historical legacies can hinder the development of democracy around
the world, and in so doing, can change the face of governance (Pop-Eleches, 2007). The current
instability in Ukraine and Crimea also illustrate practical difficulties with democratic transition.
Ukraine is embroiled in revolution due to what could be described as incomplete democratic
transition and Crimea, at least allegedly, desires independence from Ukraine and possibly even
annexation by Russia, another country with a questionable democratic transition. All three
countries are part of the post-Soviet bloc. Instability born out of this region should greatly
hinder the external efficacy of those within; a democratic deficit need not affect established
democracies – they can absolutely affect those in stages of transition.
Take the previously noted Canadian Ad-Scandal as an example of instability. Due to
prevalent corruption in the Liberal government, one of the most dominant governments in
Canadian history, citizen backlash all but decimated the party and allowed for a conservative
resurgence both politically and ideologically. The short-term consequences of the corruption
scandal resulted in numerous national elections in a very short time period while parties and
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ideologies were plunged into intense competition. This event was greatly destabilizing to the
Canadian political sphere. It did not threaten the democratic regime in place within that country,
but it did destabilize it. In both practical and theoretical terms, this period of destabilization was
very problematic. Canada, a parliamentary system, became paralyzed due to the scandal, and the
repeated calling of national elections hindered the ability of the Canadian government to operate
not just in the course of several months, but over several years, as a political realignment
occurred due to backlash against the Liberal Party (Blais, Everitt, Fournier, Gidengil, & Nevitte,
2005). In practical terms, the dysfunction of governance ripples across the rest of society;
economics, confidence in governance at large, and state power dynamics can and do change.
Theoretically, disturbances of this kind should result in better governance due to the removal of
the corrupt officials, but the disturbance and instability that resulted from it is the primary issue
of consideration.
A fascist critique of democracy delves entirely into the inefficiency of democracy, and
especially in times of crisis. Leadership is essential for the smooth operation of the state, and if
leadership is frequently changing or legitimacy uncertain then the state cannot smoothly
function. Should such function decline, people would rightly question the government’s ability
to address the goals of the nation. Democracy is not a universal regime; its spread across the
world is not universal. Autocracy still exists, and ideologies that compete with democratic
norms have their respective followers. If democracy destabilizes due to corruption then external
efficacy is expected to be in crisis as well; a person cannot have say in government when the
government itself is gridlocked or chaotic in function.
Political efficacy holds an important place in democratic theory, and this is the reason for
its connection to corruption and democratic legitimacy (Stewart, Kornberg, Clarke, & Acock,
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1992, p. 179). Whether citizens feel as though the government is responsive to them is likewise
an important consideration for democratic politics. The prominence of democratically focused
literature reviewed throughout this chapter only serves to underscore this regimes importance for
political efficacy concerns. As such, a natural extension of this literature is concerned for the
regimes potential demise. Such a demise, particularly in the Western world where democracy is
more entrenched than elsewhere, could have wide-reaching, and disastrous, consequences. Put
another way, “stable or increasing levels of support facilitate stable democracy, whereas
declining levels of support undermine democracy and threaten its collapse. The trajectory of
political support is critical” (Mishler & Rose, 1999, p. 78). Thus, if corruption threatens
efficacy, and efficacy threatens regime legitimacy, then corruption threatens regime legitimacy.
Additional works are reviewed below to finish making this logical connection.
Ulbig (2008), studying the impact that perceptions of voice and influence (external
efficacy) have on feelings of policy satisfaction and political trust, addresses a potential problem
for democracy. Ulbig argues that it is insufficient for policy satisfaction and political trust in
democracy to simply have a voice in politics. Citizens must, in addition, believe they have
sufficient influence over politics (Ulbig, 2008, pp. 523-526). Stated in terms consistent with this
chapter and previous literature, citizens must have a sufficiently high external political efficacy
in order to gain policy satisfaction or trust in government. Placed in the context of the
democratic deficit literature, Ulbig argues that “giving people a voice in politics is not a panacea
for ailing democracy” (Ibid., p. 525). Democracy requires more than simply a forum for people
to speak their minds; the people must gain a sense that speaking their minds actually matters. If
citizen concerns go unanswered then disillusionment, and a threat to regime stability, results. On
the other hand, if a citizen believes his or her voice is being heard, that expectations of the
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regime are being met, then democratic legitimacy increases. Context, however, is important to
note here.
Mishler & Rose (1999), investigating the democratization of the post-communist
countries of Eastern Europe, note the difficulties that the regime will have during times of
transition primarily through socialization. They note that while support for democracy is slow
and changes only incrementally over time for those peoples already within established
democracies, those living in democracies in transition, and particularly those from the former
communist countries in direct philosophical and economic opposition to democracy, will have
much more uneven and potentially volatile support for the regime. Post-successful revolution,
support for a democratic regime may increase in a rally-around-the-flag sort of way, but whether
the regime lasts is dependent upon performance over time and the necessary socialization into
democratic norms that must take place. In short, the dynamics for newer democracies and those
undergoing transition to them from the post-communist bloc, are likely to be different than those
of more established democracies around the world. Accounting for this, they argue, is crucial for
analysis of democracies and their performance around the world (Mishler & Rose, 1999, p. 79).
For the purposes of this paper, this argument is crucial in determining the potential differences
found in both corruption and efficacy measurements. It also introduces the necessity of adding a
post-communist control into the aggregate-level measurements in the respective empirical
analysis. Such a control is included to satisfy the apt contentions of Mishler & Rose.
Mishler & Rose (1999) find that for the post-Soviet bloc of Eastern Europe, all have
experienced increased socialization into democratic norms as expected. More importantly,
however, the regimes themselves are still vulnerable due to the inherent difficulty associated
with regime transition. The greater approval of the regime itself is attributed to citizen gains and
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approval of greater freedom and liberty relative to experience with communism. Still, despite
these approvals, the regimes themselves are vulnerable (Mishler & Rose, 1999, pp. 96-97). It is
important to note that regime vulnerability due to communist legacy is a cascading issue. Given
the necessity of socialization into democratic norms, threats to these norms alongside incomplete
transition can contribute to a deficit of democracy by virtue of democracy not having enough
time to crystallize and self-perpetuate. Corruption, then, is a particularly threatening issue if
given opportunity to take root in such a system in transition.
Democratic regime stability is not limited simply to being established or transitional,
however, as Norris (1999) indicates. There are a sundry of institutional explanations for political
support as well. Norris (1999) finds that democracies with greater expectations and history of
civil liberties tend to have greater confidence in the system at large whereas those without such
robust civil liberties do not. In addition, she finds that, consistent with previous literature,
confidence in government is greatly influenced by whether a person’s preferred party is in power
in government. When a person’s preferred party lacks power or is out of power completely,
confidence in the system itself diminishes. This reinforces the oft-noted winner vs. loser effect
in democratic governance (Norris, Institutional Explanations for Political Support, 1999, pp.
233-234).
Miller & Listhaug (1999) also have a take on stability by way of political performance
and trust. They find that declining trust in democratic governance is associated with higher
expectations. The authors contend that this translates into more than just an economic indicator
for citizen approval of government, or connection of material well being with government
performance. Instead, it shows that citizens are coming to expect more from their democratic
governments than previously. When citizen expectations become too high based on actual
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outcomes, disappointment and declines in trust levels will occur. There are thus two solutions:
first, expectations can be lowered, which is an issue for the public; or second, that government
must be reformed in accordance with changing citizen expectations for its performance (Miller &
Listhaug, 1999, p. 216). These findings reiterate the expectations for democracy vs. results of
democracy argument in the literature.
Norris’s (1999) conclusion to her volume Critical Citizens is cautious in its contentions
regarding democratic stability. On the one hand, she finds and acknowledges that citizens in
democracies are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with government in terms of performance
ratings. On the other hand, this does not necessarily translate into regime change or instability.
It also does not necessarily mean that such change or instability cannot occur. She notes that
“these trends in public opinion can be expected to prove healthy if they fuel pressure for major
institutional reforms designed to strengthen representative and direct democracy” (Norris,
Conclusions: The Growth of Critical Citizens and its Consequences, 1999, p. 270). The if of the
statement is indeed the point of contention, however. In theory there is no reason why such
dissatisfaction with government observed in democracies around the world cannot lead to
instability and regime change. The ultimate question is whether such satisfaction will rise out of
reforms to democracies in response to public opinion or whether regime change will occur. At
this time, no established democracy has collapsed. Indeed, even those countries that have
undergone democratic reforms, such as Russia, cannot be said to have fully established itself in
terms of the regime. The authoritarian roots so prevalent throughout Russian history explains the
current autocratic leanings of the Putin administration. Is this a case of democracy collapsing or
just incomplete transition from authoritarianism to democracy? It is difficult to make that
determination at this time. It can be said, however, to be suffering from a democratic deficit. As
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such, even those that are established can begin suffering from this phenomenon and it should be
accounted for during any empirical tests. Trust in government, presence of a communist legacy,
and some structural determinants testing the directness of democracy are all means for which a
test of a democratic deficit should be conducted. The lynch pin of such a test accounted for in
this essay is in the inclusion of external political efficacy. Potential instability by way of a
democratic deficit is well gauged using this test.
Norris’s (2011) follow-up to Critical Citizens entitled Democratic Deficit provides an
updated look into her previous volume’s examinations. Her questions are broad but ultimately
she seeks to investigate what the democratic deficit is in today’s world and just how seriously it
should be taken from various angles. One such angle deals with trends in democratic deficits
within the past decade in terms of explicitly stated support for democracy. Using the available
countries with regime transition experience in the World Values Survey from 2005-2007, Norris
examines satisfaction with democracy as a regime. She has mixed findings. On the one hand,
she finds no consistent trend of deficit across established liberal democracies. On the other, she
does find deficits across several samples and during certain time periods. They do not appear to
be endemic, however, of broad regime instability or loss of system support. Furthermore, newer
democracies and those of the post-communist bloc exhibit more variation in system support than
in established democracies, suggesting that democracies in transition are those with greater
tendencies towards democratic deficits (Norris, Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited,
2011, pp. 114-115). This would seem a natural occurrence given the socialization required for
diffuse system support over a long period of time.
Another angle Norris (2011) takes regards other such evaluations of system performance
that attempt to disentangle themselves from reactions to policy preference outcomes or winner
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vs. loser satisfaction gains and losses exclusively. Part of Norris’s primary observation is that
the research literature is largely speaking past one another due to examination of the democratic
deficit through different lenses. In examining them all, Norris makes three findings. First, the
quality of governance and democracy matter for citizen evaluations; second, “economic
development and subjective well-being proved equally important for satisfaction;” and third,
there is a definite winner vs. loser effect exemplified by winners being more satisfied with
democracy than losers (Norris, Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited, 2011, p. 215). At
this point Norris acknowledges that deficits can and do occur for the variety of reasons she
examines above, but one final question remains: does it matter?
The answer, although with several caveats, is yes. Norris finds that deficits do exist but
do not appear as threatening in practice – at least not yet – than they are in theory. In fact, she
argues that such deficits can create conditions that are ultimately good for democracy since such
deficits rouse citizen action. This action prompts governmental reform to address any perceived
deficits that arise, at least within a framework of governance influencing a deficit. Another
caveat of note is that deficits arise among those whose preferred parties or candidates are not
winning and thus preferred policy outcomes are not occurring. This reinforces much of the
established literature but also finds that the issues are not exclusive of one another (Norris,
Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited, 2011, pp. 240-246). In short, while it does not
currently seem as though any established democracies are likely to undergo regime change due
to threats to their regime legitimacy, they are likely to undergo bouts of instability by way of
protests, riots, etc. that will prompt self-correcting reforms into democratic governance. Such
reforms will prevent regime change.

58

The final consideration of Norris’s (2011) piece regards the importance of the individual
to the idea of a democratic deficit. If such a deficit were to occur, it would revolve, most
importantly, around individual thoughts and preferences. There are noted structural and cultural
components that influence the individual, certainly, but ultimately it is the individual that will
determine if such a deficit will occur. More directness in democracy and being outside of, in
particular, the post-Soviet bloc will decrease the likelihood of a harmful democratic deficit.
Accounting for communist and the post-Soviet bloc of Eastern Europe is given treatment in the
aggregate, country level analysis in the next chapter.

Theoretical Interactions in Media and Socioeconomic Status
Before moving on, there is one additional area to note. The literature itself has been
discussed at length, but throughout some of these works are the implicit interactive effects of
various factors of import to this study. In particular, socioeconomic status and freedom of the
press are areas that would naturally seem to interact with perceptions of corruption. After all, it
is a natural assumption that the poor would view a situation differently than the rich, or that Jon
Stewart would cover news, particularly given the satirical nature of his program, unlike the
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). The means of viewing or observing a situation is
going to depend upon one’s personal circumstances.
As Warren (2004) points out, democracy is at particular philosophical risk for corruption.
Moreover, external efficacy is also important to democratic regimes. When combined with
concerns of press freedom and socioeconomic status, two variables important enough
independently in their own rights – the potential interactions between them and corruption could
sweeping effects across this particular regime in particular.
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As noted by Power & Taylor (2011) in their study of the media in Brazil, media in the
country can help or hinder efficacy and government legitimacy depending upon media’s function
and attitude towards corruption. A critical watchdog media can have a positive or negative
impact upon the population’s external efficacy in coverage of corruption particularly in a young
democracy like Brazil where government and regime legitimacy are more tenuous. If coverage
is too critical, it may undermine the legitimacy of the government and regime and lead to
instability. If it is not critical enough, or perhaps simply does not cover such matters at all – then
there can be an unrealistic image of how responsive (or responsible) the government is to the
citizenry. Besides the choice of news editors and journalists on what news to cover, the kind of
media outlet whose content is being consumed is important, on a structural level, to the kinds of
news coverage being permitted. For the purposes of this essay, the freer, or more liberalized the
media market, the more it will serve a critical watchdog function towards government. For many
other countries around the world, the presence of a state run news media serves only to reinforce
messages approved by the state and for its purposes. In other words, it is propaganda. Therefore
it is appropriate to formulate and test, theoretically and empirically, the notion that media – the
level of freedom in chapter 4, and trust in media in chapter 5 – and corruption is interacting
somehow. For a critical watchdog function that reduces external efficacy by revealing
corruption, it would be expected that the magnitude of a person’s perceptions of corruption on
external efficacy will greatly differ based on the level of press freedom in a country; the freer it
is, the more a critical watchdog function would occur, and the less free it is, the more it would be
akin to an indoctrination, or propaganda effect.
Lastly, there are implicit and explicit assumptions that democracy is under threat by
corruption, but also by those most able to benefit from it. Warren (2004) notes the philosophical
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reasoning for this, but a more practical example is in Sun’s (2004) examination of corruption in
China. There it is noted that with liberalization – and in particular as a wealthy or upper class
develops more dramatically than in recent history – corruption becomes more at issue. In
essence, with money comes power of influence. Naturally, the rich are expected to have higher
external efficacy, particularly if they perceive (and take advantage of) corruption in government,
and thus have higher external efficacy – or ideas that the government is responsive to them,
compared to those lower on the socioeconomic ladder. Given that liberalization tends to travel
with democratization, Sun’s (2004) contentions, though serious in and of themselves for a
liberalizing country like China, could be even more so for democratic regimes. If money buys
influence, and this influence is acquired particularly through perceivably corrupt means, then
democratic legitimacy is potentially threatened. Socioeconomic status and its relationship to
corruption and external efficacy, then, is examined in particular depth in chapter 5, the individual
level empirical chapter.
The primary literatures dealing with corruption, perceptions of corruption, and political
efficacy have been reviewed. Regime considerations, particularly democratic regimes for the
theoretical and practical importance of corruption and efficacy therein, have been examined, and
the theoretical underpinnings for interactions between media, socioeconomics, and perceptions
of corruption, have been explained. The theory that binds all of this work together along with
the appropriate methods for investigation will be presented in the next chapters, but the
following statement sums the relationship of corruption and efficacy well: efficacy is the vehicle
for which corruption can influence democratic legitimacy. If A > B, and B > C, then A > C.
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CHAPTER 4

CORRUPTION & EFFICACY ON THE COUNTRY LEVEL

“Man is by nature a political animal.”
– Aristotle
Aristotle’s ancient words of wisdom hold as true today as it did during his time. The
world today is seemingly smaller due to the likes of a more globalized community. A ripple is
felt farther now than ever before. It is for this reason that the theoretical and empirical basis of
this study should incorporate as many cases in the world as can possibly be conducted. To that
end, this chapter will serve to investigate corruption and efficacy on the aggregate level. That is
to say that states, not people, are the primary unit of analysis for this chapter. An individual
level analysis will be conducted in chapter 5.
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Theory
The primary focus of this investigation is the link, if any, between perceptions of
corruption and external political efficacy, or government responsiveness. To reiterate the
primary research question of this paper: Do perceptions of corruption affect external political
efficacy? If so, how?
Using perceptions of corruption instead of alternative measures permits a means of
circumventing uncertainty in exposed corruption levels. Acknowledgement must be made to the
contentions of S. Morris (2009) in his explanation of measures of corruption. Indeed, there are
two solid methods: perceptions of corruption and experiences of corruption. For Morris, he
rightly expands his analysis to perceptions, participation in, and patterns of corruption (Morris S.
, 2009, p. 133). This is a thorough means for which to analyze corruption, especially when
studying a single case. However, in opening this means more broadly outside of a single country
even to a region, this becomes problematic. The perception of what exactly constitutes
corruption changes depending upon where in the world one is located14; thus the measure of
participation in corruption will vary widely unless a single study can be constructed and applied
to the world at large. Unfortunately as of the time of writing no such dataset exists; it would be a
tremendous boon to research in this field, however, if such a set was collected and made
available. Using perceptions of corruption alone allows for this culturally relative determination
of corruption to remain observed by virtue of not focusing on the determination of what
experience – assuming an experience is even admitted – is corrupt and which is not15;
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This is also referred to as cultural relativity.
Is bribing a police officer to get out of a speeding ticket corruption? Is the police officer choosing not to give a
ticket because he or she thinks the violator of law is nice, or has an attractive physical appearance, etc. corruption?
Are moral infractions, such as adultery while in office, acts of corruption? Americans and, say, the French, may
disagree on this entirely.
15
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perceptions will remain perceptions, and anyone’s version of what constitutes as corrupt will
thus feed into their interpretation and reported perception16. The analysis of patterns of
corruption in the way Morris does with Mexico in 2009 is qualitatively ideal, but not broadly
practical. Much like the experience of corruption measure, the level of cultural relativity makes
establishing patterns on a worldwide, or perhaps even regional, level problematic. Patterns are
best kept to more homogenous groupings; a worldwide study is too heterogeneous for an
effective pattern-based analysis to take place, at least with currently available worldwide
surveys.
Consistent with observations made by Williams (1999a) about contemporaneous foci on
corruption, this study is more concerned with how perceptions of corruption interact with the
sundry of factors that may contribute to political efficacy. The addition of perceptions of
corruption being measurement focus as opposed to scandals or reported personal experiences
addresses several problems with the literature at large. Despite extended debate in the literature
regarding prescriptions of curtailing corruption, this study does not seek to do so. It is due to this
non-normative and non-prescriptive stance on corruption that the primary complaint towards the
topic by Theobald (1999), that academia has not adequately addressed the differences between
the first world and the rest and thus cannot make broad prescriptions, does not have to be
addressed. Even if prescriptions are at any point implied, Theobald’s (1999) complaint is invalid
due to the primary measurements of this study focused on the use of perceptions of corruption
instead of the aforementioned alternatives. It is still important to determine what factors
contribute to perceptions of corruption but the primary focus is in determining whether these
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This is especially true for individual level analysis; the aggregate level here does have a systematic guideline due
to Transparency International’s use of expert determination of corruption levels. This is explored in more detail in
the methods section.
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perceptions contribute to external political efficacy by way of measuring government
responsiveness.
Another reason why this study endeavors to bring as much of the world as possible into
the analysis is simply due to it not having been done before and in this way. Anderson &
Tverdova (2003) and Norris (2011) have the biggest studies with regards to corruption in the
established literature; and each deal with limitations in terms of their number of countries.
Anderson & Tverdova have sixteen countries and Norris is restricted to those in the World
Values Survey, the number of which are similar to that of the previous authors. This paper’s
primary contribution is in the scope of investigation, incorporating all barometer surveys on the
aggregate level and all but the Eurobarometer countries on the individual level. The full list of
countries is available in appendix VII.
For corruption at large, the potential linkage to political efficacy will grant it a new, fresh
look into relevancy outside of philosophical or normative arguments. Perceptions of corruption
as inputs to government responsiveness as external political efficacy heightens its practical
application to the subject at large and will serve to buttress the literature beyond the reactionary
studies, as noted by Peters & Welch (1978).
The lack of breadth in terms of studying corruption and efficacy is noted, but it should
not be taken as viewing case studies as detrimental. Quite the contrary; case studies are
immensely useful for studying particulars of corruption and efficacy, especially in various
countries and cultures where they may be of particular interest. These are common for the
United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and others – but therein also lies the opportunity for
improvement (Redlawsk & McCann 2005; Johnston 1983; Sun & Johnston 2009; Peters &
Welch 1980; Dobratz & Whitfield 1992; Blais et al. 2005; Moran 1999; S. Morris 2009; Renno
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2011, and others). By increasing the scope of study to an even larger number of countries
broader generalizations can and should be made.
Should perceptions of corruption be a significant input the implications are numerous.
For example, if perceptions of corruption increase external political efficacy, this reinforces the
work of Harrison (1999) and Evans (2004): corruption would indeed be seen to grease the
wheels of politics. This would be especially significant if it was found to occur exclusively in
one regime type, such as democracy. Even in the event of null findings it is significant. This
would indicate that considerations of corruption, favoritism and illegality ((Redlawsk & McCann
2005), do not significantly factor into efficacy measures. Albeit unexpected, it would indicate
the importance of other characteristics, such as the oft noted education variable or some other
alternative. Political efficacy is a cornerstone of democratic politics (Iyengar 1980; Almond &
Verba 1963; Stewart et al. 1992; Ulbig 2008). Should political efficacy get too low, or the
general population no longer participate due to disappointment, anger, or black lash with and
against governance or general apathy, democracy itself becomes at risk (Blais et al. 2005; Miller
& Listhaug 1999; Clarke & Acock 1989; Valentino et al. 2009; Abramson & Aldrich 1982;
Pollock III 1983; Finkel 1985; Finkel 1987; Lambert et al. 1986); though perhaps some
democracies more-so than others, such as those in transition (Norris 2011).
There exists a great deal democratic focus in much of the literature regarding corruption
and political efficacy. This focus demands a degree of conditional investigation, be it in the
moralist, normative argument that corruption is bad for democracy and will negatively affect
external political efficacy as a matter of course, (Fackler & Lin 1995; Seligson 2002; Anderson
& Tverdova 2003; Canache & Allison 2005; Meier & Holbrook 1992; Sun 2004; S. Morris &
Klesner 2010; Bowler & Donovan 2002) or the revisionists who claim it is either irrelevant or
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perhaps even good (Dobratz & Whitfield 1992; Tavits 2010; Johnston 2006; Dych & Lascher
2009), or perhaps it is conditional upon various structural conditions, such as parliamentary
systems, proportional representation electoral laws, different levels of government, etc., (Tavits
2007a; Tavits 2007b; Porto 2011; Kee 2003; Sandholtz & Gray 2003; Karp & Banducci 2008;
Stewart et al. 1992) using the categorization originating in Johnston (1986). Consequently this
investigation embraces several models. Dichotomization of regime type is one way to measure
this variable but this is sometimes not the most effective means of truly gauging variation in
actual governance of a regime. In addition, there are questions of what constitutes a full
democracy versus a full non-democracy? Is voting sufficient? In such a case China could be
listed as a democracy – yet scholars would likely scoff this notion immediately. As such, an
additional model is used to offer some additional nuance to regime indicators. This discussion
leads to several expectations and subsequent hypotheses, again, with condition and nuance.
There is an additional consideration that must be discussed; that of structural variables
that may have lasting influence. Specifically, whether countries have prior experiences with
communism would seem an important structural variable to account for per the contentions of
Pop-Eleches (2007), Mishler & Rose (1999), and Norris (2011). The vast philosophical
differences between economics alone, as an example, would demand accounting for whether a
post-communist legacy exists in a country. It would seem, particularly since the fall of the
Soviet Union occurred only two decades ago, that countries with communist histories could still
be struggling with, if nothing else, considerations of external political efficacy. Democracies are
more than just structures, and perhaps the greatest competitor for democracy should be
controlled for as potential influences – even for those countries that are democracies today.
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Economics always carry significance in the realm of politics, and here is no different. As
such, it is accounted for. Per the literature, the degree of economic liberalization – herein gauged
as economic freedom, is tested on both the aggregate and individual levels to follow such studies
as Norris (2012), Johnston (2005), Bennet (2002), Sun (2004), Heineman (2009), Harrison
(1999), Moran (1999), and Williams (1999b). In doing so, the popular contention that
economics dominates will be tested alongside corruption and other structural level variables;
perhaps economics will not be as important as oft claimed.
The final area of theoretical importance under investigation is that of the media. On the
aggregate level serving as the focus for this chapter, the degree of media freedom is investigated
in accordance with findings in the literature that more liberalized, perhaps even more vigilant
media is good or bad for political efficacy (Aarts & Semetko 2003; Bennet 2002; Porto 2011;
Mutz & Reeves 2005; Baumgartner & Morris 2006), and as a result, democracy at large.

Hypotheses
First and most central to this paper is the hypothesis that perceptions of corruption have
negative and statistically significant affect upon external political efficacy as measured by
government responsiveness. This hypothesis is conditional, however, upon the model being
used. Exact model specification is explored in the next section, but for now this leads to the
second hypothesis: perceptions of corruption will have a positive and statistically significant
effect upon external political efficacy exclusively in democratic regimes in the dichotomous
classification of regimes models. This naturally leads to hypothesis three, which offers slight
nuance to the first two. In the fourth and final model, both perceptions of corruption and
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Freedom House measure of democracy will have a positive and statistically significant effect on
external political efficacy. Restated for ease, the three hypotheses are:

H1: As perceptions of corruption increase, external political efficacy will decrease.
H2a: As perceptions of corruption increase, external political efficacy will decrease in
democratic regimes.
H2b: Perceptions of corruption will not have a statistically significant effect upon external
political efficacy in non-democratic regimes.
H3: As perceptions of corruption and Freedom House score increases, external political efficacy
will decrease.

Consistent with the literature on various structural conditions for increased external
political efficacy, this study does account for some of the decidedly important factors that
contribute to such an increase. Per the findings of Karp & Banducci (2008), it is expected that
there will be a positive and significant relationship between external political efficacy and the
presence of proportional representation. Naturally this is restricted to democratic regimes. This
leads to hypothesis four:

H4: Democracies with proportional representation will increase external political efficacy.

Despite the many inputs into attitude formation, media might play the most pivotal role in
the contemporary world. Media type cannot simply be dichotomized into free or not free,
especially by virtue of state ownership of media, however. Whether the media is important to the
formation of perceptions of corruption and political efficacy is also examined. The presence of
state owned or privately owned news media, along with whether the news media are trusted
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sources in the country in question is measured. Privately owned news media, or even media that
is providing news perhaps unintentionally such as ‘infotainment’ news sources like The Daily
Show with Jon Stewart, with independence from the state apparatus, are expected to be more
critical of the government and thus contribute to the perceptions of a democratic deficit. State
run news media, however, is expected to be trusted more as a show of transparency and internal
accountability. To some this may seem counter-intuitive, but it must be kept in mind that this
study is only concerned with democracies (Graber, 2003; Baumgartner & Morris 2006; Bennett
2009; Carpini & Williams 2000). Such media as the BBC are used as examples of state-owned
news media in a democracy. Contrast this with state-owned television in non-democracies and
the results are likely to be completely different if not entirely in opposition (Gunther & Mughan
2000)17. To prevent a mix up of classifications and clashes of state vs. private dichotomizations,
a more nuanced measure, the Press Freedom Index will be used. In addition to this measure as
an independent variable by itself, it is also interacted with perceptions of corruption. The
expectation is that as perceptions of corruption increase, the degree of this variable’s effect on
external efficacy will vary depending upon the level of press freedom; specifically, when
corruption is high and press freedom is high, external efficacy will decrease – thus indicating a
watchdog effect (Power & Taylor 2011). This leads into the next primary hypothesis and its
interaction sub-hypothesis:

H5: As the press freedom index decreases (indicating more freedom), external political efficacy
will increase.

17

See chapter 1 and 12 in Gunther & Mughan (2000) for an especially pertinent look into media in democratic vs.
nondemocratic regimes.
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H5b: The magnitude of the effect that perceptions of corruption has on external efficacy is
amplified as press freedom increases, and this effect is statistically significant. This
would indicate a watchdog effect.

Economic considerations are also important for this aggregate level study. Gerring &
Thacker (2005) indicate in their study of neo-liberal economic policy and its correlation with
corruption that open markets and lower regulations lower corruption and that having a larger
public sector has no effect. Whether a public sector has an effect or not is important for the neoliberal critique of economic policy since it is argued that having a large public sector encourages
corruption. These authors find that this is not the case. They do find that neo-liberal economic
policy tends to lower corruption. This essay builds on the work of Gerring & Thacker by
examining the degree to which free markets, and varying levels of free markets, contribute or not
towards external political efficacy. This will shed light on the question of whether social
democracies, such as those in Europe, or more liberal democracies such as the United States,
experience relative decreases in the external political efficacy of their citizenries by virtue of
political economic differences. This economic indicator coupled with structural indicators such
as the presence of proportional representation, federalism, etc. should capture which regimes,
and most likely which democracies, are likely to experience a decrease in external political
efficacy. In doing so, the sundry of implications for low external efficacy in these countries are
open for further examination and discussion empirically and normatively in future works.
For the purposes of measuring open markets and liberalism and whether they contribute
to external political efficacy, data from the Heritage Foundation will be used. This foundation is
noted for its political leanings. Due to the non-ideological and non-normative stance of this
essay, however, risk of contamination by political predisposition should be minimal if existent at
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all. The data of the Heritage Foundation is used purely for calculation’s sake with regards to
market liberalization. The data itself is extensive and includes all necessary cases (countries) of
interest, including non-democratic regimes. The thoroughness of the index is the ultimate reason
for its use. In addition to this condition and precaution, none of the foundation’s reports or
political treatises are consulted or otherwise reported, further decreasing potential bias. This
leads to the sixth and final hypothesis for this chapter:

H6: As economic freedom increases external political efficacy increases.

Hypothesis four will be applicable to three of the four models where democracy is
included. Hypothesis five will be present in all models. Hypothesis six is applicable in all
models since even in cases where a non-democratic regime exists, such as China, economic
freedoms can still be gauged. Being in the presence of a non-democratic regime need not be
instantly non-liberalized, though the two tend to travel together. With the hypotheses presented
the exact model specification and source list can be discussed.

Data & Methods
As indicated in previous chapters, this investigation does limit itself purely to one regime
type or another; all states for which there is data are analyzed in this worldwide study. Coding
for such an important structural variable is included to account for this significant difference
throughout the world. Indeed, the aggregate level analysis focuses almost entirely on structural
variables. The reasons for this are several-fold: first, between individual countries, the primary
differences between them will be their structural variations. Likewise, by taking a meta-focus
with this chapter, it enables the use of the perceptions of corruption standard in political science:
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Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, for the primary independent variable
under investigation. This index is calculated by “a combination of surveys and assessments of
corruption, collected by a variety of reputable institutions” and has been independently reviewed
by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (Transparency International , 2014, CPI:
In Detail). It is consistently regarded as the foremost source for clear, concise, and accurate
measurements for perceptions of corruption around the world. The scale itself is actually
measuring the perceived cleanliness of a system, and is ranked as follows: 0 is the least clean
(and thus most corrupt) and 100 is the most clean, or least corrupt.18 There is a notable caveat to
using this source, particularly in comparison to the sources used for the following individuallevel chapter: the perceptions of corruption measurement is an amalgamation of data from
multiple sources, including businesses and “experts.” This data, even despite its accepted use
and reliability, is different than the data used in the next chapter. Whereas this data has been
filtered through businesses and experts, the data from the next chapter deals purely with the
surveyed opinions of large quantities of respondents with no formal expertise in the corruption
field. In other words, the manner of data collection is different between the data sources in the
two chapters. For this reason, in particular, the findings of both the aggregate level and
individual level chapters should be interpreted separately not just due to differences in the level
of analysis, but also the means of measuring the primary variable of interest.
For the dependent variable, external political efficacy, barometer surveys provide the
necessary data with variations of the question: “Does the government care about you or people

18

See appendix VIII for Transparency International’s 2013 CPI rankings. 175 countries are listed.
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like you?” Exact wording may change, but the same question is, in essence, being asked19. Each
barometer survey used and its exact wording is included in appendix section II.
Data collection on political efficacy is varied. In the Americas, the Americas Barometer
does tally an actual external political efficacy indicator. This is likewise true for Eurobarometer
as well; for individual countries and for the European Union at large20. For Afrobarometer,
however, and despite categories indicating the presence of directly measured political efficacy of
any kind, no such data is actually gathered. For Arab Barometer, external efficacy is directly
measured. For (east) Asian Barometer, all forms of political efficacy are gathered and in varying
ways; there are multiple questions for each aspect of political efficacy. These are included in
appendix section II.2122
How to measure political efficacy was a topic of considerable debate at one time. The
primary issue of concern was that measurements of one, such as internal, may actually be
tapping external as well. Basically the argument became one of whether measurement scales
were unidimensional or multidimensional in nature (Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990, pp. 289-290).
Most importantly, however, the authors find that internal and external efficacy are indeed
different and can be measured differently, and that measures of external efficacy in terms of fair
outcomes are adequate (Ibid., pp. 306-307). 23 For the country-level and individual-level

19

These data were supplied by the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University, which takes no
responsibility for any interpretation of the data. The author takes all responsibility for interpretation and
presentation of data in this essay.
20
The inclusion of the European Union at large presents an interesting opportunity for study. Unfortunately due to
the structure of the independent variables, this variable must be left out of consideration.
21
The amalgamation of barometer data and the steps taken to incorporate it all into the rest of the models is
explained in appendix section II as well. This is provided for reproducibility.
22
Data analyzed in this dissertation were collected by the East Asia Barometer Project (2001-2012), which was codirected by Profs. Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu and received major funding support from Taiwan’s Ministry of
Education, Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University. The Asian Barometer Project Office
(www.asianbarometer.org) is solely responsible for the data distribution. The author appreciates the assistance in
providing data by the institutes and individuals aforementioned. The views expressed herein are the author's own.
23
Or “better” than the alternative of trying to gauge whether political elites are responsive to the masses at large.
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analyses in this paper over the next two chapters, measurements of external efficacy are indeed
consistent with this measure; questions pertain to how responsive a government or regime is to a
person and his or her segment of society. This is different than asking whether or not the
government is broadly responsive to the masses at large; by narrowing down whether a person
believes he or she, and the associated demographic, are being responded to, the measure
becomes narrower and more useful. This paper is concerned only with external efficacy.
It must be stated up front that there are natural data limitations as a result of using the
barometer surveys for political efficacy measures. First and most obvious is that not all world
states are represented. This is unfortunate but unavoidable. Alternative measures that may result
in higher numbers of countries around the world being analyzed would have to be via proxy,
such as through confidence or trust in government, as was found consistently, directly, and
positively correlated with external political efficacy, per Niemi et al. (1991). Gauging external
efficacy directly with fewer cases is an acceptable tradeoff for increased precision in the
findings. Thankfully, all barometer surveys used do have some variation of the standard political
efficacy question.
Despite controversy for its political orientation, the Heritage Foundation’s Index of
Economic Freedom will be used for all economic considerations. Political bias occurs with the
Foundation’s reports and qualitative assessments of the raw data. The raw data, however, is all
that this paper uses and does not take a political stance. The purpose of the index is purely for
the ranking of the largest list of countries. Other politically biased sources for such indices are
used in the literature as well, such as the Canadian Frasier Institute, but the treatment of raw data
is the ultimate determinant of potential bias within the results (Ovaska & Takashima, 2006).
This index is, as mentioned earlier, incredibly robust and allows for all states, democratic or
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otherwise, to be gauged – and only the data is used, no commentary or report that could
potentially contain bias. The scale goes from 0 to 100, where 0 is the least economically free and
100 is the most economically free (The Heritage Foundation, 2014).
The Press Freedom Index, much like the CPI and economic freedom indices, uses a 0 to
over 100 scale; also can go slightly below 0. For press freedom, 0 is least oppressed, or most
free, and 100 and above is most oppressed, or least free (Reporters without Borders, 2014). This
scale goes above 100 during times of particular hardship for reporters; violence against them is
typically indicative of a score going beyond the 1-100 scale. Likewise, the scale dips below 0
for times where press freedom is expanding. This continuous scale should allow for greater
specificity in how media is regarded within the models themselves.
Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Index will be used exclusively for the fourth and
final model of this chapter. The reason for this is simple: regime type is arguably difficult to
classify using a simple dichotomous classification. To accommodate anyone skeptic of this
dichotomous scale a more in-depth scale, the Freedom House scale, will be used. Countries are
ranked using a 1 – 7 scale, where 1 is most free and 7 is least free (Freedom House, 2014). An
alternative measure to Freedom House is the Polity IV democracy rankings. These rankings
have a greater scale, from -10 – 10 but are not as up to date as Freedom House’s measures;
Freedom House is thus used. ‘Most free’ contains a Western liberal bias and is not merely a
matter of electoral politics, or structure permitting votes; this is a definitional distinction of
democracy.
Despite the theoretical importance of education to external efficacy, there is no index or
database currently available with enough scope to satisfy the requirements of this paper’s
investigation. Unfortunately, education has to be excluded from this chapter’s models.
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As previously mentioned, there are three models to test the hypotheses of this chapter.
The primary difference between the models is in consideration of how to classify regime type;
given the importance of democracy to both perceptions of corruption and external political
efficacy, it is pertinent to establish several models which allow for this to be specifically tested
amongst democracies exclusively. Due to the theoretical importance of democracy, a
democracy-only model will be tested. A non-democracy model is not included due to the
number of non-democracies in the sample; there are only ten. Still, these ten may have
statistically significant sway over the results; therefore a pure democracy model is included. The
breadth of the study is to grasp as much of the world as possible, and thus a total sample,
democracies and non-democracies, will serve as the baseline. The models are: (1) the baseline
model, including all states, democratic and non-democratic. This is coded with a standard
dummy variable; (2) democratic regimes only using the dichotomous classification of regime
type; (3) all regimes accounted for, uses Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Index. Exact
model specification is included below. All variables, unless plain in their names, are explained
in appendix section III.
In addition to the baseline models, there exists a possibility that the media is interacting
with perceptions of corruption. Due to this theoretical possibility established in the literature,
interaction models will be included alongside the baselines. Press Freedom and perceptions of
corruption are interacted together in these additional models. The expectation is that the
magnitude or degree of the effect of perceptions of corruption on external efficacy will be
different depending upon the level of press freedom; the interaction tests this. Inclusion of this
interaction term tests, in essence, whether perceptions of corruption have a greater or lesser
affect in the presence of different levels of press freedom. So, for a practical illustration: do
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perceptions of corruption have a greater or lesser impact on external efficacy levels in Denmark
depending on the levels of the country’s level of press freedom? If yes, then corruption is
varying depending upon the level of press freedom, and thus the effect corruption has upon
external efficacy is different based on the degree to which the press is free or not.
The models are time series panels using linear regression with AR(1), and checking for
random effects. The units of analysis are individual countries. The time of analysis is 2001 –
201224.
Baseline Model – Democratic & Non-democratic Regimes - Dichotomous
Efficacy = β0 + β1Corruption + β2Democracy + β3EconomicFreedom + β4PressFreedom +
β5FedvUni + β6PresvParl + β7SemiPres + β8PR + β9Communist + β10PostCommunist +
β11GDP + µ
Democratic Regimes Only – Dichotomous
Efficacy = β0 + β1Corruption + β2EconomicFreedom + β3PressFreedom + β4FedvUni +
β5PresvParl + β6SemiPre + β7PR + β8Communist + β9PostCommunist + β10GDP + µ

Freedom House Scoring Model – All Regimes
Efficacy = β0 + β1Corruption + β2FreedomHouse + β3EconomicFreedom + β4PressFreedom +
β5FedvUni + β6PresvParl + β7SemiPre + β8PR + β9Communist + β10PostCommunist + β11GDP
+µ

24

Years are not constant per country; some are three in a row, others are every other year, and some are staggered by
still larger gaps of time.
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Interaction Model – All Regimes
Efficacy = β0 + β1Corruption + β2[Democracy or FreedomHouse] + β3EconomicFreedom +
β4PressFreedom + β5FedvUni + β6PresvParl + β7SemiPres + β8PR + β9Communist +
β10PostCommunist + β11GDP + β12(Corruption*PressFreedom) + µ

Results
The results of the baseline models for this section are displayed below in Figure 1. This
is a total set using the dichotomization of regime type as well as the Freedom House score,
displayed side by side for ease of comparison. The interaction term of corruption and Press
Freedom is also included.

TABLE 1: BASELINE AGGREGATE MODEL, DEMOCRACIES & NON-DEMOCRACIES
Linear Regression with AR(1), random effects
External Political
Efficacy

Perceptions of
Corruption Index
Democracy
Freedom House Index
Economic Freedom Index
GDP per capita at PPP
Press Freedom Index
Federal vs. Unitary
Structure
Presidential vs.
Parliamentary Structure
Semi Presidential
Structure
Proportional
Representation

Democracy Dummied (1)

Freedom House
Scores (2)

Democracies
Dummied
with Press
Interaction
(3)

0.0015
(0.0018)
-0.2522
(0.1116)**
-

0.0016
(0.0018)
-

0.0017
(0.0018)
-0.2935
(0.1157)**
-

0.0141
(0.0210)
0.0024
(0.0035)
1.28e-06
(2.14e-06)
0.0012
(0.0010)
0.0511
(0.0606)
0.0102
(0.0427)
0.0167
(0.0570)
0.0728
(0.0413)*

0.0024
(0.0034)
1.05e-06
(2.12e-06)
0.0013
( 0.0009)
0.0582
(0.0600)
0.0145
(0.0421)
0.0212
(0.0565)
0.0741
(0.0396)*
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0.0031
(0.003)
1.29e-06
(2.11e-06)
0.0031
(0.0016)*
0.0583
(0.0596)
0.0125
(0.0418)
0.0286
(0.0565)
0.0700
(0.0395)*

Freedom
House
Scores with
Press
Interaction
(4)
0.0019
(0.0018)
0.0189
(0.0214)
0.0028
(0.0035)
1.49e-06
(2.13e-06)
0.0024
(0.0016)
0.0496
(0.0597)
0.0096
(0.0421)
0.0213
(0.0564)
0.0713
(0.0408)*

Post-Communist Legacy
Corruption & Press
Freedom Interaction

-0.1010
(0.0552)*
-

-0.0964
(0.0565)*
-

-0.0994
(0.0548)*
-0.0001
(0.00004)

-0.0925
(0.0557)*
-0.00004
(0.00004)

0.4658
0.1828
-0.0001
0.1365
(0.2139)**
(0.2145)
(0.00004)**
(0.2201)
0.0008
0.0114
0.0007
0.0126
R2 Within
0.3035
0.2695
0.3122
0.2927
R2 Between
0.1761
0.1699
0.1879
0.1834
R2 Overall
181
181
181
181
Obs.
Note: Variable ‘Communism’ dropped because of collinearity.
All coefficients and standard errors are rounded to the 10 thousandth place except for GDP, the interaction term, and
constant.
Entries are regression coefficients followed by standard errors in parenthesis.
*** denotes an estimate statistically significant at p <= 0.01
** denotes an estimate statistically significant at p <= 0.05
* denotes an estimate statistically significant at p <=0.1
Constant

For the most part, all variable coefficients behave as expected in their directionality,
though some explanation is required for Press Freedom. The index used in the models means
that an increase in the index equates to less press freedom, not more. The coefficient is positive
in all four models above. This indicates that, as the literature would indicate, external efficacy
rises as press freedom decreases; at least it would if it was found to be statistically significant. In
three of the four models this is the case, but interestingly enough, the third model, with
democracy dichotomized and including the corruption and press freedom interaction term, press
freedom is found to be statistically significant. This is an unexpected finding on the aggregate
level given the inclusion of non-democratic regimes. These regimes are expected to contribute
to a lack of external efficacy, and one such reason is due to oppression of the media. For press
freedom to have statistical significance in this category is telling – but especially due to the
dichotomization. The way in which democracy is coded in that model includes those regimes
that are ranked ‘partially free’ by Freedom House as well as those that are completely free. In
other words, regimes with increasing democratic aspirations, are likely swaying the results.
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One of the most important theoretical arguments, that efficacy is important to democratic
regimes, has mixed support according to the findings in Figure 1. When democracy is
dichotomized, which includes partially free regimes as stated earlier, then democracy has a
statistically significant and positive relationship with external political efficacy. This is
consistent also with the model which includes the corruption and press freedom interaction. This
grants verification of the theoretical importance that democracy, even partial or incomplete
democracy, has upon external political efficacy. An interesting contrast to this is that the greater
Freedom House scale is not found to have any statistical significance in both models where the
measure is used. Furthermore, the directionality suggests that the more non-democratic the
regime, the more external political efficacy there would be. There is no statistical significance
here, but it is suggestive, if not wholly indicative, of partially free regimes having more influence
in the model, particularly when examining the democratization dichotomization in which
partially free democratic regimes are included.
The interaction models do not turn up any significant differentiation from the baselines.
The proposed interaction effect of corruption and press freedom is not statistically significant.
This indicates that the effect on external efficacy that the level of corruption has is not changing
based on the level of press freedom. In other words, it makes no statistical difference on external
efficacy what the corruption and press freedom levels are when interacted with each other; any
statistically significant effect that these variables have with external efficacy is independent of
each other. For the overall model, variables that are statistically significant are consistent
regardless of whether the baseline or the interaction model are used.
The most consistent variables of statistical significance are the proportional
representation and post-communist legacy variables. These are statistically consistent over all
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four tested models. This provides substantial support for two theoretical contentions: first, that
proportional representation will increase external political efficacy, per Karp & Banducci (2008);
and second, that those countries with post-communist legacies will experience difficulty with
external political efficacy; that is to say that as external efficacy goes up, the likelihood of being
a post-communist country goes down. The practical implications of this are discussed more in
the discussion section.
On the aggregate, perceptions of corruption hold no statistical significance in any of the
tested models on the aggregate level. Taken on the aggregate level this may not be surprising but
such a test must take place to determine if it, among structural level variables, holds any
statistical significance. Taken on the aggregate and with both democratic and non-democratic
regimes, the answer to that question is simply ‘no.’
The results of the democracies-only models are displayed below in Figure 2. The
dichotomization model is regarded as the baseline and therefore the democracy dummy variable
from Figure 1 has been removed. For sake of comparison between democracies, the Freedom
House scale is added to additional models.

TABLE 2: DEMOCRACIES ONLY MODEL, DICHOTOMOUS & FREEDOM HOUSE
VARIANTS
External Political
Efficacy

Linear Regression with AR(1), random effects
Democracies Dummied
Freedom House
Democracies
(5)
Scores (6)
Dummied with
Press Freedom
Interaction (7)

Perceptions of
Corruption Index
Freedom House Index

0.0013
(0.0018)
-

Economic Freedom
Index

0.0025
(0.0034)

0.0014
(0.0018)
0.0054
(0.0216)
0.0026
(0.0034)
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0.0018
(0.0018)
0.0028
(0.0034)

Freedom
House Scores
with Press
Interaction
(8)
0.0020
(0.0019)
0.0101
(0.0216)
0.0030
(0.0035)

GDP per capita at PPP
Press Freedom Index
Federal vs. Unitary
Structure
Presidential vs.
Parliamentary
Structure
Semi Presidential
Structure
Proportional
Representation
Post-Communist Legacy
Corruption & Press
Freedom Interaction

1.17e-06
(2.12e-06)
0.0010
(0.0010)
0.0580
(0.0600)
0.0217
(0.0426)

1.22e-06
(2.13e-06)
0.0008
(0.0011)
0.0569
(0.0602)
0.0233
(0.0431)

1.37e-06
(2.10e-06)
0.0035
(0.0023)
0.0554
(0.0594)
0.0166
(0.0423)

1.48e-06
(2.11e-06)
0.0034
(0.0023)
0.0531
(0.0594)
0.0193
(0.0426)

0.0168
(0.0565)
0.0752
(0.0397)*
-0.1026
(0.0554)*
-

0.0162
(0.0566)
0.0779
(0.0412)*
-0.1001
(0.0562)*
-

0.0262
(0.0564)
0.0669
(0.0398)*
-0.0964
(0.0549)*
-0.0001
(0.0001)

0.0257
(0.0563)
0.0715
(0.0410)*
-0.0913
(0.0558)****
-0.0001
(0.0001)

0.2199
0.1970
0.1740
0.1272
(0.1903)
(0.2134)
(0.1938)
(0.2193)
0.0038
0.0066
0.0007
0.0022
R2 Within
0.2639
0.2671
0.2824
0.2899
R2 Between
0.1573
0.1600
0.1767
0.1828
R2 Overall
179
179
179
179
Obs.
Note: ‘Democracy’ variable unneeded for dichotomization; dataset excluded all non-democracies by the
dichotomization scale.
All coefficients and standard errors are rounded to the 10 thousandth place except for GDP.
Entries are regression coefficients followed by standard errors in parenthesis.
*** denotes an estimate statistically significant at p <= 0.01
**denotes an estimate statistically significant at p <= 0.05
* denotes an estimate statistically significant at p <=0.1
****Post-Communist Legacy drops to p=0.102, just outside statistical significance, in the last model.
Constant

For democracies only, the findings remain consistent with the aggregate level with a
couple of exceptions. First, press freedom does not at any point become statistically significant,
unlike in the last of the aggregate models. This is not entirely surprising since democracies are
relatively similar in support of the press instead of being against it. The second exception is in
the statistical significance of the post-communist legacy in the last interaction model. The
statistical significance for this variable drops off, but sits just outside the range at p=0.102. The
inclusion of the corruption and press freedom interaction, despite not having any statistical
significance itself, managed to throw off the consistent statistical significance of the postcommunist legacy. This indicates that, despite not having a statistically significant relationship
by itself, the magnitude of the effect between corruption and press freedom on external efficacy
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is causing enough difference between corruption and press freedom that statistical significance is
lost in the otherwise dominant post-communist legacy variable; the interaction term is offsetting
post-communist legacy’s effect on external efficacy.
Again no statistical significance is found for the perceptions of corruption variable. This
is again unsurprising on the aggregate level where structural variables are expected to perform
better. The practical implication of finding no statistical significance at this level is a matter of
arguable relief, particularly for the normativist interested in structural level factors of external
efficacy. Simply put, the lack of statistical significance for perceptions of corruption should be
easing for anyone that would consider it as significant as structural variables, or at least those
variables examined here, towards external efficacy considerations, and amongst democracies
alone.
As an additional check on the influence of countries to statistical significance
methodologically, the regression was also tested as a hierarchical model organized by country
ID. Unsurprisingly, there were no general differences in the results of the tables presented above
and the additional checks except in one test. When democracy is dichotomized and the press
freedom * corruption interaction is included, press freedom by itself becomes statistically
significant at p <= 0.05. This indicates that, when organizing the data around country IDs, as
external efficacy increases, the press becomes more oppressed in a country. This finding is
counter-intuitive, but the actual increase is so slight that this finding, though statistically
significant, is not necessarily substantively so. Given the lack of statistical significance in all
other tests conducted at this level, this finding is noted as an oddity and not a substantively
worthwhile finding.
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Discussion
The aggregate findings and relevant ramifications of this chapter are surprising.
Perceptions of corruption are not statistically significant in any of the models, yet several other
variables consistently were. On the aggregate level, the theoretical importance of regime type
was given support, but only when democracy was dummied. The inclusion of partially free
regimes with the most established, totally free, democracies is the critical part of this
relationship. In essence, the difference between any form of democracy, even those that are not
completely free, are significant indicators of possessing higher external political efficacy. This
stands in stark contrast to those that are totally unfree autocracies. Outside of the aggregate level
and the support for democracy that is found there, there are other variables of consistent
significance.
The statistical significance of proportional representation upon every model is consistent
with the findings of Karp & Banducci (2008). The result itself is not surprising when taken with
theoretical context. What is surprising, however, is that proportional representation is
statistically significant alongside all other variables included in the models, and especially
perceptions of corruption and press freedom; both variables of which seem to have greater
theoretical and philosophical linkage to external political efficacy than proportional
representation would. The implication of this finding should bolster arguments made by
supporters of proportional representation which contend it as superior to alternatives. While this
study does not take a side in the debate of proportional representation vs. winner-take-all in
terms of efficiency or fairness, the resultant increase in external political efficacy does lend
support to the notion that, when taken on the aggregate and in a sample of democracies only,
countries with proportional representation have higher rates of external political efficacy. The
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voices of the citizenry are regarded as better heard and this, then, could be used to bolster
supporters of this kind of voting structure.
The proposed interactive effect upon external efficacy by perceptions of corruption and
press freedom is not statistically significant. The magnitude of the effect on external efficacy
that corruption has is not different based upon the level of press freedom.
The presence of post-communist legacy holding statistical significance in almost all
models also bolsters the significance of studying the effected states and their communist
histories. These results clearly indicate that those states with post-communist legacies will have
lower rates of external political efficacy. The impact of communism upon the political cultures
of these states should be given substantial consideration in future research; it is more than a
qualitative curiosity, but a quantitative one as well. Indeed, those who focused upon the effects
of post-communist legacies in the established literature should see these results as encouraging.
The consistent support in all three models indicate that such historical communism, even in the
presence of currently existing communism – China and Vietnam are included in the list of
countries25 – post-communist legacies remain as important as ever for considerations of whether
the citizenry believe their governments are responsive to their voices.
Results for the hypothesized relationships are as follows. For the first hypothesis, that as
perceptions of corruption rise, external efficacy will decrease, is false. The results of all models
in this chapter confirm this. The second hypothesis and its two derivatives are also false.
Perceptions of corruption have no statistically significant relationship with either democracies or
non-democracies, though the latter was not reported as tested among the models in the previous
section. H2A does show the direction of perceptions of corruption as supportive of what was

25

Communism dropped in the models and are left unreported.
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hypothesized but does not hold any statistical significance. This hypotheses is shown to be false
in significance but not directionality. H2B is true, however, since in all instances regime type is
not a statistically significant predictor of external political efficacy.
The third hypothesis is true, but only in directionality. Freedom House scores and
perceptions of corruption coefficients behave as expected but neither hold statistical significance.
The fourth hypothesis regarding proportional representation increasing with external
political efficacy is true. The directionality behaves as expected and the variable is consistently
found to have statistical significance.
The fifth hypothesis regarding press freedom also does not operate as expected. The
directionality is reversed; one would expect that as press freedom increase, so too does external
efficacy. This is not the case. The relationship itself, however, is not found to be statistically
significant except in one model, dichotomization with the press and corruption interaction. The
hypothesis is false. The sub-hypothesis regarding the interaction itself is also false, but not due
to directionality concerns – but instead due to lack of statistical significance. No effect, much
less one supporting a watchdog effect, was found.
The sixth and final hypothesis for testing in this chapter, regarding increases in economic
freedom corresponding to increases in external political efficacy is false; only directionality is
consistent with the hypothesis. No economic variable, economic freedom or GDP, have a
statistically significant relationship with external political efficacy.
As the aggregate level analysis closes there are several points to be kept in mind,
particularly regarding the perceptions of corruption finding. First, corruption measures on this
level, though theoretically and hypothetically present, are not found. This is due to the
somewhat surprising importance of both proportional representation and post-communist
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legacies as the prime statistically significant indicators of increased external political efficacy.
The sample size, furthermore, is far lower here than in the following chapter, which examines the
individual-level. In addition to these reasons, the difference in how perceptions of corruption is
measured could also be altering the findings. Given the difference between Transparency
International’s use of businesses and experts to determine corruption levels in various countries,
the barometer surveys used in the next chapter deal exclusively with the survey respondents of
no particular inclination; experts, businessmen, etc. are only included if by chance in the
population samples and were not specifically sought out with all the potential biases that could
result.
Despite no statistically significant findings for the corruption variable here, the
theoretical substance behind perceptions of corruption being statistically significant on the
individual level is, again in theory and hypothetically, expected to be higher. It is this import to
the individual level that perceptions of corruption should be most influential. Furthermore, the
theoretical link of trust and confidence measures to both corruption and efficacy is testable on
the individual level; the barometer surveys, providing the canvas for the next chapter’s testing, is
rich in trust and confidence questioning. The individual-level analysis should be most telling for
the primary question of corruption’s influence upon external efficacy.
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CHAPTER 5

CORRUPTION & EFFICACY ON THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL

“Corruption has its own motivations, and one has to thoroughly study that phenomenon and
eliminate the foundations that allow corruption to exist.”
– Eduard Shevardnadze
Chapter 4 investigated perceptions of corruption and political efficacy on the world stage;
states were examined as well as a sundry of structural conditions. These findings were
unexpected. Perceptions of corruption were never found to hold statistical significance in each
of the models run. Instead, the presence of a proportional representation voting system, and the
existence of a post-communist legacy were the primary statistically significant indicators of rises
in external efficacy. The aggregate, structural level of analysis is concluded with unexpected
findings. In this chapter, the individual and his or her attitudes are the focus. Individuals are the
unit of analysis; and perhaps they will behave more as expected.
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Theory
The focus of this chapter is an extension of the analysis for chapter 4. Studying the
aggregate level of efficacy and corruption is consistent with the literature, as structural
differences have been found significant in explaining differences in efficacy. Despite the
importance of the aggregate level, the importance of the individual with regards to perceptions
and attitudes cannot be understated. For this reason, an investigation of the individual is
conducted here to fully and fairly examine the linkage between perceptions of corruption and
external political efficacy. Per Clark & Acock (1989), attitudes themselves can, and often do,
influence actual political behavior. This is not a uniform consequence of external efficacy, but it
is a typical one. As Clark & Acock (1989) find, regardless of potential political behavior,
however, external efficacy feeds into general political attitudes. Somewhere down the line of
inputs and outputs external efficacy will influence political attitudes, and from those attitudes
actual behavior, such as voting, protesting, rioting, etc. (Fackler & Lin 1995; Peters & Welch
1980; Blais et al. 2005; Dobratz & Whitfield 1992; Meier & Holbrook 1992; Tavits 2007b;
Valentino et al. 2009; Finkel 1987; Madsen 1987; Almond & Verba 1963; Ulbig 2008; Miller &
Listhaug 1999; and Renno 2011). The attitudes of the individual, then, are clearly important to
fully grasp the question of whether or not perceptions of corruption contribute to external
efficacy.
On the aggregate level that are certain expectations that can be made, especially in
reviewing the literature, regarding the difference between regime types (Warren 2004; Stewart et
al. 1992; Ulbig 2008; Johnston 2005, Norris 2012 and others). Democratic regimes are expected
to be more sensitive to attitudes and perceptions due to the inherent potential consequence of
political behavior. Political behavior, voting and so on, is fundamentally important to the
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function of the democratic regime; it is thus expected that external political efficacy be an
important consideration for its healthy continuity. This is not necessarily so for non-democratic
regimes. With that said, the barometers do not account for structural variables; given that the
individual is not a democratic or non-democratic regime, applying the variable in such a way as
to paint entire observation groups is skimming ecological fallacy. The structural level analysis
served to investigate the relevant regime variables.
In collecting data for this chapter, in particular looking very in-depth to the questioning
of the barometer surveys, it became clear that the questions themselves being asked were
consistently dependent upon perceived attitudes of the region in question. For example, for the
Eurobarometer, there are no such questions regarding whether democracy seems an appropriate
form of governance; for the Arab and Asian barometers, in contrast, these questions are asked.
The contextual differences between the regions are important to note, similar to the differences
in efficacy and corruption considerations on different levels of government (Stewart et al. 1992).
The barometers themselves are constructed with regional contexts in mind and these contexts are
respected here. This guides the hypotheses and construction of the methodology for the rest of
the chapter.
Of great interest and importance are the way trust and confidence among the sample
populations interact with external efficacy. Consistent with contentions by Ulbig (2008), trust
and external political efficacy are expected to travel hand in hand (see also: Baumgartner &
Morris 2006; Miller & Listhaug 1999). This chapter takes particular focus upon trust in
government, media, and interpersonally, in its model construction.
Where applicable, models will account for trust of policies and governments that are inline with preferences, per the common contention in the literature that there is a winner vs. loser
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effect with regards to efficacy and perceptions of corruption (Tavits 2007a; Lambert et al. 1986;
Madsen 1987; Norris 1999).
The importance of economics will also be tested, both in terms of general economic
appraisals and personal appraisals, the latter where applicable (Heineman 2009; Williams 1999b;
Harrison 1999; Moran 1999; Sun 2004; Johnston 2005). The surprising result from the
aggregate level, that economics – or at least economic freedom – did not contribute to external
political efficacy is retested here for the individual. It is expected to behave differently in
accordance with the literature. Economic considerations are important not just structurally, but
individually as well.
Media and its potential interaction with perceptions of corruption are also tested beside
the baselines. Note that the debate in the media literature over whether the media has an effect
on the viewer is taken as resolved; that there does exist a measurable media effect and that this is
potentially important for perception considerations. As such, besides testing media and
corruption variables separately, they are also interacted (Aarts & Semetko 2003; Bennet 2002;
Porto 2011; Mutz & Reeves 2005; Baumgartner & Morris 2006; J. Morris 2009). The degree of
corruption’s effect on external efficacy is expected to vary based on the level of trust in the
media. So if perceptions of corruption are already high, its effect on external efficacy will be
different based on whether the media is trusted or not, either by mitigation or amplification. This
is a way of testing for the presence of the watchdog effect or an indoctrination effect (Power &
Taylor 2011). Should this variable be statistically significant, it will indicate that the degree or
magnitude of the effect that corruption has on external efficacy will vary based on the level of
trust in the media. So, for example, if trust is high and corruption is high, then one could
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perceive a watchdog effect. If trust is high and corruption is low, then one could see an
indoctrination effect.
The individual level affords a marked advantage theoretically due to the inclusion of
educational attainment variables. As found and argued by Bowler & Donovan (2002) and
Ainsworth (2000) most notably, education is substantively linked to political efficacy writ large;
internal and external. It is expected that education will be found consistently with statistical
significance and that as education increases so too does external efficacy.
Socioeconomic status is used as a control for income for each barometer survey. Not all
barometer surveys have reported income, however, but do include relative measures, such as
Afrobarometer, which asks to rank one’s living conditions, such as very good or very bad.
Inclusion of socioeconomic indicators is a basic control. Besides this control, however, and as
argued by Moran (1999) and Sun (2004) in their studies of the effects of liberalization, the rich,
or those with higher socioeconomic status, should naturally have higher efficacy due to being
able to engage, by virtue of their statuses, in corrupt activity with the government. As a result of
this theoretical expectation an interaction is included in calculations for all barometers. The
interaction itself measures the degree of the effect that perceptions of corruption has on external
efficacy based on the level of socioeconomic status. So, if, per Moran (1999) and Sun (2004),
the rich are expected to have higher external efficacies, the degree of corruption’s effect on
external efficacy will be dependent upon socioeconomic status; being rich will alter the
perceptions of corruption effect on external efficacy. The expectation is that the effect
corruption has on external efficacy will be mitigated in the presence of higher socioeconomic
status. The rich do not care about the corruption in government if they are the ones taking
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advantage of it; thus, the traditional theoretical expectation that corruption decreases external
efficacy would be negated based on higher socioeconomic status.
Lastly, the theoretical importance of culture and potential exceptionality of various
countries and peoples over others demands another measure beyond the standard survey. For
this purpose, multilevel modeling to account for country-level effects on populations is included
next to the standard survey and OLS regressions (Albright & Marinova 2010; Burton et al. 1998;
Gelman 2006). These models will contrast with the baselines in accounting for these countryspecific effects within the surveys.

Hypotheses
The hypotheses here are not altogether different than those of the previous chapter. The
importance, however, is in establishing the contexts to fully appreciate the weight of what is
being studied. Chapter 4’s hypotheses regarding the relationship between perceptions of
corruption and external efficacy, for example, are still applicable and are restated here. Later
hypotheses regarding the relationship between economic or press indices and political efficacy,
however, cannot be tested using the barometers. In consequence, adjustments have to be made;
these adjustments thus focus on the attitudes regarding those dimensions. Trust, in particular,
holds critical importance on the individual level.
Still central to this chapter is the hypothetical relationships between external political
efficacy and perceptions of corruption. For some barometer surveys there exist only a single
corruption measure, for others, they are further broken down. Generally speaking, the theory
underpinning the first hypothesis from the previous chapter applies equally well here. It is
restated below.
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H1: As perceptions of corruption increase, external political efficacy will decrease.

The structural hypotheses from the previous chapter, three through six, are not included
in this chapter. Depending upon the barometer, questions pertinent to those variables are
included to provide control for the models.
Trust and confidence in government, the media, state of the economy (when applicable),
and interpersonally are expected to have significant effects upon external political efficacy. In
some barometers there are questions pertaining to the state of the economy; when these questions
are present, this will be tested as a control. In doing so, this should shed further light on the
relationship between economics and external political efficacy if such a connection exists. It is
not gauging degrees of economic freedom (in essence, liberalization), but it will capture views of
the economic conditions of the countries in question. Socioeconomic status is also gauged as a
control for each model and in interaction with corruption. For trust in the media, the media as
watch dogs and critics of government would seem to contribute to a decrease in external political
efficacy by portraying the faults of government; such faults could or would give the impression
of less responsive, or perhaps incompetent, governance. This will provide greater context and
nuance to the findings of the previous chapter. This leads to hypotheses two through five below.

H2: As trust in government increases, so too does external political efficacy.
H3: The magnitude of corruption’s effect on external efficacy will be different based on the level
of trust in the media.
H4: Trust or confidence in the state of or direction of the economy will lead to an increase in
external political efficacy.
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H5: The magnitude of corruption’s effect on external efficacy will be different based on one’s
socioeconomic status.

Based upon the literature, trust and confidence measures take center stage here.
Additional variables pertaining to other potential inputs, such as with preferred parties in power,
political and philosophical ideology, and others, will again be included where applicable for
added control. Education is noted as an important factor in external political efficacy in the
literature at large as well and is therefore added to all models where the data is available.

Data & Methods
Data is provided from the sources mentioned in the chapter 4. The barometer surveys are
the focal points of analysis here. It must be noted that for the aggregate level, efficacy was
gauged using a unified, aggregated measure across all barometer surveys. For this chapter no
such aggregation or unified measure is employed. The original scales are used within each
regional analysis.
Both perceptions of corruption and external efficacy are attitudes; as such, there are
potential issues in claiming causality. Moreover, the statistical tests being employed, though
indicating statistical significance, do not necessarily address causality as a result of the two
primary variables being attitudes. In other words, in the event that perceptions of corruption do
hold statistical significance, this does not necessarily indicate that perceptions of corruption lead
to a causal increase or decrease in external efficacy; the inverse may be true, external efficacy
may be driving perceptions of corruption. As a means of disentangling this issue, an additional
test was conducted using the Americas Barometer which substitutes perceptions of corruption for
bribery and clientelism. In this way, instead of an attitude affecting an attitude, an action affects
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an attitude – which is a stronger test of the causal claim. Due to the wide differences between all
barometers and what questions are included, only the Americas Barometer is given this
additional causal test.
Each model is constructed based upon individual barometer surveys. Included variables
are entirely dependent upon which barometer survey includes them. All models include some
variation of the efficacy measure which are reported in the appendix as well as the regime
identifier. For the primary independent variable of concern, perceptions of corruption, those
barometers, such as Afrobarometer, that ask specific questions about corruption with various
branches (executive, legislative, judicial) will be given preference and reported in the models.
For those that do not, general perceptions of corruption measures will be used. Where
applicable, education is also gauged as a control variable. Per contentions in the literature, it is
expected to go up as external efficacy goes up.
Due to the theoretical importance that countries play in terms of corruption and in
efficacy, multilevel modeling is used for comparison and contrast with the OLS and survey
regressions used. The multilevel (or hierarchical) analysis accounts for variation between
whatever the organizational variable is; in this case it is by country. Furthermore, the multilevel
analysis accounts for mixed effects within STATA 13. Using mixed effects accounts for both
random and fixed effects by the organizational variable (country) in the regression analysis. For
the Asian Barometer, however, Hong Kong is separated from China. This is due to the special
status (legally and otherwise) Hong Kong holds in China. Consistent with this difference as
accounted for in the barometer, this essay counts Hong Kong as a separate entity alongside
countries during the multilevel analysis of that area.
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Each model shown below is the baseline OLS or survey model. The multilevel models
are identifiably similar but organized in regression by country. The models shown below also
exclude interactions that are included in the empirical analysis in the next section. The base
variables that are being interacted, media, corruption, and socioeconomics, are displayed here.
Due to the potential interference that trust variables play with perceptions of corruption and
external efficacy, each model is additionally tested without trust variables included. In the event
that substantive findings are altered, these are reported in the results.
Beginning with the Afrobarometer, there is only one barometer available and for a single
year. This makes analysis swift and simple with an OLS regression. Model 1, for
Afrobarometer, is shown below. This is the set up for each of the models presented below, in
categorical order, for brevity’s sake; some barometers have many corruption variables and trust
variables, where others have only few. Media trust is not available for this barometer survey but
a sundry of other trust and corruption indicators are. Gender, education, age, and socioeconomic
status are also included as dummy variables. Only Afrobarometers round 4 is used here. The
year of analysis is 2008.

Afrobarometer Model
Efficacy = β0 + β1, 2, etc.[Corruption Vars.] + β3, 4, etc.[Trust Vars.] + β5Gender + β6Age
β7Economics + β8Education + β9Socioeconomics + µ

The second model is based on the Americas Barometer. This barometer is provided as a
merged dataset and is set up through STATA as a typical panel time series. Unlike in
Afrobarometer, media trust is an available variable. Corruption, in contrast, is only a single
variable. This variable, furthermore, includes both perceptions of corruption and actual

98

experiences of corruption. In terms of theoretical purity it is acceptable, if slightly muddled, but
this is the only corruption question consistently asked and will be used. Though splitting hairs,
even with the experience of corruption, one is still perceiving corruption. For those not
experiencing corruption, they still have the ability to perceive corruption. The measure is
adequate for use. The model, shown below, is conducted using standard linear regression of the
declared survey data. The time period of analysis is 2004-2012.

Americas Barometer Model
Efficacy = β0 + β1Corruption + β2, 3, etc.[Trust Vars. Including media] + β4Sex + β5Age +
β7Education + β8Economics + β9Socioeconomics + µ

The third model is based on the Arab Barometer. This barometer, unlike the Americas
Barometer, is unavailable in a merged dataset. Furthermore, some questions are not consistently
asked in the same way, at all, or are changed into other variables per barometer wave or round.
As a result, the Arab Barometers will be conducted separately per round. Round 2 has
inconsistent education questioning and so the variable is excluded in one run of the equation; a
second run is displayed in the next column.26 Round 2 also asks a question regarding how fair
and honest news media is, which is included as a variable for round 2 only. Due to the media
variable included in round 2 but not round 1, the interaction between corruption and media is
only included for round 2. Both rounds are conducted using standard OLS. Round 1’s time
period of analysis is 2006-7 and Round 2’s is 2010-11.

26

Tunisia is excluded from the education variable in round 2.
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Arab Barometer Model, R1 & R2
Efficacy = β0 + β1,Corruption + β2,3

etc.[Trust

Vars.] + β4Sex/Gender + β5Age + β6Economics +

β7Education + β8FairMedia(R2 only) + β9Socioeconomics + µ

The fourth model is based on the Asian Barometer. This barometer, like the Arab
Barometer, does not have a merged dataset. Moreover, the second Asian Barometer does not ask
political efficacy questions consistent with the first or third waves, and a large gap therefore
exists between the two. Like the Arab Barometer, this model is separated by wave. Both waves
are conducted using standard OLS. Wave 1’s time of analysis is 2001-3 and wave 3’s is 20102012; the waves took much time to complete and do not actually cover multiple years. All
respondents from a country are surveyed during a single time period. The models displayed
below are identical but many questions between the waves have had their wording changed or
placing within the survey changed.

Asian Barometer Models, W1 & W3
Efficacy = β0 + β1, 2, etc.[Corruption Vars.] + β3, 4, etc.[Trust Vars. Including the media] +
β5Gender + β6Age + β7[Economic Vars.] + β8Education + β9Socioeconomics + µ

The fifth and final model would have been based on the Eurobarometer surveys.
Unfortunately, corruption issues have only been added as special barometer issues beginning
with round 79. Efficacy measures ceased after round 74. The unfortunate result of this is that
Europe cannot be gauged in this individual level examination, though discussion will be given to
the Eurobarometer Anti-Corruption report recently (as of early 2014) released later in this
chapter. Though not directly tested in this essay, the European report does speak of corruption’s
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effects upon trust and economics. These will be discussed for comparative context but will not
factor into the conclusions of this paper.
Results
Results of the Afrobarometer survey models are presented in Figure 3, below.
TABLE 3: AFROBAROMETER
Afrobarometer Round 4, 2008, OLS Regression & Multilevel Analysis27
16,738 Observations
Scale: 1-4, 1 being difficult, 4 being easy. Higher number indicates high external efficacy.

External Political
Efficacy

Baseline
Model (1)

Socioeconomic
Interactions (2)

Multilevel
Baseline (3)

Multilevel w/
Socioeconomic
Interactions (4)

Corrupt Executive

-0.0538
(0.0139)***
-0.0347
(0.0154)**
-0.0306
(0.0146)**

-0.0577
(0.0327)*
-0.0534
(0.0371)
-0.0536
(0.0352)

-0.0484
(0.0136)***
-0.0058
(0.0149)
-0.0163
(0.0142)

-0.0576
(0.0316)*
-0.0198
(0.0358)
-0.0520
(0.0340)

-0.0454
(0.0127)***
0.0264
(0.0127)**
0.0199
(0.0106)*
0.0152
(0.0108)
0.0625
(0.0103)***
-0.0195
(0.0084)**
0.0277
(0.0103)**
-0.0092
(0.0107)
0.0314
(0.0106)**
-0.0082
(0.0099)
-0.0249
(0.0168)

0.0109
(0.0302)
-0.0009
(0.0300)
0.0200
(0.0106)*
0.0150
(0.0108)
0.0626
(0.0103)***
-0.0197
(0.0084)**
0.0275
(0.0103)**
-0.0091
(0.0107)
0.0310
(0.0106)**
-0.0081
(0.0099)
-0.0243
(0.0168)

-0.0027
(0.0125)
0.0020
(0.0125)
0.0031
(0.0106)
0.0243
(0.0106)**
0.0498
(0.0101)***
0.0062
(0.0084)
0.0003
(0.0102)
-0.0006
(0.0105)
0.0085
(0.0106)
0.0166
(0.0097)*
-0.0147
(0.0162)

0.0367
(0.0292)
-0.0273
(0.0291)
0.0029
(0.0106)
0.0246
(0.0106)**
0.0496
(0.0101)***
0.0061
(0.0084)
-0.0001
(0.0102)
-0.0003
(0.0105)
0.0082
(0.0106)
0.0168
(0.0097)*
-0.0142
(0.0162)

Corrupt Legislature
Corrupt Government
Officials
Corrupt Police
Corrupt Judges &
Magistrates
Trust Executive
Trust Legislature
Trust Ruling Party
Trust Opposition
Party
Trust Police
Trust Courts
Trust Family
Trust Others
(Interpersonal Trust)
Female

27

Countries in study: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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0.0026
(0.0006)*
0.0247
(0.0075)**
0.0036
(0.0044)
0.0443
(0.0078)***
-

0.0026
(0.0006)***
0.0248
(0.0075)**
0.0037
(0.0044)
0.0419
(0.0162)**
0.0014
(0.0110)

0.0018
(0.0006)**
0.0092
(0.0075)
0.0056
(0.0046)
0.0599
(0.0077)***
-

0.0018
(0.0006)**
0.0091
(0.0075)
0.0057
(0.0046)
0.0391
(0.0158)**
0.0036
(0.0107)

-

0.0070
(0.0125)

-

0.0052
(0.0120)

-

0.0083
(0.0118)

-

0.0131
(0.0114)

Socioeconomic
Status*Corrupt Police

-

-0.0206
(0.0100)**

-

-0.0144
(0.0097)

Socioeconomic
Status*Corrupt
Judges & Magistrates

-

0.0101
(0.0101)

-

0.0110
(0.0098)

Constant

1.7274
(0.0593)***
0.0364
0.0353
-

1.7342
(0.0708)***
0.0367
0.0353
-

-

-

1.7388
(0.0936)***
0.3258
(0.0524)***
1.0335
(0.0057)***

1.7950
(0.1009)***
0.3262
(0.0525)***
1.0333
(0.0057)***

Age
Economic Appraisal
of Country
Education
Socioeconomic Status
Socioeconomic
Status*Corrupt
Executive
Socioeconomic
Status* Corrupt
Legislature
Socioeconomic
Status*Corrupt
Government Officials

R2
Adj. R2
Country (ID)
Constant
Country (ID)
Residual

Note: All coefficients and standard errors are rounded to the 10 thousandth place.
Entries are regression coefficients followed by standard errors in parenthesis.
Multilevel Analysis: 20 groups, group variable is by country
*** denotes an estimate statistically significant at p<=0.01
** denotes an estimate statistically significant at p <= 0.05
*denotes an estimate statistically significant at p <= 0.1

The findings for the Afrobarometer models require a great deal of unpacking. The
baseline is examined first (model 1), followed by the socioeconomic interaction version of the
model (model 2), and then moving on to the multilevel baseline (model 3) and its interacted
version (model 4).
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Firstly, for the baseline model 1, all corruption variables are statistically significant.
These findings are not altogether unsurprising, however, given the countries of study. Africa is
notorious for corruption, and its influence upon whether citizens believe government cares about
them (external political efficacy) seemed highly likely. Perhaps more interesting than the
statistical significance of each corruption variable is in the direction of one in particular. All
corruption variable coefficient directionalities behave as expected with the exception of corrupt
judges & magistrates. Here, as judges are perceived to be more corrupt, external efficacy
increases. This is highly unexpected and is will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
As far as trust variables are concerned, there is more variation in statistical significance.
Between the executive and legislature, only the executive is statistically significant. This is
likely due to the higher profile nature of executives and their politics. It is easier to pay attention
to the perceived political apex than to a larger number of seemingly less important figures. For
the literature at large, the findings surroundings trust in political parties are of particular note.
Both trust in the ruling party and trust in the opposition party are statistically significant, and
their coefficient directionalities are as one would expect. This provides support for the
contention in the literature that there is a winner vs. loser effect when external political efficacy
comes into play. Trusting the police was also statistically significant, indicating that when the
police force is trustworthy a person will have higher external political efficacy. Interestingly,
trust in the courts did not have a statistically significant effect upon external political efficacy,
which seems odd given the significance of trusting the police.
Perhaps odder than the difference between trust in the police and the courts was the
difference between trust in family and trust in others. Trust in family is statistically significant,
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meaning the higher trust one has in family the more likely a person’s external efficacy will
increase. Trust in others, however, is not statistically significant in the baseline OLS model.
The perceived economic status, good or bad, of the country, is also statistically
significant, but only in the OLS models (1 and 2); it loses statistical significance in the multilevel
models (3 and 4). The importance of economics to nearly all topics of political science does not
make statistical significance surprising, but to lose this significance in the multilevel models is
curious.
Education is not statistically significant but follows the expected coefficient directionality
in all models. This casts doubt in the literature which claims that education tends to increase
alongside increases in external efficacy. The result is surprising.
Socioeconomic status is statistically significant and behaves in accordance to theory. As
one’s socioeconomic status increases so too does external political efficacy. The richer a person
is, the more likely he or she believes the government is responsive to him or her. This is
consistent across all models.
Age is the final variable of statistical significance; as age increases, external efficacy
increases. This is unsurprising, especially given that education, age, and socioeconomic status
tend to travel together. An 18 year old is not likely to be as educated as a 24 year old, nor be as
financially well off. For that matter, a 24 year old is not expected to have as high external
efficacy due to older generations being more involved in government and politics. By simple
reflection of the population, one would expect the older a person gets to increase with external
efficacy, broadly speaking.
For all other models only perceptions of a corrupt executive remains statistically
significant. This makes sense, again, given that the executive is the most high-profile
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government official. It is unclear, however, why all other corruption variables lose significance
in all other models except to say that interactions between corruption and socioeconomic status,
while none hold statistical significance themselves, do alter the dynamics of the rest of the
corruption variables.
In terms of trust, the standard OLS models (1 and 2) have statistical significance with
trust in the executive but not the legislature, whereas in the multilevel models (3 and 4), the
relationship is reversed; the legislature and not the executive holds statistical significance.
Across all models trust in the current ruling party was statistically significant, providing support
for the winner vs. loser effect documented in the literature. The OLS models (1 and 2) saw
statistical significance in trusting the opposition party as well, but this significance ceases in the
multilevel models (3 and 4).
The relationship noted earlier for trust in the police in the baseline OLS model (1)
continues in model 2, but ceases in the multilevel models. The lack of statistical significance in
the courts is consistent across all models.
Interestingly, interpersonal trust, not statistically significant and with opposing
directionality in the OLS models (1 and 2), is statistically significant in the multilevel models (3
and 4) and has expected directionality. For the multilevel models, external political efficacy
increases as interpersonal trust increases. This is far more consistent with the literature than the
findings of the OLS models, which holds no statistical significance alongside reverse
directionality. Given the oft toted importance of interpersonal trust writ large, the findings are
mixed. This indicates that nuance is important when it comes to political efficacy; for Africans,
at least, family seems far more important than trust in others in the OLS models. When
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expanded in the multilevel models, accounting for variation between the countries, interpersonal
trust is statistically significant and behaves in accordance with the established literature.
Only in model 2, using OLS and interacting socioeconomic factors with perceptions of
corruption, was an interaction variable statistically significant. Socioeconomic status interacted
with perceptions of corruption in the police was statistically significant. This means that the
degree of the effect of perceiving the police to be corrupt on external efficacy is different based
on a person’s socioeconomic status; the effect itself is mitigating external efficacy. The likeliest
practical explanation for this is that, regionally speaking (model 2), the effect of perceiving the
police as corrupt is dependent on whether a person is rich or poor. Given the performance of the
socioeconomic variable independently, which indicates that as socioeconomic status increases,
external efficacy increases, it is likely that whether the police are crooked has more impact on
the poor than the wealthy. This would seem to indicate a potential relationship between the
wealthy and corruption in the police force, but due to a lack of statistical significance in all other
models this finding is muted against the prevailing evidence to a lack of statistical significance.
Still, while not tested here, there is likely a practice of having the police in the pockets of the rich
in Afrobarometer region.
Lastly, the multilevel group variable for which the analysis was organized around,
country, was statistically significant. This indicates that organization by country is statistically
significant in subsequently found relationships with external political efficacy.
To test for potential issues of causality in the models trust variables were removed. All
variables behaved consistently when these variables were removed within the baseline model. In
model 2, the baseline with interactions, perceptions of corruption in the legislature and
government officials became statistically significant. In the third and fourth models, both
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multilevel models, the exclusion of trust variables caused economic appraisal to become
statistically significant. Trust, in other words, was mitigating the statistical significance of
economics in the multilevel analysis. Within the baseline with interactions present, trust was
muddling the effects of perceiving corruption in the legislature as well as government officials.

In terms of the Afrobarometer alone, the hypotheses for testing result as follows:
H1: conditionally true; all corruption variables are consistent in directionality and statistical
significance with external efficacy in the baseline, but only executive corruption is
consistent statistically significant across all models.
H2: conditionally true; as trust in executive leadership, ruling party, and the police are
directionally consistent and statistically significant. Trust in the legislature and courts are
not statistically significant. Moreover, the statistical significance and direction of trust in
opposition parties suggests a winner vs. loser effect going on.
H3: Cannot be tested; no media trust variable available for Afrobarometer.
H4: true; the state of the economy is statistically significant. As the perceived state of the
economy improves, so too does a person’s external political efficacy.
H5: true; the magnitude of the effect on external efficacy by perceptions of corruption is
mitigated by socioeconomic status. 28

Model 2’s interaction between socioeconomic status and perceptions of corruption in the police force was
statistically significant.
28
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The results of the Americas Barometer are presented in Figure 4, below.
TABLE 4: AMERICAS BAROMETER
Americas Barometer Merged Dataset; 2004-1229
Survey, Linearized Regression & Multilevel Analysis
Observations: 22,851
Scale: 1-7, 1 being disagree, 7 being agree. Higher number indicates higher external efficacy.

External Political
Efficacy

Survey
Baseline
Model (1)

Perceptions of
Corruption
Media*Corruption
Interaction
Interpersonal Trust

(0.1430)
(0.0169)***
-

Trust Justice System
Trust Legislature
Trust Police
Trust Political Parties
Trust Executive
Trust Supreme Court
Trust Mass Media
Trust Elections
Economic Appraisal
Years of Education
Female
Age

0.0054
(0.0152)
0.0501
(0.0102)***
0.0928
(0.0114)***
0.0215
(0.0102)**
0.0415
(0.0107)***
0.0822
(0.0096)***
0.0253
(0.0110)**
0.0240
(0.0098)**
0.0264
(0.0103)**
0.2330
(0.0108)***
-0.0015
(0.0038)
-0.0088
(0.0346)
0.0016
(0.0009)*

Survey
Baseline with
Interactions
(2)
0.0268
(0.0733)
0.0244
(0.0100)**
0.0055
(0.0152)
0.0502
(0.0102)***
0.0927
(0.0114)***
0.0210
(0.0102)**
0.0416
(0.0107)***
0.0822
(0.0096)***
0.0252
(0.0110)**
-0.0186
(0.0201)
0.0267
(0.0103)**
0.2329
(0.0108)***
-0.0016
(0.0038)
-0.0088
(0.0347)
0.0015
(0.0009)*
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Multilevel
Baseline (3)

Multilevel with
Interactions (4)

0.1264
(0.0145)***
-

0.0077
(0.0644)
0.0204
(0.0081)**
0.0024
(0.0132)
0.0545
(0.0090)***
0.0845
(0.0092)***
0.0159
(0.0082)*
0.0525
(0.0087)***
0.0778
(0.0083)***
0.0264
(0.0099)**
-0.0189
(0.0163)
0.0300
(0.0084)***
0.2194
(0.0090)***
-0.0120
(0.0032)*
-0.0167
(0.0254)
0.0004
(0.0008)

0.0023
(0.0132)
0.0545
(0.0090)***
0.0846
(0.0092)***
0.0163
(0.0082)**
0.0526
(0.0087)***
0.0777
(0.0083)***
0.0265
(0.0099)**
0.0169
(0.0080)**
0.0298
(0.0084)***
0.2195
(0.0090)***
-0.0119
(0.0032)*
-0.0170
(0.0254)
0.0004
(0.0008)

Countries in study: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia,
Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Dominican Republic, Haiti,
Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad & Tobago, Belize, Suriname, United States, Canada.
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Socioeconomic Status30

-0.0286
(0.0190)
-

-0.0283
(0.0389)
-0.0002
(0.0178)

-0.0717
(0.0153)***
-

-0.0842
(0.0323)**
0.0071
(0.0162)

R2
Country (ID) Constant

0.8665
(0.1289)***
0.1786
-

1.0712
(0.1836)***
0.1789
-

Country (ID) Residual

-

-

1.2654
(0.1219)***
0.2408
(0.0432)***
1.8013
(0.0084)***

1.4739
(0.1647)***
0.2399
(0.0430)***
1.8011
(0.0084)***

Socioeconomic
Status*Perceptions of
Corruption
Constant

Note: All coefficients and standard errors are rounded to the 10 thousandth place.
Entries are regression coefficients followed by standard errors in parenthesis.
Multilevel Analysis: 17 groups, country.
*** denotes an estimate statistically significant at p<=0.01
** denotes an estimate statistically significant at p <= 0.05
*denotes an estimate statistically significant at p <= 0.1

Within the Americas Barometer sample, the primary relationship under investigation
between external efficacy and perceptions of corruption behave exactly as theorized in the
baseline models. The directionality is consistent – more corruption is less external efficacy – and
it is found to be statistically significant within these baselines as well. Directionality is constant
across all models, but loses significance when interactions are included.
All trust variable coefficient directionalities behave as expected in the baseline models;
trust in the mass media, however, loses statistical significance and reverses its directionality on
both model 2 and 4, which include the interaction terms. All other trust variables, with the
notable exception of interpersonal trust, are also statistically significant across all models.
Controlling for sex is not statistically significant in either the baseline or interaction
models. Economic appraisal of the country behaves as one would expect given the prominence
of economics in the literature; as they improve, so too does external efficacy. This applies

The best proximate measure in the Americas Barometer (besides the incomplete q10new) is idio1. It asks: “How
would you describe your overall economic situation?” Idio1 is used here instead of categorical alternatives (q10d).
30
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consistently across all models. Age is a statistically significant indicator of external efficacy in
models 1 and 2, the survey models; as one gets older, one becomes more externally efficacious.
This statistical significance is lost in the multilevel models, 3 and 4.
Surprisingly, education has a reverse directionality, meaning less education equals more
external efficacy; moreover, this variable is statistically significant in the multilevel models, 3
and 4. This finding is highly unusual, as one would expect that the higher one’s education, the
higher one’s perceived external efficacy, and also, the more one tends to make. This finding is
further complicated by the directionality of the proxy variable for socioeconomic status. The
directionality behaves as one would expect; as socioeconomic status goes up, external efficacy
also goes up. Education and socioeconomic status normally trend together but here it is not the
case. In the multilevel models, 3 and 4, socioeconomic status is also statistically significant,
whereas in the survey regressions, 1 and 2, it is not statistically significant.
Taken on the whole, the Americas Barometer behaves more or less as one would expect
in accordance with the theory – except in terms of interpersonal trust, the mass media, and
education. With interpersonal trust, its lack of statistical significance calls into question the basic
notion that interpersonal trust is important in terms of external efficacy, at least within this
sample. It is odd that trust in others does not have a statistically significant effect whereas trust
in institutions and those within them do. Perhaps this is merely due to the distinctions between
people at large and those in official positions of power. Not being within the mind of each
respondent, however, makes this little more than curiosity-fueled speculation. In sum, trust in
entities related to the government are more important than basic trust in other people writ large.
Interestingly, trust in the mass media in the Americas is also associated with higher
external efficacy in the non-interacted models and holds statistical significance; this would seem
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contrary to a critical, watch dog media. Regardless, trust in the mass media is positively and
statistically correlated with a rise in external efficacy in the baseline models but loses statistical
significance in the interacted models, though its directionality behaves in accordance with
theoretical norms.
Education lacks statistical significance in both of the survey models, 1 and 2, and also has
a reverse directionality from expected; as education decreases efficacy increases. Directionality
is the same in the multilevel models but gain statistical significance. This implies that the less
educated feel as though they have more say in government when country-level effects, accounted
for in the multilevel models, are covered. This is an odd finding given the theoretical importance
education levels to political efficacy.
The interaction between corruption and media is statistically significant in both models
tested. This indicates that the degree or magnitude of the effect that perceptions of corruption
has on external efficacy is different based on the level of trust in the media; the effect on external
efficacy is amplified as trust in the media decreases and perceptions of corruption increases.
This suggests a strong watchdog effect. Interesting to note, however, is that in the baseline
models both mass media and corruption are statistically significant on their own yet in the
interaction model they lose their significance. This suggests that the interaction between them is
more influential than either variable alone. Moreover, it also provides support for the notion that
there is indeed a media effect going on; for the degree of effect on external efficacy at least, both
regionally and on the multilevel accounting for individual countries, that perceptions of
corruption holds, is different based on the level of trust in the media.
The interaction between corruption and socioeconomic status is not statistically
significant. This indicates that the magnitude of the effect of perceptions of corruption on
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external efficacy does not seem to vary based on the levels of socioeconomic status. Alone, an
increase in socioeconomic status in the multilevel models does indicate an increase in external
efficacy, but there does not appear to be an effect with perceptions of corruption. This implies
that, at least for the Americas Barometer sample, corruption and socioeconomic status are more
as variables independent of each other.
When trust variables were removed, each of the models had the following changes to
statistical significance: (model 1) education, economic appraisal, and socioeconomic status
became statistically significant; (2) perceptions of corruption, education, and age became
statistically significant; (3) no differences; (4) perceptions of corruption became statistically
significant. Overall, the substantive differences for baseline models only served to prop up
control variables but for the interaction models, trust certainly became a factor in muddling the
statistical significance of perceptions of corruption on external political efficacy. In particular,
the interaction between trust in media and perceptions of corruption was the most influential
variable here. In model 4, for example, the inclusion of the media interaction variable renders
perceptions of corruption statistically significant, whereas its exclusion drives perceptions of
corruption to p=0.00. Within the Americas and in the presence of interaction, the effect that
perceptions of corruption has on external political efficacy is certainly confusing the causal
pathway between them; the interaction between the media and perceptions of corruption, in
particular, is especially problematic. In short, perceptions of corruption certainly have an effect
upon external political efficacy, but so does trust, and at least when interaction effects are
accounted for, the relationship that corruption and trust have together nullifies perceptions of
corruption by itself. This serves to bolster the finding regarding the media interaction variable.
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Lastly, when the causality check was conducted using clientelism and bribery instead of
perceptions of corruption, the results conformed to theoretical expectations. In all four tests
conducted, mirroring each of the Americas Barometer models, the bribery variables were not
statistically significant but the clientelism variable consistently was. As clientelistic practices
decreased – meaning government officials did not offer something in exchange for a vote or
other favor in a quid pro quo manner – political efficacy increased. Such an experience of
corruption would certainly contribute to an overall perception of it, and thus a causal connection
can be formed with these results between corruption and external efficacy; corruption is indeed
driving efficacy. It is interesting, however, that bribery of government officials and police
officers were not statistically significant, though clientelism was. This begs further investigation
in the future though it remains outside of the scope of this immediate paper.

For the Americas Barometer, the hypotheses result as follows:
H1: conditionally true; corruption is statistically significant with expected directionality in the
baseline models. In the interaction models, it loses its significance, but the interaction
between it and the media is statistically significant.
H2: true; as trust in government increases, external efficacy increases.
H3: true; the degree of the effect on external efficacy by perceptions of corruption is amplified as
corruption increases and media trust increases. This suggests a watchdog effect.
H4: true; as economic appraisal increases external efficacy also increases for both the baseline
and interaction models.
H5: false; there is no statistically significant interaction between perceptions of corruption and
socioeconomic status.
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The results of the two rounds of the Arab Barometer OLS models are presented in Figure
5, below.

TABLE 5: ARAB BAROMETER, OLS REGRESSION
Arab Barometer Round 1 & 2, 2006-7 & 2010-11, OLS Regression3132
R1 (minus Morocco): 3,043; Round 2 (minus Tunisia): 7,261
Efficacy in R1 & 2 (recoded): Scale is 1-4; 1 being disagree, 4 being agree. Higher number indicates higher external
efficacy.

External Political
Efficacy

Round 1 OLS
Baseline (1)

Round 1 OLS
with Interaction
(2)

Round 2 OLS
Baseline (3)

Round 2
OLS with
Interactions (4)

General Govt.
Corruption
Trust in Executive

-0.0622
(0.0224)**
-0.0929
(0.0196)***
-

-0.0431
(0.0236)*
-0.0926
(0.0196)***
-

0.0043
(0.0332)
-

-0.1363
(0.0807)*
-

0.0870
(0.0210)***
-0.0893
(0.0197)***
0.0530
(0.0192)**
-0.0608
(0.0188)**

0.0869
(0.0210)***
-0.0903
(0.0196)***
0.0525
(0.0192)**
-0.0600
(0.0188)**

-0.1043
(0.0152)***
-0.0969
(0.0149)***
-

-0.1035
(0.0152)***
-0.0973
(0.0149)***
-

0.0651
(0.0137)***
-

0.0653
(0.0136)***
-

0.0042
(0.0383)
-0.0713
(0.02100**
0.0176
(0.0351)
0.0120
(0.0119)
-

0.0027
(0.0383)
-0.0712
(0.0210)**
0.0165
(0.0350)
0.0115
(0.0119)
-

Corruption * Fair
Media Interaction

-

-

-0.2996
(0.0255)***
-0.0087
(0.0147)
0.0432
(0.0226)*
-0.0075
(0.0072)
-0.1224
(0.0133)***
-

-0.2985
(0.0255)***
-0.0085
(0.0147)
0.0438
(0.0226)*
-0.0075
(0.0072)
-0.1971
(0.0437)***
0.0666
(0.0370)*

Age

-0.0040
(0.0014)**

-0.0040
(0.0014)**

-0.0021
(0.0009)**

-0.0021
(0.0009)**

Trust in
Government
Trust in Courts
Trust in Legislature
Trust the Police
Trust in Political
Parties
Interpersonal Trust
Economic Appraisal
Female
Education
Media Fairness

31

Countries in round 1 of study: Jordan, Palestine, Algeria, Morocco(-), Lebanon, Yemen.
Countries in round 2 of study: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria,
Tunisia(-), Yemen.
32
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Socioeconomic
Status33
Corruption *
Socioeconomic
Status Interaction34

7.59
(3.56)**
-

4.43
(1.44)**
-1.29
(4.91)**

1.53
(2.76)***
-

-1.11
(1.58)
2.54
(1.51)*

Constant

3.4150
(0.1221)***
0.0517
0.0479

3.3722
(0.1231)***
0.0538
0.0498

3.8823
(0.0918)***
0.0960
0.0947

4.0397
(0.1234)***
0.0968
0.0951

R2
Adj. R2

Note: All coefficients and standard errors are rounded to the 10 thousandth place.
Entries are regression coefficients followed by standard errors in parenthesis.
*** denotes an estimate statistically significant at p<=0.01
** denotes an estimate statistically significant at p <= 0.05
*denotes an estimate statistically significant at p <= 0.1

The results of the two rounds of the Arab Barometer multilevel models are presented in
Figure 6, below.

TABLE 6: ARAB BAROMETER, MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS
Arab Barometer Round 1 & 2, 2006-7 & 2010-11, Multilevel Analysis
R1 (minus Morocco): 3,043; Round 2 (minus Tunisia): 7,261
Efficacy in R1 & 2 (recoded): Scale is 1-4; 1 being disagree, 4 being agree. Higher number indicates higher external
efficacy.

External Political
Efficacy
General Govt.
Corruption
Trust in
Executive
Trust in
Government
Trust in Courts
Trust in
Legislature
Trust the Police
Trust in Political
Parties
Interpersonal
Trust

Round 1
Multilevel
Baseline (5)
-0.0600
(0.0228)**
-0.0824
(0.0197)***
-

Round 1
Multilevel with
Interaction (6)
-0.0398
(0.0240)*
-0.0823
(0.0197)***
-

0.0649
(0.0211)**
-0.0573
(0.0199)**
0.0171
(0.0196)
-0.0488
(0.0187)**
0.0257
(0.0384)

0.0653
(0.0211)**
-0.0579
(0.0198)**
0.0171
(0.0196)
-0.0479
(0.0186)**
0.0246
(0.0384)
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Round 2
Multilevel
Baseline (7)
0.0989
(0.0324)**
-

Round 2
Multilevel with
Interactions (8)
0.0512
(0.0782)
-

-0.0619
(0.0151)***
-0.0661
(0.0150)***
-

-0.0614
(0.0151)***
-0.0664
(0.0150)***
-

-0.0241
(0.0139)*
-

-0.0239
(0.0139)*
-

-0.1482
(0.0256)***

-0.1477
(0.0256)***

Truncated: e-08 for coefficient and standard error in model 1, e-07 in model 2. E-07 for coefficient and e-08 for
standard error in model 3. E-07 for coefficient and standard error in model 4.
34
Truncated: e-07 for model 2 coefficient, e-08 for model 2 standard error. E-07 for coefficient and standard error
in model 4.
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Economic
Appraisal
Female
Education
Media Fairness
Corruption *
Fair Media
Interaction
Age
Socioeconomic
Status35
Corruption *
Socioeconomic
Status
Interaction36
Constant
Country (ID)
Constant
Country (ID)
Residual

-0.1099
(0.0213)***
0.0112
(0.0348)
0.0222
(0.0120)*
-

-0.1098
(0.0212)***
0.0099
(0.0347)
0.0222
(0.0120)*
-

-0.0670
(0.0149)***
0.0430
(0.0217)**
0.0177
(0.0071)**
-0.0977
(0.0131)***
-

-0.0668
(0.0149)***
0.0432
(0.0217)**
0.0174
(0.0071)**
-0.1211
(0.0425)**
0.0208
(0.0358)

-

-

-0.0040
(0.0014)**
-8.18
(4.71)
-

-0.0040
(0.0014)**
3.60
(1.46)**
-1.29
(4.86)**

-0.0009
(0.0009)
7.31
(3.40)**
-

-0.0009
(0.0009)
-1.03
(1.53)
1.71
(1.45)

3.4370
(0.1462)***
0.1486
(0.0508)***
0.9232
(0.0118)***

3.3840
(0.1474)***
0.1487
(0.0508)***
0.9222
(0.0118)***

3.5152
(0.1306)***
0.2805
(0.0671)***
0.9086
(0.0075)***

3.5691
(0.1537)***
0.2798
(0.0670)***
0.9085
(0.0075)***

Note: All coefficients and standard errors are rounded to the 10 thousandth place.
Entries are regression coefficients followed by standard errors in parenthesis.
Multilevel Analysis: 5 groups, country.
*** denotes an estimate statistically significant at p<=0.01
** denotes an estimate statistically significant at p <= 0.05
* denotes an estimate statistically significant at p <= 0.1

The results of the two rounds and model types of the Arab Barometer are certainly varied.
For round 1, which has a much smaller pool of countries surveyed, perceptions of government
corruption are found statistically significant in both the OLS and multilevel models whereas in
round 2 it is not most of the time. Models 3 and 8, the OLS baseline and multilevel with
interactions respectively, are not statistically significant. The differences in measurement

35

Truncated: e-09 for coefficient and e-08 for standard error in model 5. E-07 for coefficient and standard error in
model 6. E-08 for coefficient and standard error in model 7. E-07 for coefficient and standard error in model 8.
36
Truncated: e-07 for coefficient and e-08 for standard error in model 6. E-07 for coefficient and standard error in
model 8.
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between the two rounds of the barometer are likely contributing to this, but the simple size
difference between countries being sampled is also a major factor here. Coefficient
directionality must be properly distinguished between the rounds. For round 1, the positive
directionality with government corruption is as one would expect: as the government is
perceived to be more corrupt, external efficacy will decrease. For the round 2 OLS baseline
(model 3) and both multilevel models of round 2 (7 and 8), despite not having statistical
significance, directionality is reversed. The scale for determining corruption, however, is also
reversed; so the direction of the coefficients is not unexpected; except in model 4. For the rest of
the round 2 models negative coefficients indicates that as external efficacy decreases perceptions
of corruption increases. In model 4, however, positive coefficient directionality indicates that as
perceptions of corruption increase, external efficacy increases. This is unusual, particularly
when compared to the lack of statistical significance in the other OLS baseline model (3)
corruption variable. This indicates that with the presence of corruption interactions, with media
and socioeconomic status, increased perceptions of corruption alone indicate higher external
efficacy. Compared to the multilevel models, round 2 conforms to theoretical norms regarding
corruption and efficacy. Worth noting, however, is that whereas in the OLS round 2 models, the
baseline is not statistically significant but the interaction model is, whereas in the multilevel
analysis, this is reversed; the baseline is statistically significant and the interaction model is not.
The inclusion of the interaction terms is clearly altering the statistical significance of the primary
independent variable, and as to why the difference between the multilevel and OLS analyses, the
answer is in the inclusion of country-level effects. In theory, each country can experience
differing levels of corruption perceptions due to different circumstances, cultural, and
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governmental contexts. These are the forces driving statistical significance, as indicated by the
constant and residual on the country-level organization being statistically significant.
Education behaves as expected; as education decreases, so too does external efficacy. Its
statistical significance depends upon the model type. For the OLS analysis for rounds 1 and 2,
education is not statistically significant. For the multilevel analysis, however, education is
consistently statistically significance. The difference in model construction sheds light on how
and when education matters to external efficacy. When taken on the whole, education’s effect
upon external efficacy is muted. When controlling for country-level effects in the multilevel
analysis, education is statistically significant. This provides mixed support for education’s
positive relationship with external efficacy per the literature. For the Arab barometer countries
as a region the relationship is not statistically significant, but when controlling for countries it
returns to significance. So, when does education matter? It clearly depends on the country.
Interpersonal trust also behaves as expected in terms of directionality, though its
statistical significance is only within the 2nd round in both the OLS and multilevel analysis. The
differences in time period of analysis and expansion of countries is the likely driver between the
differences in the rounds.
For trust variables in round 1, positive coefficients mean that as trust decreases so too
does external efficacy. Trust in the executive, legislature, and political parties follow this
expected direction and have statistical significance in all models. The interesting deviation from
this norm is in trust in the courts and police, both of which are also statistically significant in the
OLS models, but not the multilevel ones. The negative coefficients indicates that as trust
increases in the courts and the police external efficacy decreases. This directional relationship is
bizarre. It indicates, albeit with mixed results in terms of statistical significance between the
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OLS and multilevel analyses, that not trusting in judicial forces translates into a higher sense that
the government cares or is more responsive to an individual. Clear across all models and rounds
is that the police and courts seem regarded separately than the rest of government. As to why,
that is left for further research.
In the second round for the trust variables, directionality is the same as with external
efficacy; lower numbers, or negative coefficient directionality, indicate agreement or positive
assessments, whereas higher numbers indicate disagreement or negative assessments. For the
trust variables in round 2, then, all behave as expected generally speaking. For the police again,
however, the OLS models conform more to general expectations and not with the trend with the
rest of the models; as trust in the police increases, external efficacy increases, and this finding is
statistically significant. An interesting difference between round 1 and 2 is that for round 1, trust
in the courts was also associated with lower external efficacy, whereas in round 2 this is not the
case. Trust in the courts behaves as expected in round 2; as trust in the courts increases, so too
does external efficacy. The reason accounting for this difference is again likely rooted simply in
the difference in sample countries.
In both rounds and across all models economic appraisals behave as expected and are
statistically significant except in round 2 of the OLS (models 3 and 4); though directionality is
maintained in the latter cases, they both lose statistical significance. So, generally speaking, as
appraisals of the economic condition of the country become negative so too does external
political efficacy. Economics, usually an important indicator throughout political science, again
gets bolstering for its relationship with external efficacy for the six out of the eight models.
Level of education has an unexpected inconsistency between the model types. In round 1
of the OLS models, the directionality behaves as one would expect but is not statistically
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significant. In round 2, the variable is still not statistically significant but the directionality
reverses. The less education one receives, the more external efficacy one gains. This reversal of
directionality is a very unusual relationship but the lack of statistical significance makes this a
mild curiosity. Across all multilevel models, however, education behaves as expected in terms
of directionality – as education increases, external efficacy increases – and is consistently
statistically significant. This mixed result between the models again underscores the statistically
significant impacts that are accounted in the inclusion of countries as an organizational tool in
the model construction.
The inclusion of the media fairness variable in the second round provides fruitful insight
into the relationship between it and external political efficacy, much as expected. The
hypothetical relationship here is worth noting, and the findings do not support the hypothesis that
increased media fairness – a proxy in this case for trust in the media – increases external political
efficacy. In fact, the opposite is found: that media fairness decreases external political efficacy.
The implications of this are discussed in more detail in the next section.
The interaction between corruption and media in model 4 is statistically significant. The
implication of this is as literature would contend. The degree of the effect on external efficacy
that perceptions of corruption has is indeed different based on the fairness of media coverage.
The proxy measure for trust in media, whether it is regarded as fair or not, makes this especially
interesting. Assuming the proxy measure is solid in that fair media is likely to be trusted more
than unfair media, this indicates what is likely to be exposure of corruption to the media
consumer. The relationship with perceptions, be it corruption or not, is a logical next step. The
consumption of the media, and the fairness of it, is altering the effect that the perceptions of
corruption have on the consumer’s external efficacy; as a person trusts the media more and
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perceives less corruption, his or her external efficacy will increase more than the variables by
themselves. There is an amplification effect.
Socioeconomic status is inconsistent in both directionality and statistical significance.
There is one substantive takeaway, however. Directionality of the variable is consistent with the
theoretical expectation that higher socioeconomic status goes with higher external political
efficacy. Indeed, when the variable is statistically significant, in five of the eight models (1, 2, 3,
6, 7). This is the case for three of the four OLS models, so all of round 1 and the baseline of
round 2, and two of the multilevel models, the round 1 interaction and round 2 baseline. As to
why, this comes down to time periods and countries of analysis. The inconsistency across the
models makes this an especially curious finding, and the implications of it prompt further
investigation. Inclusion of more dates and times may serve to smoothen the findings to become
more generalizable, but at present, this essay does not provide a clear empirical reason behind
the differences between the various models. The prevailing evidence – five out of the eight
models tested – does lend itself to affirming, albeit cautiously, that socioeconomic status does
indeed, generally, have a statistically significant relationship with external efficacy, though in the
Arab barometer consistent with theoretical expectations.
Lastly, the interaction of socioeconomic status and perceptions of corruption. This
variable is statistically significant in three out of the four models of testing. Models 2, 4, and 6
are statistically significant, encompassing both model types’ round 1, and the OLS round 2. The
multilevel round 2 is not statistically significant. This indicates that the degree or magnitude of
the effect that perceptions of corruption has on external efficacy is different based on the
person’s socioeconomic status; as wealth increases and perceptions of corruption decrease, the
effect on external efficacy is mitigated. The wealthier a person is, the more likely he or she will
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have higher external efficacy and, furthermore, not perceive as much corruption in government.
This is consistent with theoretical expectations.
The first round of the Arab barometer, even with trust variables removed, remained
completely consistent. In round two, however, several changes were made. In models 3 and 8,
perceptions of corruption become statistically significant. In models 7 and 8, education loses its
statistical significance. Similar to previous barometers, economics becomes statistically
significant in models 3 and 4 alongside other controls. The major takeaway from this is that
when perceptions of corruption were not significant, in models 3 and 8, with trust removed
perceptions of corruption do become statistically significant. The general statistical significance
of corruption in both rounds of the Arab barometers was not threatened, but with this additional
check for the causality of corruption and efficacy serves to reinforce that, at least a quarter of the
time in these barometers, trust was interfering with the expected statistical effects.

For the Arab Barometers, the hypotheses result as follows:
H1: generally true; corruption is statistically significant and with expected directionality where
this significance is found. Most models, across both OLS and multilevel, support this
hypothesis.
H2: conditionally true; as trust in government increases external efficacy rises with the exception
of the courts and police in some instances. Directionality and statistical significance vary
in the judicial realm.
H3: true; for the region at large the degree of the effect on external efficacy by perceptions of
corruption is amplified, as corruption increases and media fairness increases external
efficacy will also increase.
H4: true; as the economic appraisal of the country increase external efficacy also increases.
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H5: generally true; there is generally a mitigating effect upon external efficacy where statistically
significant. As socioeconomic status increases and corruption decreases, external
efficacy also decreases. This suggests, again, that the rich profit by virtue of
responsiveness through corruption in government.

The results of the two waves of the Asian Barometer are presented in Figure 7, below.
TABLE 7: ASIAN BAROMETER, OLS REGRESSION
Asian Barometer Waves 1 & 3, 2001-3 & 2010-2012, OLS Regression3738
W1 Observations: 6,109; W3 Observations: 9,214
Efficacy in W1: Scale 1-4, 1 being strongly agree (to having no influence), 4 being strongly disagree; higher number
indicates higher external efficacy.
Efficacy in W3 (recoded): Scale 1-4, 1 being not responsive, 4 being very responsive; higher number indicates
higher external efficacy.

External Political
Efficacy

Wave 1 OLS
Baseline (1)

Wave 1 OLS with
Interactions (2)

Corruption in
National
Government
Corruption in
Local Government
Trust Government
Overall
Trust Executive

0.0295
(0.0174)*

-0.0199
(0.0679)

0.0547
(0.0164)**
0.0144
(0.0144)
-

0.1605
(0.0683)**
0.0156
(0.0144)
-

0.0235
(0.0164)
-0.0044
(0.0186)
-0.0281
(0.0175)
0.0057
(0.0153)
-0.0282
(0.0186)

0.0240
(0.0164)
-0.0015
(0.0187)
-0.0278
(0.0176)
0.0072
(0.0153)
-0.1714
(0.0666)**

Trust Courts
Trust National
Government
Trust Political
Parties
Trust Police
Trust Newspapers

37

Wave 3
Wave 3
OLS
OLS with
Baseline (3) Interactions
(4)
-0.1331
-0.0051
(0.0106)***
(0.0381)
-0.0422
(0.0104)***
-

-0.1578
(0.0385)***
-

-0.1096
(0.0102)***
-0.0466
(0.0097)***
-0.0818
(0.0115)***
-0.0347
(0.0102)**
-0.0369
(0.0092)***
-0.0424
(0.0107)***

-0.1092
(0.0102)***
-0.0454
(0.0097)***
-0.0814
(0.0115)***
-0.0331
(0.0102)**
-0.0370
(0.0092)***
0.0079
(0.0385)

Countries/districts in round 1 of study: Japan, Hong Kong, (South) Korea, China, Mongolia, Philippines, Taiwan,
Thailand.
38
Countries/districts in round 2 of study: Japan, Hong Kong, (South) Korea, China, Mongolia, Philippines, Taiwan,
Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia.
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Trust Television
(News)
Interpersonal
Trust
Economic
Appraisal
Family Finances
Natl. Govt.
Corruption *
Newspaper Trust
Interaction
Natl. Govt.
Corruption * TV
Trust
Local Govt.
Corruption *
Newspaper Trust
Local Govt.
Corruption * TV
Trust
Education
Female
Age
Socioeconomic
Status
Natl. Govt.
Corruption *
Socioeconomic
Status Interaction
Local Govt.
Corruption *
Socioeconomic
Status Interaction
Constant
R2
Adj. R2

-0.0114
(0.0196)
-

0.1110
(0.0660)*
-

0.0041
(0.0109)
-0.0039
(0.0157)
-0.0725
(0.0082)***
-0.0507
(0.0091)***
-

-0.0478
(0.0387)
-0.0034
(0.0156)
-0.0735
(0.0082)***
-0.0504
(0.0091)***
-0.0423
(0.0146)**

-0.0048
(0.0120)
0.0007
(0.0133)
-

-0.0051
(0.0121)
0.0001
(0.0133)
-0.0017
(0.0261)

-

0.0354
(0.0265)

-

0.0053
(0.0150)

-

0.0589
(0.0249)**

-

0.0257
(0.0148)*

-

-0.0837
(0.0251)**

-

0.0143
(0.0151)

0.0258
(0.0054)***
-0.0500
(0.0218)**
-0.0010
(0.0008)
-0.0314
(0.0086)*
-

0.0258
(0.0054)***
-0.0515
(0.0218)**
-0.0010
(0.0008)
0.0392
(0.0307)
-0.0194
(0.0118)*

0.0088
(0.0031)**
-0.0226
(0.0134)*
0.0013
(0.0005)**
-0.0173
(0.0057)**
-

0.0088
(0.0031)**
-0.0218
(0.0134)
0.0013
(0.0005)**
0.0029
(0.0201)
-0.0152
(0.0083)*

-

-0.0090
(0.0117)

-

0.0083
(0.0083)

2.3290
(0.1122)***
0.0176
0.0151

2.1728
(0.1944)***
0.0205
0.0172

4.0429
(0.0576)***
0.2113
0.2099

3.9823
(0.1049)***
0.2128
0.2109

Note: All coefficients and standard errors are rounded to the 10 thousandth place.
Entries are regression coefficients followed by standard errors in parenthesis.
*** denotes an estimate statistically significant at p<=0.01
** denotes an estimate statistically significant at p <= 0.05
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*denotes an estimate statistically significant at p <= 0.1

The results of the multilevel models, 5-8, for the Asian Barometers are displayed below
in figure 8.

TABLE 8: ASIAN BAROMETER, MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS
Asian Barometer Waves 1 & 3, 2001-3 & 2010-2012, Multilevel Regression
W1 Observations: 6,109; W3 Observations: 9,705
Efficacy in W1: Scale 1-4, 1 being strongly agree (to having no influence), 4 being strongly disagree; higher number
indicates higher external efficacy.
Efficacy in W3 (recoded): Scale 1-4, 1 being not responsive, 4 being very responsive; higher number indicates
higher external efficacy.

External Political
Efficacy

Wave 1 Multilevel
Baseline (5)

Wave 1 Multilevel
with Interactions
(6)

Wave 3
Multilevel
Baseline (7)

Corruption in
National
Government
Corruption in
Local Government
Trust Government
Overall
Trust Executive

0.0728
(0.0177)***

-0.0421
(0.0684)

-0.1094
(0.0108)***

Wave 3
Multilevel
with
Interactions
(8)
-0.0132
(0.0377)

0.0274
(0.0169)
0.0280
(0.0149)*
-

0.1274
(0.0676)*
0.0297
(0.0149)**
-

-0.0586
(0.0104)***
-

-0.1634
(0.0380)***
-

0.0169
(0.0164)
0.0191
(0.0189)
0.0144
(0.0186)
0.0148
(0.0152)
-0.0349
(0.0188)*
-0.0123
(0.0196)
-

0.0182
(0.0164)
0.0225
(0.0190)
0.0143
(0.0186)
0.0161
(0.0152)
-0.1851
(0.0660)**
0.0669
(0.0653)**
-

0.0018
(0.0134)

0.0008
(0.0134)

-0.1204
(0.0104)***
-0.0331
(0.0100)**
-0.0731
(0.0116)***
-0.0209
(0.0102)**
-0.0396
(0.0091)***
-0.0120
(0.0108)
-0.0195
(0.0112)*
-0.0049
(0.0161)
-0.0685
(0.0085)***

-0.1197
(0.0104)***
-0.0325
(0.0100)**
-0.0730
(0.0116)***
-0.0200
(0.0102)**
-0.0396
(0.0091)***
0.0102
(0.0381)
-0.0474
(0.0384)
-0.0050
(0.0160)
-0.0690
(0.0085)***

Trust Courts
Trust National
Government
Trust Political
Parties
Trust Police
Trust Newspapers
Trust Television
(News)
Interpersonal
Trust
Economic
Appraisal
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Family Finances
Natl. Govt.
Corruption *
Newspaper Trust
Interaction
Natl. Govt.
Corruption * TV
Trust
Local Govt.
Corruption *
Newspaper Trust
Local Govt.
Corruption * TV
Trust
Education
Female
Age
Socioeconomic
Status
Natl. Govt.
Corruption *
Socioeconomic
Status Interaction
Local Govt.
Corruption *
Socioeconomic
Status Interaction
Constant
Country (ID)
Constant
Country (ID)
Residual

-0.0171
(0.0139)
-

-0.0180
(0.0139)
-0.0018
(0.0258)

-0.0309
(0.0094)**
-

-0.0307
(0.0094)**
-0.0252
(0.0145)*

-

0.0489
(0.0263)*

-

-0.0068
(0.0149)

-

0.0615
(0.0246)**

-

0.0182
(0.0145)

-

-0.0791
(0.0249)**

-

0.0183
(0.0149)

0.0172
(0.0058)**
-0.0578
(0.0215)**
-0.0017
(0.0008)**
0.0112
(0.0101)
-

0.0177
(0.0058)**
-0.0585
(0.0215)**
-0.0017
(0.0008)**
0.0697
(0.0308)**
-0.0089
(0.0118)

0.0018
(0.0035)
-0.0149
(0.0132)
0.0011
(0.0005)**
-0.0052
(0.0060)
-

0.0019
(0.0035)
-0.0146
(0.0132)
0.0011
(0.0005)**
-0.0026
(0.0200)
-0.0085
(0.0082)

-

-0.0145
(0.0115)

-

0.0081
(0.0081)

2.1127
(0.1350)***
0.1639
(0.0501)***
0.8311
(0.0075)***

2.1212
(0.2048)***
0.1662
(0.0509)***
0.8299
(0.0075)***

3.8804
(0.0735)***
0.1226
(0.0298)***
0.6277
(0.0046)***

3.8797
(0.1143)***
0.1215
(0.0296)***
0.6273
(0.0046)***

Note: All coefficients and standard errors are rounded to the 10 thousandth place.
Entries are regression coefficients followed by standard errors in parenthesis.
Multilevel Analysis: 6 groups in wave 1; 9 groups in wave 2.
*** denotes an estimate statistically significant at p<=0.01
** denotes an estimate statistically significant at p <= 0.05
*denotes an estimate statistically significant at p <= 0.1
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The differences between the waves and model types are few, indicating general
consistency across the region. Coefficient causality must be kept in check. For both waves,
coefficient directionality tends to be opposite of one another. For efficacy this is already noted
above the tables themselves, but for corruption this is also the case; an increase in value in one
wave indicates higher efficacy or corruption, yet in the other it represents a decline. For those
especially curious about the numbers and directionalities in the tables, please consult appendix
section II, subsection d, for the scales of each question.
National corruption in both the OLS and multilevel analyses during wave 1 are
statistically significant provided one condition: that they are in the baseline models of analysis
and not in the interaction models. When in the baseline and statistically significant,
directionality also behaves in accordance with the theoretical norm; as perceptions of corruption
increase, external efficacy decreases. For wave 3, again national corruption is only statistically
significant in the baseline models and coefficient directionality is consistent with expectations.
Local corruption, in contrast to national corruption, is statistically significant in all
models except model 5, the baseline multilevel model for wave 1. Coefficient directionality is
consistent with expectations throughout. The difference in statistical significance for perceptions
of local corruption in model 5 is likely indicating more prominence of national corruption during
that time period when accounting for country-level organization in the model. Taken on the
whole, local corruption is consistently tied to external efficacy.
For the trust variables in wave 1 and across both OLS and multilevel models, all
directionalities behave as expected with the exception of political parties, newspapers, and
television; political parties also switch coefficient directionality between the model types but
lack statistical significance in both sets of models. No trust in government indicators are
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statistically significant in the wave 1 OLS models; for wave 1 multilevel, trust in government
overall is statistically significant alone. Across both models, trust in newspapers is statistically
significant in the multilevel baseline but not in the OLS baseline; television trust has no
statistical significance in either baseline. For both interaction models, however, trust in
newspapers and trust in television are both statistically significant. When trust in television news
is significant, the directionality becomes positive, indicating that as trust in TV news increases
external efficacy also increases. For newspapers, on the other hand, coefficient directionality
indicates that as trust in newspapers decreases, external efficacy increases. This is an odd
finding when one considers the level of censorship and control over the media in some of the
sample countries. It suggests an inherent skepticism of written news but not television news, at
least when accounting for the interactions between corruption and the media, and
socioeconomics and corruption.
Amidst the controls in both sets of models for wave 1, economics and finances are not
statistically significant and, at least for economics in the OLS models, economic directionality is
reverse the norm. In wave 1’s OLS models, as views of the economy decrease, external efficacy
increases. This is odd, but the lack of statistical significance makes it less irksome to contend
with theoretically. Education behaves as expected in directionality and in statistical significance
in both sets of models. As one becomes more educated, one’s external efficacy increases.
Gender is also statistically significant in the first wave across both models; the directionality
indicates that men are more likely to have increased external efficacy compared to women. For
age, the OLS models do not hold any statistical significance but the multilevel analysis does. In
terms of directionality, the younger a person is, the higher their external efficacy. This is
unusual given the trend of education, socioeconomic status, and age. It is more expected that as
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one gets older, more educated, and presumably achieves a higher socioeconomic status (or at
least has the chance to over time) then one will have higher external efficacy. This is simply not
the case in either model sets, and especially not when it hold statistical significance.
For wave 3 control variables, only age consistently continues its statistical significance
and directionality in both the OLS and multilevel models after wave 1. For the OLS models,
remains statistically significant but loses significance in the multilevel analysis. Gender is only
statistically significant in the wave 3 OLS baseline model, model 3, and in no other.
Directionality is consistent with wave 1, indicating a male bias in higher external efficacy.
Socioeconomic status is generally not statistically significant, occurring only three times
out of all eight models, in models 1, 3, and 6. Only in model 6, wave 1 with multilevel
interactions, was the directionality consistent with the theoretical norm; that higher
socioeconomic status positively correlates with higher external efficacy. For models 1 and 3
directionality is reversed; as socioeconomic status declines, external efficacy increases. Much
like the finding with age, this is general finding is unusual. This is likely indicating higher
enthusiasm amongst the younger generations; as to why this is occurring it is open to further
investigation.
The results of the trust variables in wave 3 are nearly all statistically significant with the
exception of interpersonal trust. The directionality are all what one would expect as well; as
trust decreases, external efficacy decreases – except in trust in the newspapers and
interpersonally. As trust in newspapers increases, external efficacy decreases. Similar to wave
1, this is again surprising, but perhaps not as much so given the number of countries in the
sample that do not exercise draconian controls over media, such as in China. Skepticism towards
reports would seem the likely driver here.
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Interestingly, trust in television news behaves the opposite of trust in newspapers in terms
of directionality and is statistically significant in the wave 3 multilevel baseline model, but this
model alone. As trust in television news increases, external efficacy increases. When put next to
trust in newspapers, this is odd, but it is not altogether surprising. Those who seek news from
newspapers are often a different crowd than those who seek it from television news; the
difference in audience is likely a big factor here.39
Economic considerations, be it of the economy as a whole or family finances, are also
statistically significant and behave as expected in directionality in wave 3 across all models.
Typically the better one sees personal finances and the economy at large, the higher external
efficacy one has. This makes sense given that those with money are most likely to participate in
politics and have influence; if one does not have money, or is focused entirely on meeting
material wellbeing (food, clothing, etc.), the priorities of states are likely to outside of one’s
personal cares or circumstances. This would naturally result in lower external efficacy due to
differences between personal and governmental priorities.
Education is statistically significant in the wave 3 OLS models but not the multilevel
models and operates in accordance to the theoretical norm. As education increases, external
efficacy increases. Age is statistically significant across all wave 3 models and goes against the
theoretical expectation that the older a person is, the higher his or her external efficacy. Indeed,
results here indicate that as one gets older, one’s external efficacy decreases. Gender is generally
not statistically significant, holding significance only in the baseline wave 3 OLS model. In all
models directionality indicates that men have higher external efficacy than women.

39

For more on the differences between television news consumers and newspaper consumers, see Chaffee &
Kanihan (1997) for a good review.
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Wave 1 interaction of corruption and the media is clearly delineated on the level of
government and the type of media. For the OLS model on the national level there is no
statistical significance. For the multilevel model, however, the interaction of national corruption
and televised news is statistically significant. Only one out of four models shows statistical
significance on the national level. For the local level, however, the interaction between both
types of media and local government corruption across both wave 1 interaction models is
statistically significant. On the multilevel with national corruption and televised news, the
degree of the effect that perceptions of national corruption have on external efficacy is different
based on the level of trust in televised news; so here, the interaction’s statistical significance is
based upon accounting for the individual countries. On the local level, however, OLS and
multilevel models indicate statistical significance, which shows that the magnitude of the effect
on external efficacy that perceptions of corruption locally have are different based on the level of
trust in both televised and newspaper coverage.
Wave 3 interaction of corruption and the media is just as varied as in the first wave. For
the OLS model, corruption on the national and local levels interacted with newspaper trust are
statistically significant. So for the Asian countries regionally tested, the degree of the effect on
external efficacy that both perceptions of corruption on the national and local levels is different,
but only for trust in newspapers coverage. For the multilevel model, only the national level
interacted with newspaper trust is statistically significant. This means that the degree of the
effect on external efficacy, for perceptions of corruption on the national level only, vary based on
the level of trust in newspapers only; corruption on the local level and with trust in television are
not statistically significant in the multilevel model.
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For the interaction of socioeconomics and perceptions of corruption, only in the OLS
interaction models, 2 and 4, are they statistically significant. On the multilevel analysis these
lose their statistical significance altogether. This indicates that, when taken regionally, the
magnitude of the effect that perceptions of corruption at large have on external efficacy is
different based on a person’s socioeconomic status; the effect is mitigating on external efficacy.
The rich perceive less corruption and have lesser external efficacy as a result. This implies that
there may, at least regionally, but cause for concern with corruption among the rich as a means
of government responsiveness. Contrasting to previous findings, however, the socioeconomic
status variable seems to operate in reverse of the theoretical norm; as socioeconomic status
decreases, external efficacy increases. This could very well be a shade of the communist legacy
observed on the aggregate level and deserves further testing in a future study.
Of all the interaction terms, the interaction between newspapers and perceptions of
corruption are the strongest and most consistent across all models. This provides support for the
implication that readers, in particular, are being subjected to either a watchdog or indoctrination
function in the media; as to which it is, the results cannot definitively determine this. It seems to
depend upon the wave and the time period of analysis; this implies general shifts in the region
and in individual countries over time. The effect of media in this way is unsurprising given the
literature of the watchdog function in particular. The ability for newspapers to go deeper (or at
least have the tendency to) into reporting as opposed to television news is the likely driver here.
While television news may provide a quicker means of conveying news and information, the
depth of news found in newspapers has greater impact on this kind of media consumer. Thus,
there will indeed be a difference in the degree of the effect that perceptions of corruption has on
external efficacy based on the level of trust in newspaper coverage. The interaction of TV news
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with corruption is, at times, also statistically significant; and the effect demonstrated is also
inconsistent, much like with newspapers. What can be asserted is that there appears to be both
an amplification and a mitigation effect upon external efficacy – but it depends upon the model
type, countries in the analysis, and the overall time period. There is no general pattern. This is
an area that will require additional research over a far longer period of time in order to discern a
trend if one exists.
Removing trust variables had generally consistent effects upon the results; national
corruption generally became statistically significant, and only in the initial OLS baseline, model
1, did national corruption lose its statistical significance instead of gain it. Control variables
generally became statistically significant except in model 3, where socioeconomic status loses
statistical significance. In the truest and most technical sense these variables cannot ‘gain’ or
‘lose’ statistical significance by including or excluding variables, but this language is used for
ease of comparison between the models that included trust. The potential causal issue presented
by the inclusion of trust variables is present, but only for perceptions of corruption on the
national level. Corruption on the local level remains consistent with and without the presence of
trust variables. In the wave 3 interaction models, 4 and 8, the interaction variables between
corruption and socioeconomic status are statistically significant, which is a substantively
influential finding.

For the Asian barometers, the hypothesis results are as follows:
H1: true; across all models and waves, corruption on either the national or local level is generally
statistically significant and behaves according to theory. As perceptions of corruption
increase, external efficacy decreases.
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H2: Conditionally true: in wave 1, only on the multilevel analysis was trust in government
overall statistically significant. As trust increased, external efficacy increased. In wave
3, trust behaves far more as expected and consistently across both model types: as trust
increases, external efficacy increases.
H3: generally true; when statistically significant there is no discernable pattern of the effect,
either amplifying or mitigating, on external efficacy. There is interaction, however.
H4: conditionally true; as economic considerations – both macro and in terms of familial
finances – improve, efficacy improves, but only in wave 3 across both OLS and
multilevel analyses.
H5: conditionally true; regionally (OLS only), the degree of the effect on external efficacy by
corruption is mitigated by socioeconomic status. The rich also perceive less corruption
and have lower external efficacy.

Discussion
Before general discussion of the chapter’s findings, a brief summary is offered for the
results of each barometer when taken together. This summary is presented in terms of general
findings by the hypotheses; for ease of comparison, a table of summary findings is presented
below in figure 9.
TABLE 9: SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES BY BAROMETER
Hypothesis

Afrobarometer

Americas
Barometer

Arab Barometer

Asian Barometer

1 (Corruption)

Conditionally
Supported

Conditionally
Supported

Supported

Supported

2 (Trust)

Conditionally
Supported

Supported

Conditionally
Supported

Conditionally
Supported
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3 (Media Int.)

-

Supported

Conditionally
Supported

Generally
Supported

4 (Economics)

Supported

Supported

Supported

Conditionally
Supported

5 (Socioeconomic
Status Int.)

Supported

Not Supported

Generally
Supported

Conditionally
Supported

The hypotheses themselves are summarized and explained below.
H1: Generally supported; as perceptions of corruption increase external efficacy also increases.
H2: Conditionally supported; trust in government tended to increase with external efficacy, but
this was largely dependent upon the barometer. In addition, judicial systems and agents
(police) do not consistently perform the same across regional barometers or even between
rounds/waves of individual region barometers.
H3: Generally supported; though at times with no discernable pattern, there is certainly an effect
being documented here. A watchdog effect is likely.
H4: Generally supported; as appraisals of the economic wellbeing of countries increase, external
efficacy also increases.
H5: Generally supported; there is a pattern, even in the Asian Barometer, that shows the effect on
external efficacy is being mitigated as perceptions of corruption decrease and
socioeconomic status increases. The rich who perceive less corruption view less
responsiveness in government.

Perceptions of corruption were not statistically significant in any model run in the
previous chapter dealing with the aggregate level. Here, on the individual level, the results are
consistently the opposite. Perceptions of corruption are generally statistically significant, and as
it increases, external political efficacy decreases. This bolsters existing contentions that
135

corruption has a negative effect upon citizenries, consistent with the moralist camp from
Johnston (1986). It does not directly contradict the contentions of revisionists, such as Evans
(2004) who contends that institutionalized corruption can be good for democracy, but this
finding does lend credence to the argument that corruption is negative for democracy on the
individual level. This is to say that, through the lens of external efficacy – an integral component
for democratic citizenry in particular – perceptions of corruption (and presumably the experience
of corruption itself as a logical extension of this) are bad for democracy. With this indirect
association in mind, this essay provides support for Seligson’s (2002) findings that corruption
lowers regime legitimacy through its impact upon external efficacy (see also Iyengar 1980,
Warren 2004).
The importance of trust when it comes to external efficacy is also consistently found in
this chapter, though with an important clarification: trust in parts of government responsible for
legislation and execution (or administration) are consistently positively correlated with external
efficacy, but aspects of the judiciary, such as courts, judges, and police, are not. Indeed, with
judiciaries there is far more variation in both directionality and statistical significance. This
suggests that there are substantive differences between regions in how judiciaries themselves are
viewed; likewise this supports the findings of Stewart et al. (1992) who find that one’s sense of
efficacy can vary based upon the level of government. Applied here, trust in various areas of
government can affect external efficacy differently. This can likely be attributed to whether or
not the legal processes themselves are viewed as corrupt or not per area of consideration. Still,
by and large, the tendency for trust and efficacy to travel in the same direction and be statistically
significant supports the contentions of Miller & Listhaug (1999), at least within the mechanics;
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their notion of subsequent reformation or rebellion is not tested in the event that external efficacy
and trust decline to a rebellious or reformative threshold.
Trust in the media is generally statistically significant, but also does not conform to
theory. By and large, trust in the media behaves much as general trust in governance; as trust
rises, external efficacy rises. Surprisingly, however, interpersonal trust (when available for
measurement) tends to lack statistical significance with the notable exception of portions of the
Arab and Afro barometers. This calls into question contentions for general interpersonal trust
being linked to efficacy woes in the presence of corruption, per S. Morris (2009), and S. Morris
& Klesner (2010)40. Why this is the case is an area of future research. If interpersonal trust is
not a significant indicator of external political efficacy when taken on the whole, then perhaps it
is an issue isolated to individual countries and regions; some regions are more homogenous than
others. For example, it may be isolated to Mexico, per S. Morris (2009) or S. Morris & Klesner
(2010), or it could be a matter of general socialization, such as corruption in Tavits (2010). If
anything, the results of this chapter, when taken on the whole, indicate that interpersonal trust is
rarely a statistically significant indicator of external political efficacy and that trust in other
institutions are more substantial. Furthermore, the actual level or branch of government being
trusted is worth further consideration. Repeatedly trust in government at large corresponds to
heightened external efficacy, but judiciaries are repeatedly an exception.
Furthermore, the interaction of media and corruption has mixed statistical significance. It
is far more certain to say that trust in the media is generally a more significant indicator alone of
external efficacy than when interacted. Still, in some circumstances – most notably in the
Americas Barometer consistently – there is statistical significance. The entanglement of trusting

40

This is largely implied due to the damaging effect that corruption has on Mexican democracy, the focus of the
cited studies.
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the media with perceptions of corruption cannot be ignored, at least when it comes to believing
that the government is responsive. Most importantly, however, there is general support for the
idea that there is indeed a watchdog effect as noted by, for example, Power & Taylor (2011).
Unsurprisingly in a literature replete with support for economics and considerations of
personal wellbeing, positive economic appraisals consistently increased with external efficacy.
This bolsters much literature contending the importance of economics; this is merely another
area where economic considerations are given significance (Heineman 2009; Williams 1999b;
Harrison 1999; Moran 1999; Sun 2004; Johnston 2005).
Socioeconomic status, on the other hand, has a more checkered degree of support, though
it is generally consistent with expectations. In Afro, Americas, and Arab barometers an increase
in one’s socioeconomic status corresponds to an increase in external efficacy, but this is not the
case in the Asian barometer. In fact, when statistically significant, often the opposite is true; that
the lower one’s socioeconomic status, the more external efficacy one has. This is highly
unusual, and the implications for socioeconomic status alone demands further research.
The interaction between socioeconomic status and perceptions of corruption is also
generally supported. Furthermore, the theoretical relationship expected, that the rich who view
less corruption will have external efficacy, indicates that, indeed, the wealthy are likely to be
engaged in corrupt activity, generally speaking. Such corruption would be indicative of higher
external efficacy as a matter of course given the nature of the relationship. Quid pro quo is
expected at this level. The findings supporting this contention bolster existing moralist
arguments regarding the state of corruption at large. Ultimately this result is unsurprising but it
is substantively important.
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Regional contexts are likely synonymous with cultural contexts, and differences in how
class is treated around the world clearly has implications for external efficacy. The lack of
Eurobarometer testing is truly unfortunate for this area of research. For North America and
Europe, the economic (and socioeconomic) prominence of these regions would provide far
greater theoretical and empirical clarity into this relationship between socioeconomic status and
external efficacy. Furthermore, the interactions tested with corruption would also be given a
greater testing environment. Generally speaking, the proposed theoretical interaction between
socioeconomic status and perceptions of corruption to external efficacy is empirically supported
by the findings of this chapter. The notion that the wealthier one is, even with higher perceptions
of corruption, that higher one’s external efficacy be – is supportable; certainly, the effect that
perceptions of corruption has on external efficacy will be different based on one’s
socioeconomic status – the typical result being that the rich view corruption far differently than
the poor when it comes to the government being responsive. Based upon the prevailing
evidence, however, whether the country is perceived as doing well economically has far more to
do with external efficacy at large than socioeconomic status or any interaction with it. This begs
the question: is external efficacy a function of general social and economic environments? The
evidence presented would seem to answer ‘yes.’ More than this, however, there are a variety of
intervening factors, such as age, education, and gender. Some more consistently statistically and
substantively important than others.
Furthermore, the unexpected findings in the Asian barometer begs the question of how
the classic patron-client relationship, or clientlelism, operates in this region. Elsewhere in the
world, though admittedly also in a very clear minority of cases in the Asian barometer, the norm
of the wealthier feeling as though they have more say in government holds true. This is
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consistent not just with notions of efficacy or clientelism but also the corruption literature. It is
expected that the wealthier are better able to be represented by virtue of their ability to harness
more financial resources to achieve their goals. The strong presence of communism in the Asian
barometer could very well be the reason behind this regional distinction. This would seem
surprising, however, due to liberalization trends in China – the communist bulwark in that
barometer. Sun’s (2004) contentions that liberalization in China is increasing corruption, or at
least the opportunities for it, would, when coupled with the traditional expectations that come
with corruption in a classical patron-client way, seem to be refuted by the findings of this paper.
For whatever reason, the Asian barometer does not generally conform to theoretical expectations.
This fact alone makes the Asian region more interesting for analysis not just for efficacy and
corruption, but also in the area of the patron-client relationship. Given the importance of
communism on the structural level as discovered in the previous aggregate level chapter, the
investigation into China, in particular, should be given priority in determining why this region
deviates from the norm in terms of socioeconomics and external efficacy.
The link between education and external efficacy is supported in accordance to
theoretical norms; as education increases external efficacy increases. Given the differences
across regions, and even within regions, the rounds or waves, attributing education to external
efficacy consistently is, though generally consistent, dependent upon other potentially mitigating
factors, such as age, socioeconomic status, and general feelings about the state of the economic
at large. The results of this chapter do not exhaust all potential mitigating factors, certainly, but
enough substance is investigated to lend support for the theoretical expectation that education
and external efficacy go together (Bowler & Donovan 2002; Ainsworth 2000).
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Despite the Eurobarometer not being directly tested within this chapter, the European
Union did commission special investigations into corruption within the past few years. The
result of this research culminated in the Anti-Corruption Report published on the 2nd of February,
2014. The results of this report are consistent with the findings of this chapter but only in as far
as trust and confidence in governance. Corruption and perceptions of corruption have degraded
trust generally across the EU at large, but also within many member states – particularly those in
Eastern Europe, which buttresses findings in chapter 4 regarding the significance of possessing a
post-communist legacy. The recommendations of the report are normative in nature and are
generally consistent with how corruption in governments are treated by most around the world; it
is negative, and it treated as a disease to be cured (European Commission, 2014). Given the
findings of this chapter, it is difficult to find fault with the conventional wisdom that corruption
is bad for effective governance. Efficacy, particularly external efficacy, is important for (in
particular) democratic governance, and given statistical significance consistently found here,
governments would seem to have good reason to combat perceptions of corruption that would
contribute to efficacy’s decline.
In summary, findings provide general support for the theory that perceptions of
corruption negatively influence external political efficacy. Moreover, other variables of testing,
such as trust, economics, etc. in accordance with the established literature largely conform to
theoretical expectations.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

“All institutions are prone to corruption and to the vices of their members.”
- Morris West
The conclusions of this essay are multifaceted. First, with regards to aggregate level
variables, perceptions of corruption are not statistically significant indicators of external efficacy.
Instead, the presence of proportional representation within voting systems and whether a country
has a post-communist legacy, indicating woes of democratic transition and crystallization of
norms during regime transition are the leading indicators of external efficacy. This reinforces
existing literature on structural level importance of culture, history, and proportional
representation (Karp & Banducci 2008; Bowler & Donovan 2002; Pop-Eleches 2007; Mishler &
Rose 1999; Tavits 2007b). Taken on the aggregate level, perceptions of corruption find no
support on the aggregate level.
On the individual level, perceptions of corruption find solid ground in its consistent
relationship with external political efficacy. It cannot be given sole credit or influence upon
external efficacy measures, however, as trust in government and presence of a strong economy
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also routinely contribute in a significant way. Still, this does not diminish the impact perceptions
of corruption have upon external efficacy. Normative considerations aside, results particularly
on the individual level demonstrate the relationship that corruption has with efficacy; as
corruption increase, external efficacy decreases. The implications of this are direct and indirect.
Direct implications of corruption’s impact upon external efficacy lies in unpacking what
external efficacy is. It is whether a person feels his or her voices matters in governance, and
ultimately whether government is responsive to him or her. This sort of responsiveness to the
individual is innately important for the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of
democratic thought – or at least governance that attempts to have democratic-like support
(Warren 2004). The results of the aggregate level chapter indicate, particularly when the
definition of democracy is cast wide, that democracy is important for external efficacy. Simply
being in a democracy tends to increase one’s belief that his or her voice matters in governance.
Indeed, the presence of proportional representation further demonstrates the degree of democracy
in its significant contribution to external efficacy. Despite these structural level indicators of
external efficacy, however, perceptions of corruption serve to mitigate it. Should a population
believe that its government is corrupt then external efficacy will decline. This is where the
indirect effects of corruption come to realization.
The deleterious effects of perceived corruption on external efficacy impact governance at
large. For democracies, corruption can contribute to a democratic deficit; or the idea that
democracy as a regime is not responsive to the wills of the citizenry. Now, this sort of deficit
has yet to be fully realized in practical reality for established democracies, but the theoretical
foundation exists. The link that trust has with external efficacy is also important here, as trust
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itself is the bedrock for which effective governance takes place. If trust in government declines
then stability is naturally at risk (see Blais et al. 2005 for a practical example).
This paper has no normative axe to grind, but the findings are consistent with the
conventional wisdom of moralists. As perceptions of corruption rises, external efficacy falls. As
trust rises, external efficacy rises. External efficacy should be as high as possible for any
government to deem itself responsive to its citizenry, and democracies are the theoretical and
philosophical bastions for responsible and responsive governance (Warren 2004; Stewart et al.
1992; Ulbig 2008; Miller & Listhaug 1999; Norris 2012). If governments around the world wish
to promote external efficacy in some way, the least that can be done is curtail corrupt practices
from within.
This study has limitations constraining its conclusions. First and most obvious is in the
exclusion of European states from the individual-level analysis as a result of data availability
limitations. This is unfortunate but unavoidable. Along similar lines are in the non-constant
years for several of the other barometer surveys. Some simply skip years for the pertinent
questions under investigation. This inserts a grain of doubt into the applicability of findings over
longer periods. The overall findings are generally consistent, but having a wider range of
consistent survey years would have been preferable.
Another admitted limitation is in the non-universal measurement of each variable. A
potential way around this would have been to use the World Values Survey, similar to Norris
(2011), but the number of available countries and short number of available years dissuades the
WVS’s use. Ideally, universal measurements of all pertinent trust, confidence, efficacy, and
corruption variables will be used and surveyed across as many countries as possible and with
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consistency in wording. This ideal has yet to come to pass and is a natural suggestion or future
research. Still, this essay is the broadest of its kind even with the data limitations.41
The various theories discussed in this essay are far reaching in scope. Until now, most of
those theories were handled with smaller regional studies or faced similar data constraints as this
paper did when attempting to expand to a greater number (such as S. Morris 2009; S. Morris &
Klesner 2010; Tavits 2010; Kee 2003; Sun 2004; Peters & Welch 1980). The testing of so many
countries on both the aggregate and the individual level provides the most in-depth test of these
theories to date. The results and methods are not perfect or need not be updated. Quite the
contrary, the expansion of this study, particularly into Europe, would be most useful; but this is
the most up-to-date and broadest study conducted yet. In the future, again given more ideal data
conditions, tests should absolutely be conducted again and over a longer stretch of time. Until
then, however, this paper should be taken alongside those that have come before it as another
step in that direction of expanding the breadth of analysis while still accounting for differences
across regions and countries.
The theoretical implications of this essay’s findings are several-fold. First, and perhaps
most importantly, is the conditional link established between external efficacy and perceptions of
corruption. On the structural level, proportional representation and historical legacies are far
more important a consideration on efficacy measures than corruption is. This makes sense when
these two variables are examined more closely. Direct democracy, or degrees of it, are indicative
of the level of control and influence that the citizenry has over the government. For control to be
exercised more directly a population will see itself as having a greater voice – and for all
practical purposes, this is because it does. The structure itself is enabling this idea. For
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Anderson & Tverdova (2003) is the next broadest study in the relevant literature with sixteen (16) countries
studied worldwide.
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structures that have less direct means control or less proportional electoral arrangements, the
fullest extent of diverse opinions throughout the population cannot be fully represented. The
result is in a smaller, even if it represents a majority, population exercising practical power in
government. When this happens, external efficacy decreases – and this is unsurprising. The
structure itself, again, is directly contributing to the influence and control of the citizenry beyond
elites that exercise control in all systems of governance as a routine matter of course.
On the individual level, the findings of this paper buttress intuitive connections between
trust, corruption, and efficacy. Surprisingly from the trust arena is in the consistent lack of
statistical significance in interpersonal measures. From the perspective of social capital theorists
this is unexpected, indeed. Trust and corruption of the government are significant indicators of
efficacy – and this suggests that, particularly when interpersonal trust is accounted for, citizens
are distinguishing between trust in others and trust in institutions or politicians. Trust in
everyone does not decline simply because trust in a government entity does. In other words,
citizen trust or mistrust is not a phenomenon that travels all at once; there is variation and
distinction between those in government and people at large.
The second practical and theoretical implication is in the realm of education. Within the
literature, education is typically attributed with external efficacy. As education increases so too
does external efficacy. The findings of the individual level analysis show this to be very
conditional depending upon the region of study. In some, education indeed behaves as one
would expect, such as in Asia – and in others it does not, such as in the Arab world. This
distinction should be accounted for in future studies of efficacy, particularly those that would
seek to uniformly apply education cross-nationally. This must be conducted with caution. It is
clear that in some regions education is indeed an important indicator whereas in others it is not;
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reasons for this are varied, but it is likely that a cultural influence is at work. Is education more
important in other areas of the world with regards to access to government? This seems likely,
but is not directly investigated by this paper. It is worth noting and exploring in the future to
uncover why there are regional differences between the education variable.
Another implication of the findings of this study regard the inconsistent statistical
significance and directionality of law enforcement, both in terms of police forces and judiciaries.
The differences between regions are notable, but even between individual barometers of the
same region there are occasional differences in this judicial area. The question that begs to be
asked is why? In particular, why is directionality inconsistent? Is this, perhaps, where
indiscretion is occurring in judiciaries? Law and order, or perhaps a lack thereof, and corruption
go hand in hand – and as findings indicate, corruption does as well with external efficacy. This
judicial area and the inconsistency found represents an avenue of research ripe for exploration.
Why does this occur? Is it dependent upon region? Culture? Structural differences in the
judicial systems themselves? These questions are open for investigation.
In the realm of economics, the findings of this paper are unsurprising, and the
ramifications of these findings are consistent with the literature. When the economy does well
people generally believe that their voices count in government and that the government is
responsive to them; external efficacy increases. This provides further evidence for the idea that
as long as the economy does well people are satisfied; or in the words of former American
President Clinton, “It’s the economy, stupid!” A matter worth exploring is the relation of
liberalism with efficacy; if it truly is the economy that matters, perhaps the liberal philosophies
of market organization and protection of individual economic and property rights matter more to
efficacy than political issues. The aggregate level analysis of this paper, however, does not give
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credence to this idea. Structurally speaking, historical legacies and direct democratic governance
through ‘more’ democratic electoral arrangements matter more to external efficacy than
economic freedom. What was not measured was economic performance. Perhaps it is economic
performance that is important and not necessarily the degree of economic freedom. This is an
area that could use more examination on the structural level. Certainly, one would expect that as
economic freedom increases so too does economic performance, but there may exist variation,
particularly amongst the Western world between liberal democracies and social democracies.
Media influence on external efficacy is conditional upon several factors. First, whether
media is separated into various kinds, such as newspaper or television; and second, what region
is under examination. In the Americas, for example, media is not given further categorization,
whereas in Asia it is separated into newspapers and television. Using these examples, in the
Americas trust in mass media increases as external efficacy increases, yet in Asia this is not the
case; it is dependent on the kind of media being examined. Trust in newspapers in Asia leads to
decreased external efficacy; this suggests that the newspapers themselves are likely demoralizing
and critical if not merely revealing how little power the general population has during the
newspaper coverage. The effect of decreased external efficacy could simply be a case of
information provided by this medium goes more in-depth on issues or the true power players
behind them. Whatever the reason, the implication of this difference between newspapers and
television in Asia is open for further investigation. Content analysis would likely prove a highly
fruitful qualitative endeavor.
Socioeconomic status largely conforms to the norm that the richer a person gets, the more
he or she feel as though the government is responsive to them. This is consistent with the
clientelistic view of politics and corruption. It is typically the rich who would engage in and,
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arguably get away with, clandestine activities that would result in the government providing
them with advantages. These advantages would translate into higher external efficacies as a
matter of course. Perhaps the most interesting finding regarding socioeconomics, however, is
not within the majority, but in the exception – the Asian barometer countries. Here the norm is
not followed, and this is peculiar. Could it be the communist legacy of China that suppresses or
mitigates the socioeconomic findings in this region? Perhaps. Why this region differs requires
more investigation. Furthermore, given the majoritarian findings of the paper in favor of the
norm, this unexpected deviation may simply be an artifact of the data limitations present here.
The time period of analysis, included countries – of which change between the waves – could all
be driving factors into why this region is not consistent. In the future, additional testing of this
region should be conducted to verify this unusual finding.
The theoretical interaction between perceptions of corruption and trust in the media has
highly contextual results. For the Arab Barometer countries, for example, the interaction is only
statistically significant in the OLS model testing the region at large. Moreover, in Asia,
interaction between perceptions of corruption at the local level and newspapers are statistically
significant whereas nationally and with television it is either not, or is at least inconsistently so.
The differences between the waves are also noteworthy, and the interaction results are
inconsistent not only across waves but across regions. In the African Barometer no media
variable was even tested. The conclusions from this are tentative; it can be safely asserted that
such an interaction between perceptions of corruption and trust in media are contextual, but
confidence cannot be given as to when or where such contexts would appear consistently. The
Arab barometer and thus the Arab world is the most consistent, but even so the differences
between the survey rounds make predictability in the future difficult to recommend or assert.
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More investigation into this relationship is advised. Quantitatively this relationship stands ripe
for further testing, but the qualitative angle should not be ignored. The one conclusion that can
be definitively drawn is that the contextual nature of this relationship does seem isolated to
particular cases and times. If, for example, in the Arab world, this relationship was particularly
pertinent during the years of study and with the countries included during this time period, then
perhaps these countries should be isolated and studied more in-depth. Case studies from this
region would likely provide fruitful context to fill out this area of research in the future.
The interaction between socioeconomic status and perceptions of corruption is also
largely contextual. Support is mostly found in the Arab and Asian barometers, and even so, the
theoretical expectation that as socioeconomic status increases external efficacy does is not
supported universally; though it is in the majority of cases as mentioned earlier. The opposite
finding is present in the Asian Barometer; as socioeconomic status decreases external efficacy
increases where statistically significant in this regions. Interaction between perceptions of
corruption and judges/magistrates in the Afrobarometer is also statistically significant in the OLS
interaction model, but little other support is found for this relationship. Generally speaking, the
conclusion for a potential interaction between socioeconomic status and perceptions of
corruption as it relates to external political efficacy is largely null. When tested, socioeconomic
status and perceptions of corruption are generally not statistically significant. Socioeconomic
status alone is far more important, empirically, it seems, than an interaction. Implicitly it seems
natural to assume that socioeconomic status and external efficacy are positively correlated due to
corrupt activities, but as tested here this is not the case.
On the whole, the primary research question of this paper in determining the relationship,
if any, between perceptions of corruption and external political efficacy is successful. In much
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of the individual level analysis, perceptions of corruption are statistically significant indicators of
external political efficacy and traveled in the expected direction; lower corruption is higher
external efficacy. This provides further practical benefits beyond the purely normative realm to
the political science literature. The substantive contribution that efficacy has with democratic
norms and voting behaviors now permits perceptions of corruption a seat at the table. Though
perceptions of corruption may not factor as the most important, statistically important variable
consistently across all regions and times, it behaves in such a way as to confidently advise its
inclusion in future research in related areas.
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For the Corruption Perceptions Index, TI’s own website states the following regarding its
formulation:
The CPI scores and ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt a country’s public sector is
perceived to be. It is a composite index, a combination of surveys and assessments of corruption,
collected by a variety of reputable institutions. The CPI is the most widely used indicator of
corruption worldwide. - See more at:
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/in_detail/#sthash.m0bVM3b9.dpuf (Transparency
International , 2014).
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1. Barometer Wording for Efficacy Questions
i. Eurobarometer: “My voice counts in (OUR COUNTRY).” Begins in
2008 with question A15A_5. Does not include the question regarding
whether a person’s voice counts in the European Union as a whole. This
paper is only interested in country-level responses.
1. Scale: 1 = agree, 0 = disagree.
2. EB Standard Barometer rounds with this question: 69, 70, 71, 73,
74. These represent the following years: 2008, 2009, 2010.
3. EB rounds 77 and 78 also use the question by the looks of their
published reports, but their codebooks are not yet finished to verify
which variables are for political efficacy.
ii. Arab Barometer: R1 (Q2511): “Citizens have the power to influence the
policies and activities of the government.” This serves as the best proxy
available from the Arab Barometer. For R2 (Q519.1): “Citizens have the
ability to influence government policies.”
1. R1 Scale: 1-4, 1 being strongly agree, 4 being don’t agree at all.
2. R2 Scale: 1-4, 1 being strongly agree, 4 being strongly disagree.
3. Recoded for individual level: 1 being strongly disagree, 4 for
strongly agree.
iii. Afrobarometer: “How easy or difficult is it for an ordinary person to
have his voice heard between elections?” Again, this is the best proxy;
similar in wording to the Eurobarometer. Uses Q74 in Round 4.
1. Scale: 1-4, 1 being very difficult, 4 being easy.
iv. Asian Barometer: Round 1, Q129: “People like me don't have any
influence over what the government does.”
1. Scale: 1-4, 1 being strongly agree, 4 being strongly disagree.
2. Round 2, Q107: “People like me can have an influence on
government.”
a. Note: Despite question being in the codebook it is not
present in the dataset.
3. Round 3, Q113: “How well do you think the government responds
to what people want?”
a. Scale: 1-4, 1 being very responsive, 4 being not very
responsive at all.
b. Recoded for individual level: 1 for not very responsive at
all, 4 being very responsive.
v. Americas Barometer EFF1: “Those who govern this country are
interested in what people like you think.”
1. Scale: 1-7, 1 being strongly disagree, 7 being strongly agree.
2. Aggregated Data
i. Downloaded all relevant data sets from respective sources; barometers,
indices, etc.
ii. Aggregated efficacy scales to the Eurobarometer binary standard.
iii. Excel files contain all relevant data for aggregate data. Available upon
request for reproduction or further research purposes.
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3. General Barometer Notes
i. For Eurobarometer, rounds 77 and 78 from 2012 are not yet finished
archiving as of the time of writing. As a result no codebook is available
for download to locate the appropriate efficacy questions. 2012 is thus
excluded from study.
4. Individual Level Questions
i. AfroBarometer, R4: 2008
1. Note: Corruption questions are selected for covering each area of
government: executive, legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic.
Uses a 0-3 scale, where 0 is “none” and 3 is “all.”
2. Q50A: “How many of the following people do you think are
involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to
say: The President and Officials in his/her Office?” Uses a 0-3
scale, where 0 is “none” and 3 is “all.”
3. Q50B: “How many of the following people do you think are
involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to
say: Members of Parliament?”
4. Q50D: “How many of the following people do you think are
involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to
say: Government Officials?”
5. Q50E: “How many of the following people do you think are
involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to
say: Police?”
6. Q50G: “How many of the following people do you think are
involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to
say: Judges and Magistrates?”
7. Note: Trust covers governance, interpersonal, political parties, and
law enforcement. Uses a 0-3 scale, where 0 is “none” and 3 is “a
lot.”
8. Q49A: “How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t
you heard enough about them to say: The President?”
9. Q49B: “How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t
you heard enough about them to say: Parliament?”
10. Q49E: “How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t
you heard enough about them to say: The Ruling Party?”
11. Q49F: “How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t
you heard enough about them to say: Opposition Political Parties?”
12. Q49G: “How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t
you heard enough about them to say: The Police?”
13. Q49H: “How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t
you heard enough about them to say: Courts of law?”
14. Q84A: “How much do you trust each of the following types of
people: Your relatives?”
15. Q84B: “How much do you trust each of the following types of
people: Other people you know?”
16. Note: Gender, age questions for control.
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17. Q101: Respondent’s Gender
a. 1 = male, 2 = female
b. Recoded 0 for male, 1 for female.
18. Q1: “How old are you?”
a. Simple number entry.
19. Note: Economics
20. Q4A: “In general, how would you describe: The present economic
condition of this country?”
a. Scale: 1=Very bad, 2=Fairly bad, 3=Neither good nor bad,
4=Fairly good, 5=Very good, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused
to answer, -1=Missing data
21. Q89: “What is the highest level of education you have completed?”
a. Scale: 0-9, 0 being no formal schooling, 9 being postgraduate schooling.
22. Q4b: “In general, how would you describe: Your own present
living conditions?”
a. Scale: 1-5, 1 being very bad, 5 being very good.
ii. Americas Barometer, merged 2004-2012 dataset
1. Note: Corruption, trust, and economy questions. Includes
governance, media, law enforcement, and interpersonal.
2. IT1: “And speaking of the people from around here, would you say
that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat
trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...?”
a. Scale: 1-4, 1 being most trustworthy, 4 being least
trustworthy.
3. Note: Scale is from 1-7, 1 being “not at all” and 7 being “a lot.”
4. B10A: “To what extent do you trust the justice system?”
5. B13: “To what extent do you trust the National Legislature?”
6. B18: “To what extent do you trust the National Police?”
7. B21: “To what extent do you trust the political parties?”
8. B21A: “To what extent do you trust the President/Prime
Minister?”
9. B31: “To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?”
10. B37: “To what extent do you trust the mass media?”
11. B47A: “To what extent do you trust elections in this country?”
12. N15: “To what extent would you say that the current
administration is managing the economy well?”
13. Note: Corruption question includes both experiences of and
perceptions of corruption.
a. Scale: 1-4, 1 being most common, 4 being most
uncommon.
14. EXC7: “Taking into account your own experience or what you
have heard, corruption among public officials is”
15. Note: Sex, age, education questions.
16. SEXI: 1 for male, 2 for female; recoded 0 for male, 1 for female.
17. ED: “How many years of schooling have you completed?”
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18. Q2: “On what day, month and year were you born?”
a. Note: Used to calculate age; if no specific date of birth was
given then a simple age was requested and reported.
19. Q10NEW: “Into which of the following income ranges does the
total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances
from abroad and the income of all the working adults and
children?”
a. Note: The measure is constructed relatively; each country
is given unique income categories, but the scale remains the
same; the higher the level (0-16) the higher the income
bracket.
b. Note: Dropped from the models, but kept here to show
what the preferred variable would have been had there been
more data. Q10d was the categorical alternative, but can’t
be used in linear regression.
c. Scale: 00 (no income) – 16 (customized highest income
level).
20. Idio1: “How would you describe your overall economic situation?
Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad,
bad or very bad?”
a. Scale: 1 being very good, 5 being very bad.
21. Clien1: “In recent years and thinking about election campaigns,
has a candidate or someone from a political party offered you
something, like a favor, food, or any other benefit or object in
return for your vote or support? Has this happened often,
sometimes or never?”
a. Scale: 1, often, 2, sometimes, 3, never.
22. Exc2: “Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve
months?”
a. Scale: 0, no, 1, yes.
23. Exc6: “In the last twelve months, did any government employee
ask you for a bribe?”
a. Scale: 0, no, 1, yes.
iii. Arab Barometer R1 2006-7
1. Note: Corruption, trust, and economy questions. Includes
governance, media, law enforcement, and interpersonal.
2. 253q: “Here are some statements that describe how widespread
corruption and bribe taking are in all sectors in [respondent’s
country]. Which of the following statements reflects your own
opinion the best?”
a. Scale: 1-4, 1 being little to no corruption, 4 being almost
everyone is corrupt.
b. 201q: “I’m going to name a number of institutions. For
each one, please tell me how much trust you have in them.
Is it a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much
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trust, or none at all?” Scale: 1-4, 1 being a great deal, 4
being none at all.
i. q2011: Prime Minister
ii. q2012: The Courts
iii. q2013: Parliament
iv. q2014: The Police
v. q2015: Political Parties
c. 204q: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people
can be trusted?”
i. 1-2 scale, 1 being “Most people can be trusted” and
2 being “You must be very careful in dealing with
people”
d. 247q: “Now let’s speak about the present government in
this country. How well or badly would you say the current
government is handling the following matters:” Scale of 14, 1 being very good, 4 being very bad; 5 is included to
state that it’s not the government’s job to do it.
i. Q2471: Managing the Economy
e. Q702: Sex: 1 for male, 2 for female; recoded 0 for male, 1
for female.
f. Q703: Education: scale of 1-7, 1 being illiterate, 2
elementary, 3 primary, 4 secondary, 5 college diploma –
two years, 6 BA, 7 MA or higher.
g. 701q: “Age”
i. Simple number; age in years.
h. Q716withoutmorocco: “Individual monthly income (in
local currency)”
iv. Arab Barometer R2 2010-11
1. Note: Corruption, trust, and economy questions. Includes
governance, media, law enforcement, and interpersonal.
2. Q210: “Do you think that there is corruption within the state’s
institutions and agencies?”
a. Coded 1 for yes, 2 for no.
3. Q101: “How would you evaluate the current economic situation in
your country?”
a. Scale 1-4, 1 being very good, 4 being very bad.
4. Q103: “Generally speaking, do you think most people are
trustworthy or not?”
a. Coded 1 for “Most people are trustworthy” and 2 for “Most
people are not trustworthy.”
5. Q201: “I will name a number of institutions, and I would like you
to tell me to what extent you trust each of them:”
a. Scale: 1-4, 1 being most trust, 4 being no trust.
b. Q201.1: The government (the cabinet).
c. Q201.2: The judiciary (the courts).
d. Q201.4: Public security (the police).
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6. Q401: “To what extend to you think that the local media is ‘fair
and honest in covering the news’ currently?”
a. Scale: 1-4, 1 being great extent, 4 being never fair or
honest.
b. Q401.1: “Fair and honest in presenting the news.”
7. Q1002: Gender: 1 for male, 2 for female; recoded 0 for male, 1 for
female.
8. Q1001: Age: Age in years.
9. Q1003: Education, all but Tunisia
a. Scale: 1-7, 1 being uneducated/illiterate, 7 being MA and
above.
10. Q1015: “The respondent’s Monthly income in 2011 US Dollars”
v. Asian Barometer W1
1. Note: Corruption, trust, and economy questions. Includes
governance, media, law enforcement, and interpersonal.
2. Q115: “How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking
are in the national government?”
a. Scale: 1-4, 1 being almost everyone is corrupt, 4 being
hardly anyone is corrupt.
3. Q114: “How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking
are in your local/municipal government?”
a. Same scale as above.
4. Q131: “You can generally trust the people who run our
government to do what is right”
a. Scale: 1-4, 1 being strongly agree, 4 being strongly
disagree
5. Q007: “Trust in the Courts”
a. Scale: 1-4, 1 being none at all, 4 being a great deal
6. Q008: “Trust in the national government”
7. Q009: “Trust in Political parties”
8. Q013: “Trust in the police”
9. Q015: “Trust in newspaper”
10. Q016: “Trust in television”
11. Q001: “How would you rate the overall economic condition of our
country today?”
a. Scale: 1-5, 1 being very bad, 5 being very good
12. Q004: “As for your own family, how do you rate your economic
situation today?”
a. Scale is same as Q001.
13. SE002: “Gender” 1 for male, 2 for female; recoded 0 for male, 1
for female.
14. SE003a: “Age” – stated in years.
15. SE005: “Education”
a. Scale: 1 – 11, 1 being no formal education, 11 being ‘other’
but above a post-graduate degree.
16. SE009: “Household Income”
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a. Scale: 1-5, 1 being lowest, 5 being highest.
vi. Asian Barometer W3
1. Note: Corruption, trust, and economy questions. Includes
governance, media, law enforcement, and interpersonal.
2. Q116: “How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking
are in your local/municipal government? Would you say …?”
a. Scale: 1-4, 1 being hardly anyone is corrupt, 4 being almost
everyone is corrupt.
3. Q117: “How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking
are in the national government [in capital city]? Would you say
…?”
a. Same scale as above.
4. Q7: “I'm going to name a number of institutions. For each one,
please tell me how much trust do you have in them? Trust in The
president (for presidential system) or Prime Minister (for
parliamentary system) [Trust in Prime Minister or president]”
a. Scale: 1-4, 1 being a lot, 4 being none.
b. Q8: “Trust in the Courts”
c. Q9: “Trust in the national government”
d. Q10: “Trust in political parties”
e. Q14: “Trust in the police”
f. Q16: “Trust in newspapers”
g. Q17: “Trust in television”
5. Q1: “How would you rate the overall economic condition of our
country today?”
a. Scale: 1-5, 1 being very good, 5 being very bad.
6. Q4: “As for your own family, how do you rate your economic
situation of your family today?”
a. Same scale as above.
7. Q23: “General speaking, would you say ‘Most people can be
trusted’ or ‘that you must be very careful in dealing with people’?”
a. Scale: 1-2: 1 being most people can be trusted, 2 being that
you must be very careful in dealing with people.
8. SE2: “Gender”, 1 for male, 2 for female; recoded 0 for male, 1 for
female.
9. SE5: “Education”
a. Scale: 1-10, 1 being no formal education, 10 being postgraduate education.
b. Note: 11-17 are repeats of the lower scale; 11 is illiterate.
It is unclear why the scale, which seemingly completes
from 1-10, repeats itself with some basic variation up until
17.
10. SE3a: “Real Age” – calculated age, in years, of respondent, based
upon answered birthdate in SE3.
11. Se13: “Household Income”
a. Scale: 1-5, 1 being lowest, 5 being highest.
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Note: Data files available upon request; formats are in MS Excel and STATA 13.
1. Efficacy – gauged using Barometer surveys.
2. Corruption – Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI);
scale of 0 – 100, 100 being least corrupt, 0 being most corrupt.
3. Democracy – In models 1-3, a dummy variable for democracy. 1 is democracy, 0
is non-democracy. Uses Freedom House scoring; free and partially free are coded
1, not free is coded 0.
4. EconomicFreedom – Uses the Economic Freedom Index by the Heritage
Foundation. Uses a 0 – 100 scale, 100 being most free, 0 being least free.
5. PressFreedom – Uses the Press Freedom Index from Reporters Without Borders,
0 – over 100, where 0 is least oppressed and 100 is most oppressed.
vii. The scale itself is generally 0-100, but there are certain years that contain
even higher values, indicating a state of heightened emergency for press
freedom. This is typically indicative of a state actively imprisoning,
killing, or torturing reporters during the time of data collection.
6. FedvUni – Dummy variable indicating federal or unitary structure of democracy.
Removed from non-democratic regime model due to unitary assumption of
authoritarian leadership. Coded 1 for federal, 0 for unitary.
7. PresvParl – Dummy variable for presidential or parliamentary government.
Presidential is 1, parliamentary is 0. For democratic model only. Republics are
coded as presidential.
8. SemiPres – Dummy variable for semi-presidential system, namely France. 1 for
semi-presidential, 0 for not. For democratic model only.
9. PR – dummy variable for proportional representation system. 1 if true, 0 if false.
Countries with proportional representation and another form are still counted as
PR. Uses the map from www.fairvote.org as the basis for the PR index.
10. Communist – dummy variable for whether current government is communist. 1
for currently communist.
11. PostCommunist – dummy variable for whether current government was
communist at some point in its history. 1 for communist, 0 if not.
12. FreedomHouse – Uses the 7 point FH scale. 1 is most democratic, 7 is least
democratic. The FH scoring has two categories, an aggregate score is assigned to
each country based on the average between the two scores.
13. GDP – measures GDP per capita at PPP. Reported as a raw number.
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These are the descriptive summary statistics for all variables in the aggregate level
models.
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Year
203
2009.108
1.956983
2001
2012
Country
0 (String)
Efficacy
203
.5561805
.1861217
.111399
.947038
Corruption
200
47.45
20.79639
14
93
Democracy
203
.9408867
.2364197
0
1
EconomicFreedom 200
64.2985
8.200407
29.5
87.5
PressFreedom
198
20.72379
23.54246
-3
136
FedvUni
203
.1083744
.3116211
0
1
PresvParl
195
.6153846
.4877565
0
1
SemiPres
198
.1262626
.3329871
0
1
PR
202
.6386139
.4815957
0
1
FreedomHouse
203
2.270936
1.478557
.5
7
CountryID
203
46.73892
27.13089
1
97
Communist
203
.0147783
.1209628
0
1
PostCommunist
203
.1773399
.3829004
0
1
GDP
196
18382.21
15399.76
454
84393
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1. Consult appendix B, section d for more information on individual questions per
barometer survey.
2. Variable names as appear in Excel and STATA are directly related to their
appropriate question. So in Afrobarometer for example, the corruption variables
are: correxec for corrupt executive, which is Q50A. This follows through with all
other variables.
3. Data files available upon request; formats are in MS Excel 2007
compatible/above and STATA 13.
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APPENDIX F: INDIVIDUAL LEVEL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
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1. Afrobarometer
Variable
Obs
respno
0 (string)
Respondent
27713
Country
27713
Correxec
21573
Correleg
22289
Corrgov
23078
Corrpolice
24049
Corrjudges
22494
Trustexec
26142
trustleg
25606
trustparty
26173
trustoppparty
25453
trustpolice
26778
trustcourts
26105
trustfamily
27600
trustothers
27504
gender
27713
economics
27162
efficacy
26082
round
27713
education
27669
age
27380
Socioeconomics 27563

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

13857
11.20817
1.204932
1.275697
1.418667
1.595077
1.277585
1.857394
1.682692
1.599167
1.224924
1.565763
1.772572
2.449493
1.681246
1.500704
2.529932
2.0342
4
3.153746
36.33185
2.626819

8000.198
5.714211
.8740706
.8196277
.8161295
.8952743
.8630172
1.104888
1.058693
1.12778
1.055383
1.116755
1.052862
.8668689
.9924722
.5000085
1.239694
1.110123
0
2.019172
14.50184
1.172507

1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
4
0
18
1

27713
20
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
9
4
4
9
110
5

2. Americas Barometer
Variable
Obs
Mean
year
151341
2008.198
country
151341
11.96999
Idnum
151341
21681.64
Efficacy
92481
3.335745
Intertrust
146884
2.23955
Trustjustice
143934
3.765462
trustleg
144365
3.648391
Trustpolice
145884
3.816752
Trustparties
147317
3.08853
Trustexec
94498
4.157834
Trustsupcourt
14831
3.829561
Trustmedia
136055
4.641072
Trustelections
101414
4.041069
Economy
5428
3.797818
Corruption
141408
1.805492
sex
58094
1.577771

Std. Dev.
2.564243
8.856723
112032.5
1.936249
.9209151
1.785396
1.832488
1.898846
1.758293
2.04785
1.802193
1.723564
1.921958
1.79843
.8578941
.493919
177

Min
2004
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Max
2012
41
999999
7
4
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
4
2

respondent
Weight1500
Estratopri
Upm
age
Socioeconomics

151341
151341
151341
151341
149403
138114

75671
.9121458
1200.817
3.12e+08
39.02829
3.09335

43688.53
.278554
886.4114
4.32e+09
15.77119
.8453397

1
0
1
1
16
1

151341
2.79
4119
9.03e+10
99
5

3. Arab Barometer R1
Variable
Obs
Mean
ser
6902
794.7231
country
6902
3.604752
efficacy
6386
2.418415
corruption
6430
2.699222
trustexec
6516
2.600675
trustcourts
6466
2.633313
trustleg
6452
2.784098
trustpolice
6577
2.382545
trustparties
6222
3.162167
intertrust
6611
1.727424
economics
6438
2.812985
sex
6899
1.489056
education
6882
3.794391
age
5597
36.17134
Socioeconomics 4282
170872

Std. Dev.
3314.632
1.971459
.9614328
.8385167
1.142963
1.10133
1.105099
1.108576
1.011219
.4453182
.9374432
.4999165
1.745968
13.44192
469717.6

Min
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
18
0

Max
205,100
7
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
2
5
2
7
99
8,000,000

4. Arab Barometer R2
Variable
Obs
Mean
qid
12782
693.7721
country
12782
12.66852
efficacy
12015
2.326592
corruption
11818
1.154595
economics
12596
2.883296
intertrust
12306
1.728588
trustgovt
12356
2.499676
trustcourts
12294
2.315113
trustpolice
12440
2.334646
fairmedia
12386
2.386808
gender
12782
1.482319
age
12732
37.35478
Education
11525
3.90577
Socioeconomics 9854
100484.5

Std. Dev.
497.1025
6.821282
.9665822
.3615332
.8583913
.4447064
1.098286
1.090967
1.082937
.9521369
.4997068
13.43533
1.685629
376874.5

Min
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
18
1
0

Max
9392
22
4
2
4
2
4
4
4
4
2
89
7
9,500,000

5. Asian Barometer Wave 1
Variable
Obs
Mean
country
12217
4.539985

Std. Dev.
2.166882

Min
1

Max
8
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idnumber
efficacy
corrnatlgovt
corrlocalgovt
trustgovt
trustcourts
trustnatlgovt
trustparties
trustpolice
trustnewspapers
trusttv
economics
familyfinances
gender
age
education
Socioeconomics

12217
11565
9067
10898
11506
10951
11487
11475
10960
10603
11671
11990
12188
12209
11033
12171
11259

420880.6
2.309295
2.458807
2.557992
2.489484
2.800384
2.82293
2.604444
2.708577
2.774592
2.953903
2.734279
2.944454
1.516095
44.23412
5.209268
2.884803

1538774
.8057993
.7851875
.7931898
.8172003
.8599479
.9548323
1.041562
.9279744
.8315643
.7941085
1.192723
.8724984
.4997614
14.98606
2.585911
1.465769

0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
18
1
1

9900111
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
2
109
10
5

6. Asian Barometer Wave 3
Variable
Obs
Mean
country
19436
6.458633
idnumber
19436
1.92e+11
efficacy
18330
2.099345
corrlocalgovt
16421
2.400706
corrnatlgovt
14648
2.455352
trustexec
14275
2.405254
trustcourts
18108
2.30169
trustnatlgovt
18576
2.26685
trustparties
18361
2.477915
trustpolice
18858
2.177272
trustnewspapers 18153
2.359665
trusttv
18677
2.235744
economics
19125
3.01715
familyfinances
19362
2.934563
intertrust
18759
1.668319
gender
19419
1.500695
education
19352
5.558185
age
19390
45.09634
Socioeconomics 16709
2.675444

Std. Dev.
3.645182
7.41e+11
.7938911
.801694
.8476813
.8677672
.8498233
.9049654
.9531879
.8216453
.7734417
.7607661
1.078162
.7966049
.4719605
.5000124
2.461995
16.11865
1.330498

Min
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
17
1

Max
13
9.01e+12
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
6
2
10
96
5
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APPENDIX G: FULL COUNTRY LIST & YEARS
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The following countries, and their dates of analysis, are provided below:
Algeria (2006,11), Argentina (2008), Austria (2008-10)
Belgium (2008-10), Belize (2008,10,12), Benin (2008), Bolivia (2008), Botswana (2008), Brazil
(2008,10,12), Bulgaria (2008-10), Burkina Faso (2008)
Cambodia (2012), Cape Verde (2008), Chile (2008), China (2002,8,12), Colombia (2008,10,12),
Costa Rica (2008,10,12), Croatia (2008-10), Cyprus (Republic) (2008-10), Czech Republic
(2008-10)
Denmark (2008-10), Dominican Republic (2008,10,12)
Ecuador (2008,10,12), Egypt (2011), El Salvador (2008,10,12), Estonia (2008-19)
Finland (2008-10), France (2008-10)
Germany (2008-10), Ghana (2008), Greece (2008-10), Guatemala (2008,10,12), Guyana
(2008,10,12)
Haiti (2008,10,12), Honduras (2008,10,12), Hungary (2008-10)
Iceland (2010), Indonesia (2012), Iraq (2011), Ireland (2008-10), Italy (2008-10)
Jamaica (2008,10,12), Japan (2003,12), Jordan (2006,10)
Kenya (2008), (South) Korea (2003,12)
Latvia (2008-10), Lebanon (2007,10), Liberia (2008), Lithuania (2008-10), Luxembourg (200810)
Macedonia (FYROM) (2008-10), Madagascar (2008), Malawi (2008), Malaysia (2012), Mali
(2008), Malta (2008-10), Mexico (2008,10,12), Mongolia (2003,12), Morocco (2006),
Mozambique (2008)
Namibia (2008), Nicaragua (2008,10,12), Nigeria (2008)
Panama (2008,10,12), Paraguay (2008,10,12), Peru (2008,10,12), Philippines (2002,12), Poland
(2008-10), Portugal (2008-10)
Romania (2008-10)
Saudi Arabia (2011), Senegal (2008), Singapore (2012), Slovakia (2008-10), Slovenia (2008-10),
South Africa (2008), Spain (2008-10), Sudan (2011), Sweden (2008-10)
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Taiwan (2001, 12), Tanzania (2008), Thailand (2002, 12), The Netherlands (2008-10), Tunisia
(2011), Turkey (2008-10)
Uganda (2008), United Kingdom (2008-10), United States (2008), Uruguay (2008,10,12)
Venezuela (2008), Vietnam (2012)
Yemen (2011)
Zambia (2008), Zimbabwe (2008).
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APPENDIX H: CLEANLINESS RANKINGS BY TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
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Country
Rank
1
1
3
3
5
5
7
8
9
9
11
12
12
14
15
15
15
18
19
19
21
22
22
22
22
26
26
28
28
30
31
31
33
33
33

Country / Territory
Denmark
New Zealand
Finland
Sweden
Norway
Singapore
Switzerland
Netherlands
Australia
Canada
Luxembourg
Germany
Iceland
United Kingdom
Barbados
Belgium
Hong Kong
Japan
Uruguay
United States
Ireland
Bahamas
Chile
France
Saint Lucia
Austria
United Arab Emirates
Estonia
Qatar
Botswana
Bhutan
Cyprus
Portugal
Puerto Rico
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

DNK
NZL
FIN
SWE
NOR
SGP
CHE
NLD
AUS
CAN
LUX
DEU
ISL
GBR
BRB
BEL
HKG
JPN
URY
USA
IRL
BHS
CHL
FRA
LCA
AUT
ARE
EST
QAT
BWA
BTN
CYP
PRT
PRI
VCT
184

128
196
172
144
142
576
146
138
193
156
137
134
176
112
316
124
532
158
298
111
178
313
228
132
362
122
466
939
453
616
514
423
182
364

Region

IFS Code

WB Code

All rankings are current as of 2013. Table created by Transparency International and can be
found here: http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/ Table reformatted to conform to this
paper.

EU
AP
EU
EU
EU
AP
EU
EU
AP
AM
EU
EU
EU
EU
AM
EU
AP
AP
AM
AM
EU
AM
AM
EU
AM
EU
ME
EU
ME
AF
AP
EU
EU
AM
AM

Country
Rank
1
1
3
3
5
5
7
8
9
9
11
12
12
14
15
15
15
18
19
19
21
22
22
22
22
26
26
28
28
30
31
31
33
33
33

CPI
2013
Score
91
91
89
89
86
86
85
83
81
81
80
78
78
76
75
75
75
74
73
73
72
71
71
71
71
69
69
68
68
64
63
63
62
62
62

36
36
38
38
40
41
41
43
43
45
46
47
47
49
49
49
52
53
53
55
55
57
57
57
57
61
61
63
63
63
66
67
67
69
69
69
72
72
72
72
72
77
77
77
80
80
82
83

Israel
Taiwan
Brunei
Poland
Spain
Cape Verde
Dominica
Lithuania
Slovenia
Malta
Korea (South)
Hungary
Seychelles
Costa Rica
Latvia
Rwanda
Mauritius
Malaysia
Turkey
Georgia
Lesotho
Bahrain
Croatia
Czech Republic
Namibia
Oman
Slovakia
Cuba
Ghana
Saudi Arabia
Jordan
Macedonia
Montenegro
Italy
Kuwait
Romania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Brazil
Sao Tome and Principe
Serbia
South Africa
Bulgaria
Senegal
Tunisia
China
Greece
Swaziland
Burkina Faso

ISR
TWN
BRN
POL
ESP
CPV
DMA
LTU
SVN
MLT
KOR
HUN
SYC
CRI
LVA
RWA
MUS
MYS
TUR
GEO
LSO
BHR
HRV
CZE
NAM
OMN
SVK
CUB
GHA
SAU
JOR
MKD
MON
ITA
KWT
ROM
BIH
BRA
STP
SCG
ZAF
BGR
SEN
TUN
CHN
GRC
SWZ
BFA

185

436
528
516
964
184
624
321
946
961
181
542
944
718
238
941
714
684
548
186
915
666
419
960
935
728
449
936
652
456
439
962
943
136
443
968
963
223
716
965
199
918
722
744
924
174
734
748

ME
AP
AP
EU
EU
AF
AM
EU
EU
EU
AP
EU
AF
AM
EU
AF
AF
AP
EE
EE
AF
ME
EU
EU
AF
ME
EU
AM
AF
ME
ME
EE
EE
EU
ME
EU
EE
AM
AF
EE
AF
EU
AF
ME
AP
EU
AF
AF

36
36
38
38
40
41
41
43
43
45
46
47
47
49
49
49
52
53
53
55
55
57
57
57
57
61
61
63
63
63
66
67
67
69
69
69
72
72
72
72
72
77
77
77
80
80
82
83

61
61
60
60
59
58
58
57
57
56
55
54
54
53
53
53
52
50
50
49
49
48
48
48
48
47
47
46
46
46
45
44
44
43
43
43
42
42
42
42
42
41
41
41
40
40
39
38

83
83
83
83
83
83
83
91
91
91
94
94
94
94
94
94
94
94
102
102
102
102
106
106
106
106
106
111
111
111
114
114
116
116
116
119
119
119
119
123
123
123
123
127
127
127
127
127

El Salvador
Jamaica
Liberia
Mongolia
Peru
Trinidad and Tobago
Zambia
Malawi
Morocco
Sri Lanka
Algeria
Armenia
Benin
Colombia
Djibouti
India
Philippines
Suriname
Ecuador
Moldova
Panama
Thailand
Argentina
Bolivia
Gabon
Mexico
Niger
Ethiopia
Kosovo
Tanzania
Egypt
Indonesia
Albania
Nepal
Vietnam
Mauritania
Mozambique
Sierra Leone
Timor-Leste
Belarus
Dominican Republic
Guatemala
Togo
Azerbaijan
Comoros
Gambia
Lebanon
Madagascar

SLV
JAM
LBR
MNG
PER
TTO
ZMB
MWI
MAR
LKA
DZA
ARM
BEN
COL
DJI
IND
PHL
SUR
ECU
MDA
PAN
THA
ARG
BOL
GAB
MEX
NER
ETH
LWI
TZA
EGY
IDN
ALB
NPL
VNM
MRT
MOZ
SLE
TLS
BLR
DOM
GTM
TGO
AZE
COM
GMB
LBN
MDG

186

253
343
668
948
293
369
754
676
686
524
612
911
638
233
611
534
566
366
248
921
283
578
213
218
646
273
692
644
738
469
536
914
558
582
682
688
724
537
913
243
258
742
912
632
648
446
674

AM
AM
AF
AP
AM
AM
AF
AF
ME
AP
ME
EE
AF
AM
AF
AP
AP
AM
AM
EE
AM
AP
AM
AM
AF
AM
AF
AF
EE
AF
ME
AP
EE
AP
AP
AF
AF
AF
AP
EE
AM
AM
AF
EE
AF
AF
ME
AF

83
83
83
83
83
83
83
91
91
91
94
94
94
94
94
94
94
94
102
102
102
102
106
106
106
106
106
111
111
111
114
114
116
116
116
119
119
119
119
123
123
123
123
127
127
127
127
127

38
38
38
38
38
38
38
37
37
37
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
35
35
35
35
34
34
34
34
34
33
33
33
32
32
31
31
31
30
30
30
30
29
29
29
29
28
28
28
28
28

127
127
127
127
136
136
136
136
140
140
140
140
144
144
144
144
144
144
150
150
150
153
154
154
154
157
157
157
160
160
160
163
163
163
163
167
168
168
168
171
172
173
174
175
175
175

Mali
Nicaragua
Pakistan
Russia
Bangladesh
Côte d´Ivoire
Guyana
Kenya
Honduras
Kazakhstan
Laos
Uganda
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Iran
Nigeria
Papua New Guinea
Ukraine
Guinea
Kyrgyzstan
Paraguay
Angola
Congo Republic
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Tajikistan
Burundi
Myanmar
Zimbabwe
Cambodia
Eritrea
Venezuela
Chad
Equatorial Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti
Yemen
Syria
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Iraq
Libya
South Sudan
Sudan
Afghanistan
Korea (North)
Somalia

MLI
NIC
PAK
RUS
BGD
CIV
GUY
KEN
HND
KAZ
LAO
UGA
CMR
CAF
IRN
NGA
PNG
UKR
GIN
KGZ
PRY
AGO
COG
COD
TJK
BDI
MMR
ZWE
KHM
ERI
VEN
TCD
GNQ
GNB
HTI
YEM
SYR
TKM
UZB
IRQ
LBY

678
278
564
922
513
662
336
664
268
916
544
746
622
626
429
694
853
926
656
917
288
614
634
636
923
618
518
698
522
643
299
628
642
654
263
474
463
925
927

SDN
AFG
PRK
SOM

732
512

187

672

726

AF
AM
AP
EE
AP
AF
AM
AF
AM
EE
AP
AF
AF
AF
ME
AF
AP
EE
AF
EE
AM
AF
AF
AF
EE
AF
AP
AF
AP
AF
AM
AF
AF
AF
AM
ME
ME
EE
EE
ME
ME
AF
ME
AP
AP
AF

127
127
127
127
136
136
136
136
140
140
140
140
144
144
144
144
144
144
150
150
150
153
154
154
154
157
157
157
160
160
160
163
163
163
163
167
168
168
168
171
172
173
174
175
175
175

28
28
28
28
27
27
27
27
26
26
26
26
25
25
25
25
25
25
24
24
24
23
22
22
22
21
21
21
20
20
20
19
19
19
19
18
17
17
17
16
15
14
11
8
8
8

VITA

SEAN BENTZEN
7252 HWY 70 South, #1601, Nashville, TN, 37221 | 615-294-0909 | seanbentzen@comcast.net
EDUCATION
Ph.D., Political Science, University of Mississippi, August 2014
Concentrations: Comparative Political Science, American Political Science
Dissertation: Perceptions of Corruption & External Political Efficacy: Regime Stability &
Democratic Legitimacy
M.A., Political Science, University of Windsor, August 2010
Thesis: Political Scandals and their Consequences: A Comparison of Canada & the United States
B.S., Pre-Law Political Science, Middle Tennessee State University, May 2009
WORK EXPERIENCE
Graduate Instructor, August 2013 – May 2014
University of Mississippi
Course: Introduction to Comparative Politics 102
Graduate Research Assistant, August 2010 – May 2013
University of Mississippi
Department of Political Science
Graduate Assistant, September 2009 – August 2010
University of Windsor
Department of Political Science
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS
National Society of Collegiate Scholars

June 2007 – Present

Golden Key International Honour Society

April 2008 – Present

Pi Sigma Alpha – Political Science Honor Society

April 2008 – Present

Southwestern Political Science Association

February 2013 – Present

CONFERENCES
South Western Political Science Association

San Antonio, April 15-17 2014

Chair of Panel: “Developing Political Attitudes in Comparative Context”
Presented Paper: “Perceptions of Corruption, External Efficacy, and the
Democratic Deficit Phenomenon”
188

